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IKTHOI>UCTI0K
In 1858, Abraham Lincoln declared* *with public
sentiment on its aide, everything succeeds; with public
sentiment against it* nothing succeeds.*
Ours is a government "of the people* by the
people* and for the people. " It follows that Washington
officials are obliged to continuously keep the public
informed of the governraent • s activities* the government of
1970 is vest and complex. Major issues are plagued by
international lay?lieations, domestic conflict* and dis-
agreement—both in and out of official circles—on the
priorities that should be set in conducting government
affairs.
Government officials find it difficult to satisfy
the public's desire for information merely by "disseminat-
ing'* information. Through the media* officials often try
to explain* interpret or clarify decisions made or
positions tartan.
To facilitate the dissemination of information on
military affairs* a central office of information was
crested shortly after the Defense Department was created in
1947. The media have continued to serve &m the channel
1
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3through which flows information on the military establish-
Mint.
The Pentagon
On July 25, 1947* Congress pa«a®a the national
Security Pet* It became affective* after its signing by
President Truman, and on September 17* 1947, Jamas Vincent
Forresta1 was sworn in as the first Secretary of defense*
Created as the "national Military Establishment, * its name
was amended to the "Department of Befense* (DOD) in 1949. 2
The Defense department is headquartered in the
Pentagon* a structure built in the 1940s on the Virginia
side of the Potomac River* The fivewsided structure is the
world's largest office building* housing 7,000 offices and
17% miles of corridors*
The sheer sise of DOB is reflected by these April
1970 figures. 4.6 million employees—a total about the
same as the nation's 30 largest industrial employers;
assets of some 200 billion dollars and expenditures totaling
about 70 billion dollars annually? 200*000 annual major
procurement orders to business? some 100*000 pxism and sub-
contractors x and installations in 50 states and 100 foreign
nations* 3
iMHfft)
Forrestal initially advocated a policy of total
decentralisation of Defense public information operations.
, developing a single* coordinated budget for &0&
u«
3caused friction between military services which exposed the
public to open disputes nod disclosures of classified
information, hu s result* the Defense Secretary moved to
restrict the dissemination of information at the seat of
the government.
On February 4* 1948 • Forrestai instructed the
Military service secretaries* their deputies and the Joint
Chiefs that no articla shall be published* or public
address be delivered* which touched on a "controversial
subject. " Sis pointed out that one such subject was the
btsSeet* 4
*s the result of two separate studies of the public
5information function at the Pentagon* Forrest al established
—July 1948—the position of Assistant to the Secretary*
Office of Public Information (OPX). Harold Hinton. a
member of the Used. Xfi£a\ XJJOSA Washington bureau since 1932*
was appointed to the position.
Hinton established a central press room in the
Pentagon* to serve the three military services and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (06P) as a convenience
to the media and the public. ¥ha services provided part of
the personnel for the consolidated operation mn^ separate
press rooms were abolished. The new information operation
officially opened on August 11* 194S.
Tan days before his retirement* Forrestal issued a








4concept of decentralised information operations* (b) sat up
a functional Office of Public Information* (cj channalad
tha release of all Defense information in Washington
through tha OPX* and (d) restrictad service public informa-
tion offices to merely supervision and coordination of
field installations outside of Washington*
Thus the OPI became the sola agency of the National
Military Establishment at the seat of tha government for
dissemination of information*
On March 18* 1949, William Frye took office as the
first Director of OFI. Ha imposed a personnel ceiling of
110 on the public information organisations of each
service* This included those transferred to 0?I* Each
service was told that no more than 15 of the 110 could be
used to give public relations advice to the service secre-
tary ®n& Chief of Staff or Chief of Haval Operations to
oversee internal departmental operations and to coordinate
public information activities of the field installations*
* return to decentralisation, however* was dictated
by the outbreak of the Korean War* The services were
authorised verbally to recapture the function absorbed tiy
the Forrest a 1 centralisation directive of 1949 and expand
personnel ceilings beyond tha pre*1949 level*
As th^ war worsened and General MacArthur became
increasingly outspoken on politico-military issues*
President Truman (Dec* S« 1950) imposed new retirements
UO*rfJ
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5for advance clearance by the State Department on foreign
policies and tha Defense Department on military policies*
Congress became alarmed at the greatly expanded
military public information activities When in Fiscal Year
1951. the figures reached 3,328 persons and 12, 286* 000
dollars. Beginning in FY 1952 through 1959, limits were
imposed and lowered each year* The estimated figures
dropped to 1,039 persons and 4,795,000 dollars in FY 1953
to 515 pmxmon* and 3,000,000 dollars by FY 1958. After
repeated pleas by DGD, Congress abolished the limitation
beginning with the FY I960 budget*
In >pril 1953, secretary of Defense Charles Wilson
revived Forrestal's centralisation directive* ftm public
information function was elevated to the assistant Secre-
tary of Defense (*SD) level* The function of public
information and legislative liaison was placed under the
*«D for Legislative and Public Affairs. Fred Beaton was
appointed to this position on Sept* 15, 1953. The two
functions were separated on March 21, 1957, and Murray
Snyder was appointed the first Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Fublic *ffairs)-~*SD<F*>.
In August 1956, Wilson appointed Charles Coolidge,
former ASD, to head a committee on classified information*
The committee reported (Hov. 1956) that DOD both withheld
too much information and gave out too much information or
"ovarclassificatien and deliberate unauthorised
•i -
'-




This camrcittee also offered some views on bow to
control press intervi**ws with military officials. Xt was
suggested that all interviews by the press with 1900
officials should be arranged through the G*I* and if so
requested by the person to be interviewed* a representative
of that office should attend the interview. There are
striking similarities between this provision and Arthur
Sylvester's 1962 interview monitoring directive which
caused such controversy through the 1960s*
in the 13 years leading up to I960, centralisation
of the public information activities by OSD became a
permanent feature of unification* However* greater
"unification" and tighter control over military information
and organisations came under the strong hand of Defense
Secretary Robert HeNanara during the sixties*
Public Mood Toward Military
Changes During the 1960s
The period 1960 through 1970 was a decade of change
in the public's attitude toward the military. The mood of
the American people* both young and old* became one of
confusion* distrust* and criticism toward their government's
Defense arm* The Vietnam conflict ^mi the "military-
industrial complex" syndrome changed the public's mood~~as
reflected through Congress—from one of "give 'are anything"





7The mm mood of tin* citisanry placee a greater
burden (a) on the military correspondents to interpret
events and policies to the public, (b) on the Congress to
question and criticise DGL to appease their constituents*
sad (c) on the Defense public affairs officer tasked with
the responsibility both of defending and explaining mili-
tary actions.
In 1970, more than ever before* Defense officials
operate on the defensive and spend much of their ti»e
reacting to public criticism sad questioning by unfriendly
congressional committees.
In June 1970* two veteran Washington military cor-
respondents made the following observations on the change
in public mood toward the military
i
I think something has happened in DOD that bears on
the question over the years* First* I suspect the
public may be a little bored with Defense information*
Second* the word *atomic used to be magic i not any
more. The public *s receptivity has diminished •&
mno %Fm**e^Pm» W^eeVam e
* reflection of the mood toward the military is
that when Admiral Moorer was appointed Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs* his picture was not on any cover of a
national magasine. This wouldn't have happened ten
years ago. There are not any World War XI heroes any
more. The public is just not interested. They
probably don't even know who Admiral Moorer is* General
Westmoreland maybe* because of his Vietnam tour. But
others have dropped out of the public eye. 7
Another regular described how this need is
reflected in the pxmmmt
On one hand* an editor will say the Pentagon* white






8in i>. C. Vet, when you see the amount of explanatory
space on DQD news* tharVs net as such there as thers
was ton years ago* • . . We've become so polarised in
this country ever Vietnam and the military-industrial
complex that we are "issue-oriented" in tha proas.
Unless there's a not centroversy_#oing on* ***** not
_
interested, for instance* *m 2*nti-b*lli»ti« missile/
is a political story; tha press prints that l»aire says
something* then that Proxmire says something, tfa never
90 into the facts on ASM—its drawbacks in the military
sense* This is a great reporting flaw and leaves the
reader confused as hell**
af Study
The main purposes of this study area (1) to estab-
lish how Washington solitary news correspondents evaluate
their sources of Defense information* (2) to identify the
barriers* as perceived by these reporters* in the news*
gathering process that hinder the free flow of military
information from COD to the public through the media* (3)
to ascartain how Pentagon newsmen assasst (a) Dafanse
public affairs organisations* (b) DGO news policies and
procedures* and (c) Pantagon officials in 1970? and (4) to
determine who the military correspondents are* how they
evaluate the performance and caliber of other Washington
newsmen* and how they report en the military beat.
* secondary objective, was to determine what was
written about Defense news policies and the Pentagon press
corps during the sixties.
Basic questions weret
(*) 8SBMQNL* What newa sources generally are of
greatest inportanee to military correspondents?
Which sources are aost "preferred" and which are
m :**-
most oftan "utilised"? How do reporters evaluate
the ai^ni fie anc«j and volume of information received
from *aeh of 15 nawe sources available?
(b) AftlllBi&i What are the thr«* greatest obstacles?
What or who caused them? Sow do they affect the
reporter's nswsgathcritig techniques?
C^m \ i^t>awwuaamtr #mm^mi<aiii ^#^e.< j^etMnrflfe% Mt W%mmtfl «*. m^^a^ <fll a* m ^m *• ^— —^ I U<Sk Vf'' HB&K IHIIMmBT UMa lllFK.IIf 1 i£ ] mHB^MB CHSbB ^P VHA>
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Pontagon press corps evaluate current defense news
policies and procedures? What affect does the
Mc&amara-8ylvaster philosophy toward news dis-
semination in tha sixties hav* on public affairs
activities in 1970? How do newsman view 80S*
officials (military and civilian) with respect to
accessibility* credibility* and productivity? Has
gathering information on Defense affairs baccate
wore difficult during the last ten years? What
affect has mussling tha military during the sixties
had on military officials i.n 1970?
(d) tmk ora«rfifnMilT' Sow does he cover the Pentagon?
How does he evaluate the genarallst reporter*
performance of other newsmen* and the caliber of
the corps of regulars at £QE> with tha Washington
press corps? How has the composition of the press
corps changed in th« last ten years? Bo military
correspondents of 1970 endorse basic criticisms
mads by the general media against &OP information
policies* such asi (a) Defease officials routinely
mmm&><-> - •- i -- --" **
lITfltf - , " (•)
Lfe
io
lie to the public and the press? (b) news manage-
ment is the greatest problem for Pentagon
reporters r and (e) the corpa of military corre-
spondents is a "kept* prssss.
iiginiflfiftncwi
In I960* G«orye Underwood completed a study of the
featagon press corps. The Washington Military Corre-
spondents" (unpublished master *m thesis. University of
Wisconsin) narrowed Leo Eosten's 1937 work, 20m SfaahiBgfcoa
9Correspondent^ to include just Defense reporters.
Underwood's study was the first and only critical analysis
of this corps of Washington newsmen.
The purpose of Underwood's study was to describe
sad analyse t (1) how Washington military correspondents
operate? (2) what problems they encounter In gathering
military n«*rsr (3) what education and journalistic experi-
ence they have had; and (4) what opinions they held on
controversial military issues.
Underwood gathered most of his data by mail-
questionnaires in March 1960. Thirty-nine reporters parti-
cipated in hia study. Thirty-one were members of the
Pentagon press corps, two were former members, two were
military specialists outside of Washington, one was a
Defense specialist in Washington, another was a roving
military feature writer for the Associated Prass, one ^n




Eight correspondent* who were part of the I960
Pentagon pr**»» corps are still covering the military beat
in 1970. (They all participated in this 1970 study.)
In the spring 1965 issue of £&lUKfei& ilfaiimflli—
Jules witcover. former Pentagon correspondent*
authored an article on the military correspondents* "The
10
Surliest Crew in Washington. **
Underwood's sad Witcover's efforts were the only
two works devoted to describing this corps of Washington
newsmen* only one of which was published.
Since Underwood completed his study* the Defense
Department has undergone great changes in its information
function. This was due primarily to the personal philos-
ophy of Defense Secretary Mewamara and his *$&{»*) * Arthur
Sylvester. Procedures they implemented have generally
remained the same through the mtid of the decade.
The 1960s were filled with press criticism of the
Pentagon's news policies. The key issues weres news
management* mussXing the military's voice* executive privi-
lege* overolassification* freedom of information* the
government's right to lie* news weaponry concept* and the
overall tightening of the flow of Defense news under the
centralised DQD Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Public Rffairs)—0*SD(P*) .




of material was written curing the sixties an Defense new*
policies. Frew extensive r*vi«*w by the author of secondary
source material it la apparent that a vast amount of
diversified material was written * about" the Pantagon as a
beat or source? "about" tha barriers in •gathering military
information and reporting Defense news; and finally, "about*
military correspondents—aspecially the regulars.
This research also revealed two key weaknesses in
what tha public and those in the journalism community have
been exposed to in this context t (a) tha majority of
related material was authored by media representatives who
had little or no diruct association with the Pentagon; many
had never actually covered COD—thus their views were
likely based on hearsay or personal opinions, rather than
first-hand experience; and (b) while journalists were quick
to jump on the bandwagon of criticism during the sixties,
little effort was made to establish how military corre-
spondents themselves viewed the whole newsgatherlng process
at the Pentagon, and more specifically, the flow of infor-
mation from COD to the public through the media,
A basic drawback to Underwood's study is he did not
distinguish between regulars, irregulars, and military
journal correspondents in the presentation of his data. In
addition, his sample included several reporters who were
not considered part of the Pentagon press corps as such.







the last decade cam® from reporters Who covered the
Pentagon* but on an irregular basis. This study concen-
trated on the opinions of the regulars* whil© presentlag
tha views of irregulars and military journal reporters
separately in an effort to isolate those correspondents who
truly specialise in reporting military news.
Chapter I sets the mood of the sixties toy reviewing
»edia reaction and criticism of defense information opera-
tions* policies* and procedures*
The second chapter describes the author's methodol-
ogy of gathering and presenting the data.
Chapter XII offers a perspective on the 1970
Pentagon press corps* how military correspondents 90 about
reporting the Defense beat* and how these reporters view
other newsmen in Washington.
The fourth chapter concentrates on DOD officials*
information organisations* and procedures as seen by the
military correspondents.
Chapter V gives an overview of the 15 news sources
available to the Defense reporter and his evaluation of
each*
Chapter VI deals with the barriers in the news*
gathering process at the Pentagon as perceived by newsmen.
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The primary source of information for the study is
data ^atharec from personal interviews with regulars and
mail-questionnaire responses from irregulars and military
journal correspondents*
The substance tor Chapter X is secondary source
material authored during the last decade,
The author made two visits to the Pentagon? one in
April and the other in June 1970. In addition, the author
considers himself a source as a "participant-observer N in
the newsgatherlng process at DOfc. 1 two-year tour as press
officer in the Sews Branch* Media Relations Division, of
the navy's Office of Information at the Pentagon immediately
preceding graduate studies in Sept* 1965 provided direct
personal experience with the Pentagon press corps and the
problems they encounter in trying to gather the news* From
this experience* the author can also appreciate problems of
the public affairs officer in trying to get information
fron officials to the pramm corps* In addition* other tours
as a Navy public affairs officer have been useful to the
study. 11
Bwii*9»ijyyMMi
fiflft llhgllMf^rinnit A* »*,*»»«»* * Includes the Office of
the Secretary of Defense COSJD) and the three military
services—departments of the Any* liavy* and Air Force*
lMt**9*HJIM1 90$
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P*fiB(Ffl)—Qffjgft gf tha. Easiatant Secretary of
.(Public, ftffajUsl* For this study, o*si>(^) refers
to the *fiD(P*), his two deputies, and the Directorate for
Defense Information (DDI) . Organisationally, OP&D(P*) also
includes: Directorate for Community Relations* Directorate
for Plans ma3i Programs* and Directorate for Security
Review.
Responsible for the routine execution of the information
function and maintains daily contact with the media.
Includes the Press Division and the ?udio-visual Division*
plus the Southeast -*sia Division* DDZ is headed by a
military service information officer assigned to 06D who is
directly responsible to the *1D(P*) and his deputies for
the conduct of disseminating Defense information and
assisting newsmen gather material on ODD*
Iftfll m; IQ (Public, ftffain,,Qfflciir at, InfflmrtfiiflB
wJULisarXs Refers both to military and civilian information
types* The terms are used interchangeably throughout the
study. While the At&iWt) and his deputies are political
appointees* military officers are assigned by their service
to OASD(P^) for normal tours of duty. M number of govern-
ment service (OS) civilian information specialists remain a
part of 0T$&(&?) from administration to administration and
provide continuity to the program. * military PAO may be a
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service based on background, education* and laxparience—and
will only serve in that capacity throughout hia military
career. Othara who have basic qualifications nay eerve in
a MO billet for ona or two toura, but retain their
designator* such as an aviator* unrestricted line officer*
or other primary job code for his earvice. When a*Os are
diacuaaed in Chapter XV* no attempt in mads to distinguish
between the information "specialist* and the non-designated
&?o since newsmen generally mx& not aware of the officer's
background} they sorely judge him on performance*
Military tenraff(t,ilBfQgttffit*lfln {TgwUaifttiflns* defers
to the individual military service information offices in
Washington. The Savy* Marinas* *x*y ***** *** force each
have a chief or director of information services and a
staff that coordinates public affairs activities with
a*SD(*/) in Washington.
£xjftSS» This term is used interchangeably with
"newsmen*" "correspondents* " and "reporters. * Ml refer
collectively both to print and electronic madia.
Fsataafln ftrniS COfan itefers to all Washington cor-
respondents that are assigned either full-time or part-time
to the military beat. This ia an unofficial title since
the press corps has tmvmz been formally organised* as is
the case with the State department and White Bouse Corre-
spondents Associations.






cot respondent* assigns* by their n«wa outlet to cover the
Pantopon either full-time or on a regular basis (visits the
Pentagon daily for the solo purpose of gathering news for
Defense stories) • These reporters are considered speclal-
ists in military affairs* and nave office space in the
Pentagon.
yipgeyi^^ayft Those Washington newsman who include
the Pentagon on their assigned heats, Usually they either
concentrate on one or two of the other major heats in town
and occasionally produce a military story, or they are
general iat reporters for smaller bureaus who try to cover
several beats* When a hot story breaks or a special news
conference is called, they are the ones who cover for thsir
news outlet.
military ,fe»rr\al.,Corrffisp<ll»1sntSt Refers to those
newsmen representing publications oriented to the military
audience* tome are considered "regulars'* around the press
room, while others concentrate on reporting wm service.
Because of their outlets and intended audiences, their
responses are presented separately, but included in the
combined totals since they gather Defense news in the same
manner as any other correspondent.
sawf dnt 1st* The correspondent • s publication {news-
paper, magasine, etc.), news service (wire or chain), or
network (radio and television) he represents as a reporter
of military affairs.
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Military official *t R#f«re to uniioriaed porsOttn*!
in the Defense Department. "Senior military official®"
refers to flag or general offreers in pop*
fn^UW ^#fijsi§1 ** Jiafc*rs to civilian pt>r»ona«al in
DOS. "Senior civilian officials'* refers to Assistant
Secretaries of Defense and above or Military Servioe &eera~
tarias.
DsflMia» QlliafiieU* Refers both to military and
civilian officials in the Department of Defense*
Veteran Military f,flr*asia?att«nti Harare to those
Washington correspondents who have been a "regular" for
nine or more years of covering the military beat* In Jane
1970. there were eight newsman in this category*

fOOTWOTKR TO XM$RQCM9CTHMf
XCit«ci in Thomas a. Bailey. 2JU& &a& i& fcfte s*:*-*;*"^
(Hew Torht The WacKillan Co., 1943), 1.
2for farther details on the ftepartment of Defense
seet Jack Raymond* Mams. ML &&u kAX&m&ia C. W. Borklund*
22MI THUfHrtiwnt &£ ^ImrtWir »nd John M. Swomlay* Jr. • Xha
Hll itftffY &»feafaii«|Timnt Particulars are cited in
Bibliography.
Cited in address by Jerry W. fxiedheim* Principal
Deputy *££>(**.)* before tha Thata Sigma l>hi Front fage
banquet* Tulsa Club. Tulsa* Oklahoma* *prii 3* 1970.
Oeorge Vernon Underwood* Jr.* "The Washington
Military Corr^s^onciants" (unpublished master's thesis*
University of Wisconsin* 1960) . the basic material for
this brief sketch of the development of O^SD(tt) from 194$
to I960 was drawn from Underwood's work* He goes into
greater detail in his thesis. See Underwood* pages IS
through 56. Other references were taken from the sources
listed in footnote Ho* 2 above.
Refers to Cresap, Mccormick and Paget Report* and
the Hathaws-Kiuckbohn Report. Both are described in
Underwood, "The Correspondents* " 22-23.
Correspondent **M* - personal interview* Washington*
o. C* June 1970.
Correspondent *R» " personal interview* Washington*
0. C* June 1970.
Correspondent %" personal interview* Washington*
D. C* Jane 1970*
9
l*so C. Rosten* Xha Wflahiwtan fflffiffitipMffiftrtintii CWsw
Yorkt asxcourt* Brace and Co.* 1937).
10Jules Witoover* "The Surliest Crew in Washington*
*
Vol. XV* Mo. 1* Spring*
XXThe author has also beeni the assistant public
affairs officer (f*0) for the navy's Task force 77 (ships
operating in the Tonkin Ouif off North Vietnam)! 9*0 for
the Service force* 0. $• Atlantic Fleet) and 9*0 for the
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mbdz* *m tm vwmumm of mrnsmz*
fc DSC*DE OF TURBULENCE. i960 - 1969
Without criticism and reliable and intelligible
reporting, the government cannot govern, for there i«
no adequate va/ in which it can keep itself informed
about what the people of the country are thinking and
doing ana wanting* The most elaborate government
intelligence service ia an insufficient provider of the
knowledge which the government must have in order to
legislate well and to administer public affairs*
—Walter Lippm&nn* September 19631
Thn aOTsrnmf?nt^BflBrftrsaa Kalatinnahig
"The government acts in regard to mass communics-
tions in three main wayst first* it may use its powers to
limit or suppress discussion* • • • Second , the government
may act affirmatively to encourage better and more
extensive communications. • • • Third « the government may
Ibe itself a part in the two-way process of communications*"
During the same year that 3echarlah Chafse authored
the above statement* the "National Military Establishment"
(later changed to the {department of Defense or siaoly BOX?)
was created by the national Security tort of 1947* This
also marked the beginning of a conflict between the
Washington press corps maA Defense officials over how mili-




Za 1969, Phil tfouldin*—reflecting on hi* tenure as
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (A8B/?*-) —
wrote, "The conflict between the pxmmm and government is
not only natural nut essential. " The 22 ysars that span
the Chaf»*-Gouldin^ remarks wars filled with literature
rsflooting the problems of disseminating and gathering news
in Washington, B. C.
Walter Lip^caann described tho relationship between
officials and newsmen in this context
i
This groat democracy will depend for the truth on
the unending pulling and hauling between the good
reporters wanting a true story and the officials Who
believe* as the saying goes, that they are protecting
the national interest. 4
The government official and the newsman have been
called *antagonist a, * "associates," "allies,* and
"adversaries* * Both are part of a communication system
that cannot function effectively without the cooperation of
the other. £009lass Cater suggested that government
5
affairs reporters represent a fourth branch of government!
other of his colleagues do not go that far*
However, Washington journalists agreed the media's
role is highly significant in the governing process* »t
minimum, the press serves as the most effective single
check—if not a balance—on government*
Whatever label is given this relationship, there
was general concurrence that the inherent conflict between
official and newsman not only is healthy, but essential to

22
the public** understanding of its government "a activitioa.
Bat for the media to function* they muat have acc*e» to
government Information. Clark ttollenhoff . Pulitser Prise
winner in 1958 for national reporting, repeatedly stated
that no single factor ia more important to the etrength of
our democracy than tha free flow of aeeurata information
about government operational However, thia flow slowed
down during tha aixtiea.
In 1969. Joseph Kraft draw attention to a paradox*
stating that while the Washington praaa are steadily
improving their work* tha task of adequately covering tha
capital aeema to be growing steadily- harder and at an even
7
e rapid clip.
Throughout the last decade the general media viewed
the Pentagon aa the tightest and toughest heat in
Washington* The significance of aa aggressive Pentagon
preas corpe* the growth ia complexity and sine of Poo* and
the free flow of information all were complicated by
stricter control of military news during this period.
Another complicating factor in 1970 is that the
Pentagon' a responsibilities touch almost mr«£f activity in
the country* a social and economic arenas while coping with
national security* More than ever before* the public* the
congress* and the pr&ss vigorously demand the fulfillment





The feelings from Capitol Bill were expressed 1a
*ut,ust 1970 toy Senator Stuart Symington, i'lsKi
Tha artisans of thia nation, conscious of th*» need
for more ana battor housing, mora and oattar schools,
control of crime, and pollution, ate, ara nevertheless
banding under increasing taxes alone with reduced
purchasiaa power due to inflationi and they have the
right to know a lot more aboat tha raasons for these
sultibillion-dollar /defanas/ sxpenditures.3
Because of this attitude, it is apparent that
officials no longer believe tbsy cam accomplish thair
mission in spite of tha press—a chares often directs*
against Robert ft. MsHamara whan ha was Secretary of Defense
(1961-196*)
• *lso, thara is an increasing appreciation
that this Mission cannot bs accomplished without tha
support of the ftswrican people. Mora to the point, ona
military correspondent saidt "Hoars and mora, officials
realise that without public support it im difficult to fund
Defense programs* *
out this support has not been easy to get because
tha Vietnam conflict and tha military-industrial complex
syndrome have confused people's feelings toward anything
associated with the military. The bast moans, at least,
tor carrying the Defense Department's msssac* to the public
in order to inform and gain their support is through the
This is the area that fives officials the greatest
headaches. While recognising that our society depends on




oust always concern themselves with the built-in conflict
between ths immmSI to release and yet to protect military
information or *maxi«tttfl» disclosure consistent with national
security** The Media have questioned whether there* la not
too ssmch esqphasis or protecting information.
JBMLJttyBl^BjtiJtttLJwfii^t i iilkJbiiWujMJOULajil
I ZAmtLou Karris poll conducted in the fall of
1969 showed that although the public feels it ia better
informed on government activities than five years earlier*
raaulta revealed a substantial distrust of news that comas
out of the capital, A majority of newspaper readers
endorsed Washington reporters as being the bast in the
country; hut three out of four fait tha real story in
Washington was behinc tha scenes and only a snail part ever
got into tha news. Tha aodia took it ona stop furthar
and fait this applied even more so to DOC.
sariy in tha 1960s* thara wars aocrusations fron
within tha *edia that tha Pentagon generally was ignored
and inadequately covered* It was also charged that there
was not enough in-depth reporting of Pentagon affairs until
the end of ths decade, the editors of the Collate*!
JajaUtAlism a^«i«p went so far as to classify tha Defense
ftepartiaent among the ten least covered broad "institutional"
11
stories by American journalise during the sixties.
In 1969* Mollenhoff used the word "shocking" to
describe the record of Pentagon news coverage during tha
•»•**! »f'
n
pa*t decade. He accue**d til* saedia of juat realising that
the spending of half tha national budget and this etatu* of
national defense ia worth covering week ay week. The pr**a
allowed itaelf* Mollanhoff said* to too dominated and mm*-
whelaed in many caaaa by propaganda of tha centralised
Pentagon praaa office (Qfi&Z/»t) , 12
h vetaran military correspondent disagreed and
suggested to tha author that thara Mi* in-depth reporting
daring tha 1960a* However, ha added, "Before tha lattar
part of tha paat decade, overall coverage of Dafanaa
mattar a waa hindarad because thara were not enough full-
ti&e Pentagon reporters, aap«eially from tha electronic
13
saedia." It w*e not until tha last few years that both
radio and television out lata hw%r» assigned correspondents
on a regular basis to tha Dafanaa beat.
Whan reporter* are assigned to cover several
gover resent departmenta or agencies they find it difficult
to adequately report on any single one* To cope with the
Base of bureaucratic aubtltiaa found on each beat* the
media turned to the "specialist* reporter in the sixties;
there are few "generaiiats* in tha 1970 Washington prase
eorpe, 14
Interpretative reporting alao ranched a mm peak
during the laat decade* although it was not something new
to Washington report era. In 1969, Rivera and Schramm noted
that in tha capital straight new* reporting, of tha conven-





Vew Deal in 1933<
Sea* correspondents say thay can fix the exact tilts
when "the old journalise" failwd* the day the U. 8.
want off the gold standard. • • Ths gathering complex-
ity during ths Hsw Deal days, during World Wax II. and
especially When the cold war began, made it increasingly
difficult to confine reporting to straight news of ths
sort that had been developed decades earlier*
Rivers and Schramm concluded that simply by
reporting what a government official said or what Congress
did was often misleading because the facts did not quite
is
speak for themselves.
fines ths end of World War II. the government has
increased both in sis* »nt& responsibility while coping with
*meriea*s new role as the giant among free nations. *s ths
hub of national security, the Defense Department took on
greater responsibilities and became an integral part of the
policy-making decision process. This resulted in an
increased involvement in global political matters, as well
as military participation, in the name of Communist con-
tainment and the preservation of world peace.
9robably mors than any other government organisa-
tion, the Pentagon's complexity and variety of missions
necessitated interpretation if the public was to comprehend
the intertwining policies, decisions, and actions of the
military establishment. *s in other departments—only mors
so—the media found during the sixties that the only
alternative to the question of how to cope with the vastness




assigned full-tima to the military best would be sole to
delve deeply into the subject and* hopefully, become an
expert on defense affairs. The ability to knowledgeably
interpret military and national security matters would bo
his greatest asset.
Lippmann. speaking before the national Press Club
in 1960, described this approach to reporting in Washington*
• • • reporting /in Washington/ is no longer what we
thought it was in much simpler days. If we tried to
print only the facts of what had happened*-who did what
and who said what—the news itetas would be like the
pieces of a jigsaw pussle thrown in a heap upon the
table. The un arranged pieces of raw news would not
sake a picture at all, and fitting there together so
that they do wake a picture is the inescapable job of a
Washington correspondent. 16
^JLUtary.Cfl£raipondentft in tha Sixties
There were many in the Washington press corps
during the sixties who viewed the military correspondents
as being somewhat below those reporters who cover the White
House, State Department, &r& Congress. Tb&y did not feel
the Pentagon had the prestige of the other three beats and
consequently considered full-time military reporters »m
being second-rate. * substantial number, however, recog-
nised that the military correspondent probably worked
harder to get his information because of military security
and the central control of information on his beat.
In 1965, Jules witcover added another perspective
when he commented on the Pentagon press corps in the





mwimh are both sympathetic and respectful toward Pentagon
correspondents! "It is a boat ~*her*a news sources must be
built within—and even against—a system that is blgge.
mora intricate and oftan mora hostile than any other in
Washington."17
While still the Waahlngtoa S&ftX'a Pant agon
reporter, Richard pryklund (later a Deputy .*££/?>) wrote
that he knew of no other beats where news sources were
subjected to lie detector tests because they talked with
newsman* where officials appealed to patriotism to suppress
legitimate news storiest in which reporters assumed phones
are tapped sad they are shadowed occasionally; and where
officials considered the flow of news to be a weapon used
in a crisis situation. ULm oommenta were &*bq& on
experience during the first half of the last decade*
there were also some Washington newsmen who openly
suggested that military reporters had thrown in with the
services against the civilian administration or were *soi
on the Pentagon. Others viewed them as either spoon-fed
"publicists for the military's cause* or accused thou: of
i a
being "lap-dogs* instead of "watch-dogs *r reluctant to
criticise those who controlled major news sources and fear-
ful of beiny *eut-off " if not sympathetic with official 1301?
positions.
In ftpril 1970, Derek Shearer authored an article in
Zfem
—ft*?'* in which he said the Pentagon press corps, in







establishments The Pentagon. a« slight be expected, has
done everything it could to curry favor with the* press and
it has succeeded. • . . Most members of the Pentagon press
2"
corps accept tha assumptions of the military. M
And still another eorrespondent drew at tantion to
what ha called the "vested interest" problem; stating that
in the Pentagon it is commonplace for reporters to asks
alliances with one or another of the armed services*
presenting by and large that particular service's views on
21highly controversial problems of national fotrntmrn*
It is true that many of the correspondents have
excellent contacts both in the military services »&& the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) . Yet the above
implications indicate that many Washington newsmen generally
have underestimated the Pentagon reporters.
Daniel %. Hankin—Goulding's successor as MB>(P.*)—
suggested to the author during an interview that "those who
attack military correspondents as lap-dogs only insult good
reporters. 1* Be added that it is more likely they ar<s
really attacking £*X> rather than the reporters. Hankin—
himself a long time military reporter before entering
government service in 1965—said that in reality » there are
very critical stories reported by Defense correspondents.
But he stated this was good; that "there always has tmmn
and always will be a conflict between Defense officials and








Iclfig an>fl ay (gala
I960
By 1960, it could be observed that the Defense
Department from its creation had been trying to centralise
sad exercise control over information activities. These
attempts were continuously thwarted by the military services*
by Congress, and by the media.
Murr^ Snyder served as the top DC© public affairs
officer from October 1957 to January 1962. Nll'tf flSJC
X0£& Hst&ldL IXiftVMttl political writer. Snyder was the
assistant to presidential press secretary James Hagerty
from 1953 to 1957. The media were t critical of the
assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs* X&Bm
magasine editorialized that "military men* contractors, and
newsmen were close to unanimous in the opinion that Snyder
stood as a major obstacle in the way of sensible and
constructive reporting of the United States defense
'ef
25
Ifposture." He also was re erred to as the "arch censor**
of Washington bureaucracy,
The 0-2 affair in May 1960 was cited by the media
as an example of the worst type of news management—the
government lying to the public. The late President Eisen-
hower saidi
The big error we made was, of course* in the issu-
ance of a premature and erroneous cover story. • • .




Credibility in our information programs is the first
essential, and it cannot b« achieved by falsehood and
hypocrisy* Which would bo promptly exposed by a free
Lippmann felt that the government "talked too much"
during the incident. 27
In many of the major issue*, secrecy prompted press
criticism of the tsissahower administration* s news policies*
In I960* the media were backed by the Moss Committee's
Five-Year Report concerning this problem. Moss be$an his
investigations of government information activities in 1955
to find out whether there was a "paper curtain* of secrec
in Washington. By July 19*0 he chanced his terminology to
• *P9&*S mountain" of secrecy.**
The press felt that mis-use of secrecy was a
particularly effective means for POD officials to cover
mistakes and improprieties because they could hide behind
military or national security. 2*
1961
The most controversial *$#(?£), Arthur Sylvester*
was appointed to the post by President Kennedy on
January 23, 1961. and held that position until he voluntar-
ily retired in February 1967. i Wm Jersey JfettUttfc Jfettm
reporter since 1924* he transferred to Washington in *f*il
1944 and served as correspondent and later bureau chief
until he joined the new Defense team.
Sylvester is most noted for his battles with the





$ the government's right to lie* and tight control
over contacts between the proas and 0<S> official*.
Benson Baldwin, noted military writer for the £&g&
XttcA XiBflyft (now retired) * once aaid of Syiveatan
/ha/ • • • executes policy; no does not sot It* But
his actions and his words ar« never lightly chosen?
they represent administration and White House policy.
If they did not* Mr. Sylvester would long ago have boon
sacrificed* as others in the Pentagon and elsewhere
have been. 3*
Too press* however, were at odds with Sylvester's
boss* now Secretary of i>efenaa Robert $• ftcNamara* before
they tangled with the e*-aews»a». issmamara'a attitude
regarding military information and his intentions to
tighten the grip on information flowing from the Pentagon
triggered immediate madia reaction during 1961.
It began when military correspondents were told in
a background session with Mentamara that tho controversial
missile gap of the I960 campaign was not going to material-
ise after all. stories from this meeting created the first
big "news flap" of HcHamara's tenure. Charges of te*&
reporting and bad faith got the official-newsman relation-
32
ship off to a poor start.
JtsJffamara quickly displayed how he intended to have
Pentagon officials speak with *otte-voiee.* Xt long had
been a GOD policy to review the apeeohea of top military
man* to ensure the content was not in conflict with govern-
ment policy and there were few public complaints about this





Irritation quickly surfaced In the stadia over what was
called the "irresponsible ana unreasonable censorship 4 of
public presentations. Military officer* openly sstpr«ss«»d
concern over changes made by D0£ censors that did not seem
to aake sense ma& for which they received no applanation.
*lso, congress&sn felt the censorship of military
testimony before congressional committees was an *improper
practice and can only be calculated to obstruct unduly the
free flow of information to which the Congress is
entitled."33
*s a result of these complaints an investigation
was eventually conducted by the Special Senate Preparedness
8ubcoaoittee« bet rtcuamara refused to allow his censors to
testify. President Kennedy becked nisi up with permission
to use "executive privilege** to keep persons from appearing
before the committee. Thus McHamara emerged from the
hearings in 19*2 stronger in his position than before. The
controversy about political "sussling* was* for the saost
34part* squelched.
Mdiaaara also too* steps to cut off the sources of
leaks fro* the Pentagon. Representative Moss susasd up
press reaction as well as the feelings of his ccamittee in
March 1961 when he wrote a letter of protest to McMsnarat
You've detailed • • . /tha/ *.. 7. Inspector General*
to investigate causes of recent "leaks" of military
documents and to work out is^roveaient of the ©epart-
s*»nt*s overall information security system. There is
grave 4mnpmt that the investigation will cause renewed







and result 1a the imposition of a sort of censorship
which is repugnant to a democratic system. 35
Tha awdia saw the ig^lication* and fait that in the
procass of eliminating inter-service squabbling, there was
tha danger also of eliminating their news sources.
focus was divert©©" from criticising POD news
policies to criticising tha philosophy of tha whole admln-
istration when on *pril 15, 19*1, the abortive Bay of Pigs
landing was completed by the tlnited States-supported anti-
Castro Cubans.
The mission itself was a complete failure, but
according to tha press, government deception was not.
James Reston said*
Zt was • . • one thing to ask the press not to
publish information about specific landing* or weapons,
and another to encourage the press to publish informa-
tion known by the government to be false. **
Mcttamara caused media criticism to shift back on
the fentagon when, in a statement before the Senate fcrmad
services Committee in May 1961, he saidt
Why^should we tell Russia that SSeus /nam* of a
missiW development may not be satisfactory? He ought
to say it*s the most perfect anti-ICBH system devised.
Instead the public domain is already full of statements
about it not bei&9 satisfactory? that it has deficien-
cies. X thin* it is absurd to release that kind of
information. 37
frees reaction was guick and to the point. HsBSi
magasine editorialised that McMamara must learn he is not
dealing with ford Motor Company *m public relations staff





severe* prompting BOD to issue a clarification stating that
Moltaaara meant we should deceive Russia, not the »msxican
public, This* however, did not erase the implications
behind Kcefamara*s Senate testimony* nor did the exposure in
the press seem to phase the Defense chief's feelings toward
tightening up military information.
ft a news conference in May* McHamarn issued a
statement intended to serve as a guide for information
policy i
In a democratic society the public must be kept
informed of the major issues in our national defense
policy* • • • The public information policies are a
delicate accommodation of two competing values, *s
President Kennedy has observed* the challenge of our
times imposes "two requirements that may seem almost
contradictory in tone* but which must be reconciled and
fulfilled* • • • the need for far greater public
information* • • • the n^md for far greater official
secrecy* " The reconciliation of these two requirements
is particularly difficult within the DOC* 3*
The press agreed that such a reconciliation is
difficult in DOD but reacted by accusing Defense officials
of not only justifying the withholding of information based
solely on military security as in the past* but now was
using the broader terms of "national security" and -policy"
to keep information from the press and the public*
M a result of the activities during 1961* th&
press came to regard DOD as having a "built-in system of
communications with the American public unequaled in scale
41by anything available to other federal agencies*
"




effort* to damp down on news sources at the Pentagon. Tha
Washington px&m* corps felt the accessibility of sources
was batter and tha public affairs organisations ware store
spaa at tha White aouse and other federal aganci«s, but
worse at the Pentagon under tha new administration.
Hot all newsmen ware as quick to join the chorus of
criticism, ft military correspondent from a gaily newspaper
—generally considered unfriendly to the administration*-
spoke for at least a segment of the Pentagon press corps
when he made this observation
t
I'm sick of all the talk about how hard it is for
Washington reporters to get the news. ood one will
go out and get it and not howl to heaven about how hard
it is. ... I find *rt Sylvester much more accessible
than Murray Snyder ever was .42
1962
"lthough press criticism of 1X3© news policies
steadily grew between 1947 and I960, and reached a new high
during 1961. it was not until Sylvester made his position
clear regarding the information function on three specific
counts that the criticism was the loudest. These points
were* (l) he acknowledged the government's management of
the news; (2) he advocated the government's right to lie in
times of extreme crisis; and < 3) he publicly suggested that
news is an essential weapon in the government's arsenal
during times of stress.43
Although the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962







here to dwell on specifics surrounding the incident
itself.
newsmen reacted immediately and amatively to
Sylvester's remarks. The fisj( X0J& liaiiifi. summed up the
situation! "There is no doubt that management or control of
the news is censorship described by a sweeter term."44
Sylvester further incensed newsmen during this
period when he issued a memorandum to Defense personnel on
October 27, 1962* reminding them of standing orders to
report all interviews or telephone conversations with the
media to the 0*48D(P*) . $n alternative to such a report was
for an official to have a monitor--usually a public affairs
officer from 0»S£(**)—present during an interview. The
late Mark Watson, ^^^eMOffm SUA military writer and dean of
the Pentagon press corps, called the monitoring directive a
45
•gestapo" technique.
By the end of 1962, the media realised that severe
restrictions had been placed on officials in BOD. But they
soon recognised that they too were being placed under new
operating restrictions. Zt was suggested that to overcome
the new barriers to free expression, officials turned to
the use of unauthorised leaks to newsmen.
The substance of these leaks often ran counter to
official Defense policy. *s a result, investigations were
ordered to detect those officials responsible for releasing
Si
such material. Sven some newsmen were questioned as to
Mn
m
their sources. The greatest concern of the reporters was
that even the threat of lie detector tests being given to
Defense officials was bound to dry up their best news
sources*
Thus, after less than two years the gap between BOD
officials and the media was widened to new proportions and
Pentagon correspondents found that reporting Defense
affairs was becoming frustratingly difficult*
1963
The deterioration of the news climate at DGD
continued, Meffamara'e policy of "speaking with one voice 4*
was crystallised by events during 1963*
Specifically, the Senate Permanent Investigating
•ubcommitta* conducted hearings in the Spring on the merit
of HcHamara's decision to award the controversial multi-
billion dollar TIX aircraft contract to General Dynamics
Corporation* even though the military had recommended
Boeing Aircraft Company. The press accused DOD of releasing
47
erroneous and misleading information to personally aid
during the hearings.
These charges were made after Pentagon officials
held background briefings for military correspondents which
resulted in stories that were contradictory of the informa-
tion developed by the subcommittee's investigators. This
also irritated some newsmen who later felt they were used
; -; " ;>••
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to dagrad* tha cradibility of tha ccsaaltt**.
•ylvaatar was parsonalXy criticised £or insisting
to the preaa that coasUttaa ii hUi im wara not qualified to
«uaation **M*»*fl judg*ant cm such a eoayiicatod «attar.
•ylvaatar also i**»iiad that tha ***** had ultarior
wotivaa involving th*ir own states* 8a latar apologisad to
tha subcoasilttaa.4*
Tha nsdia generally reacted to tha nawa policies of
1963 by suggesting that DOD waa seeking atill tighter
control ovar the ralaaaa of military mm with a policy
designed to suppress dissent *m cloaa avanuaa through
which evidence of dissent normally found ita way to tha
pr.~.<' *_,. toW *._ mmtktm thafe offlei8i-
had baan intimidated by *cftamara«s policies and that full
and franx discussion of anything was in jeopardy. 50
Writing in tha fioJLaaa»l& JflUXnaUsa Zsotlm. a young
reporter assigned to tha Pentagon for only a short whila
obsarvad that in 1963 it too* hi* just sight waaks to
bacos* a loud container. Ba suioaarisad tha situation by
•aylngi on a day-to-day basis, thara wara too many obstacles
to getting infonsation on mm, that Pentagon correspondents
•xpt***** a vary high dagraa of dissatisfaction with tha
inforaation policies, and that experienced reporters fait
officials wara lass available than ever. 51
1964
Critics of Defense aaws policies fait that in 1964
hmAMu
MM •»«•*«! *• *
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the Pentagon continued to strengthen centralisation of
information activities? still interfered with reporters?
and took other actions to inhibit the flow of Defense
information.
Whilst the Mci*aiaara~&yivester team, according to the
press, justified the continued trend toward unifying
information activities in the name of economy, the media
felt that the real purpose was to suppress diverse opinions
on military matters*
Sylvester did not agree that IX* policy was
inhibiting newsmen* Regarding his 1962 interview monitoring
directive* Sylvester sent a letter to the chairman of the
Sigma Belts Chi committee on freedom of information in
June* It stated that he did not foresee any lessening of
contacts between reporters and their sources* N • • X am
not aware of any good newsmen * * * having Insoluahle
difficulties.-52
While many disagreed with the principle Involved
and some found the directive very detrimental* one Pentagon
reporter said* There's more red tape. They've slowed me
down in getting routine information* But they haven't kept
me from getting much information X really feel X ***&•*"
Xt is difficult to measure the direct affect of the monitor
system sines apparent Xy many officials did not abide by it
and talked informally to their own p^mmm contacts.
While reporters felt the flow of unimportant news
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getting harder to pry the crucial stories out of SOB. One
correspondent said. "Things are getting tighter and
tighter. Our sources are jotting more sad mere reluctant
to tal*."54
1965
Media views in IfreS genersliy reflected concern
overs (a) the centralised news procedure centered around
&»«>(?*.)
---suggesting the clasp down on military services
was still considered the major threat to the Pentagon
press; (b) the indiscriminate practice of hiding behind
national or military security; (c) the channeling of news
queries into "oblivion*; m*6 (d) the growing consistency to
manage the news to suit the aims of OOD or the
administration.
Another issue surfaced during this period. By 1965
the 0. S. was deeply committed in the Vietnam conflict and
newsmen began to criticise restrictions against reporting
the war*
This took on greater significance as the number of
reporters covering the war increased. There were only 40
newsmen in Vietnam in 1*64—including foreign journalists.
By the summer of 1965, the Saigon press corps had grown to
over 450 newsmen. 5S
Has Gallagher
• Associated Press, said new restric-
tions were clearly aimed not at security matters but at




Bo added that such control* exceeded anything done in the
darkest days of World War XX. 3*
mis comment was endorsed by the Freedom of
Information Committee of tha American Society of newspaper
gditors (*£££) on *pril 15, 1965. Committee member* stated
that tho "one-voice" philosophy of MdSamara and Sylvester
had extended "from the halls of tha Pentagon to sons miii-
taxy installations in Vietnam. "*7
While tha critica* attentions wars shiftad to tha
battlefield, othar occurrences olosar to tha Pentagon also
concarnad military reporter*. Moon briefings—called
"nooners*—initiated in 1962 for tha Pentagon press corps*
developed into a verbal fencing match between Sylvastar and
tha correspondents. By 1965 tha briefings had degenerated
into such Mutually unproductive affaira that thay ware held
vary infrequently. Thus ona more ehannal through which
tha news could flow was all but eliminated.
In 1970 a vataraa military writer recalled that
-the nooner failed because wa /reporter*? ashed Arthur
Sylvester • • • too many questions that ware annoying and
ha didn't have the patience that Jerry Friedheim ijaankin*a
Principal Deputy A8Z>tF*l7 or Dan /fisnkin/ have—so it
failed."5*
On a broader scale* two international incidents
took place in 1965 that only served to strengthen tha con-









In the Spring* the government again was accused of
misleading the public whan the 13. 8* intervened in the
Dominican Republic. David Kraslow, Ifl* Pag* lft* Xi&ea*
wrote of the incident!
for one who grew up believing that when the if. S.
government said something, that was it, the past two
weeks in Santo Domingo cane as another in a series of
awakenings* . . • If government officials want to argue
that deliberately misleading the public is justified
under certain conditions* they must be willing to
chance undermining the confidence of oitiseas in the
word of their government.&°
On July 17* 1965 • the French government alleged
that a U. 8. reconnaissance aircraft had been intercepted
by trench aircraft in a prohibited area above a French
atomic plant at Pierrel&tte and forced to land. Defense
officials flatly denied this was so, saying the plane had
not entered the sons, but later admitted it had* This
presented all the makings of another 0-2 affair. Xt
appeared to the public and to the press that the government
had been spying, was caught, and then when it tried to lie
its way out. was caught in those lies.
Oouiding amplified the situation in retrospect when
he wrote thatt
Fierrelette illustrates better than any incident Z
know how a series of innocent errors and misunderstand-*
ings on the part of two governments can cause a flaming
international controversy, and how wrong governments
can be when they think they are right. 51
.» veteran military correspondent summed up the
media's feelings at the end of 1965 when he commented that
military officers know that their careers are in trouble if
M M
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they talk out of turn and civil servant* are even more
easily quieted than the military.*2
tiff
Criticism of Pentagon news policies did not let up
in 1966. It wan generally stated that despite considerable
nrannura from both the press and Congress, dgd refused to
admit any undue restraint on the free flow of Defense
information. The madia felt that instead of retreating
from such policies* the Pentagon initiated further steps
which seemed certain to mean greater harriers to military
information.
One such step was when DGD launched a study of
public opinion in 1966, to determine how the public reacts
when they get or do not get to see military secrets and
other classified information. Again Representative Moss
intervened by asking the Pentagon to abandon the study. In
a letter to Deputy Defense Secretary Cyrus Vance, he saids
•^fL*!!! thm caveat °* Implications that we might be
?£! iSL^JL**?11* *? «****« information and influence
of^govtrnm^.63 ""— *° «***«** »«PI>ort for the aims
Concerning the environment at the Pentagon itaalf,
one Pentagon reporter observed that the Memsmara-Sylvoster
attitude had seeped down through the upper echelons of DC©
and inundated the middle ranks of officers and civilians—
generally the best news sources t *It«s attitude more than
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anyone caught talking to one will be punished.*64
This viewpoint was further reflected by other »edia
responses. Xa earlier tia»«, according to newsmeat
officials would sit down and talk to reporters about sensi~
tiva matters* But ia 1966. reporters thought there was a
tendency for officials to shy away from correspondents and
rarely confide ia them.
Tha press fait tha credibility of IX>D that was
undermined during tha Cuban crisis of 1962 was far from
being restored la 1966* Much of tha credibility problem
was said to be an outgrowth of tha Vietnam war.
I wire service military correspondeat wrote that
tight control and close supervision over the war by top
civilian leaders la Washington had placed a premium on
coverage of the Pentagon where so many of the decisions are
shaped.
When the capital's correspondents were asked in
1966 how they would rate the credibility of Washington*"
based government information sources of Vietnam news, the
Secretary of Defense was ranked third behind the President
and the Secretary of State in the category of "excellent*
credibility* Information personnel ia the separate military
services ranked seventh while the POD public affairs people
ft ..,
were rated tenth in credibility.
Vietnam tugged at already strained relations
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the press during a mooting in Saigon in *ugust 1966 when he
reportedly said, "Sewsmen have a patriotic duty to dissem*
inate only information that makes the u. 6* look good*" *•
questions were fired at him from the press he added* "Look*
if you think any American official is going to tell the
truth* then you're stupid." This merely prompted media
comment that Sylvester did not believe officials told the
press all there is to know—a charge that was to re-occur
with greater frequency. *s the Vietnam conflict became
worse* so did the administration's credibility.
The Palomnres incident earlier in the year had
already tarnished what little credibility existed under the
Johnson administration. In January a Strategic Mr Command
(SAC) C-S2 bomber exploded over the Spanish coast. Three
H-bombs were recovered but a fourth fell into the
Mediterranean Sea. Both the governments of Spain and the
U. 8. did not admit it was missing until 44 days after the
accident.
The Pentagon information policy during this period
was viewed by the press as one that ranged from "half*
u
truths'* and "untruths" to "no comment" responses.
though it was later exposed that the U. S. government was
limited by an agreement with Spain which specified what
could be released and when* the public and media could not
be faulted for believing U. s. officials once again had
practiced planned deception.
.~*- m ift





*bil Moulding added another perepect ive to the
situation
i
• • • X am aware of no other major •public* news event
in recent years in which the government concealed such
an amount of information from its people. But while wein public affaire were embarrassed toy the days of
silence. X know of no way that the United States could
have ignored the t^Bir^m of Spain in this instance*
• . . Palomares was an outstandir^ example of another
point—the futility of attempting to play a major news
story in low key. 6*
1967
nineteen hundred sixty-seven was filled with
occurrences that continued to irritate the press. In
January Sylvester announced his resignation, Gouldiag—his
deputy since April 1965—was appointed as his replacement*
eoulding. a former Pentagon correspondent for the Claveland
MlSdn &a&l*£» and his two deputies* Richard Fryklund
(WlShlnqfrfan SJUC Military reporter) and 2>an Henkin fJat^n*
,)
&£ Jthm &xmA JGOGCSfift) * pledged to do "everything in itheix?
power to provide newsmen with better access to
information.*70
BswMfMftfc editorialised on Sylvester *s departure
that he fought against restrictions* but neither the Whi
Bouse nor Mosemara could be talked into loosening up news
71
sources.
Frykluad. while still a reporter, amplified on the
remarks in jty&SKa&kj
Reporters used to wonder why MeKanara and
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was because Sylvester was only saying things that they
would ii*e to hava said theatselves* • . . Much of the
"news management* blamed on Sylvaster was tha doing of
the President and NoHasMurs-*^but Sylvester took the
blame without complaint and with apparent enjoyment. 72
*£tor announcing his resignation, Sylvester told
lymmamn in his office (Jan. 5, 1967) that ha had "increased
tha flow of information from tha Pentagon tremendously and
had provided greater, faster responses to inquiries.* 73
Unfortunately, most newsman did not agxm* with his assar-
tion. Instead, tha zredia said that Pantagon replies to
news inquiries oftan wara dalayad for daya, while they wars
"waffled," diluted tund drassad up to avoid any controversial
or embarrassing revelation.
aoulding, who had replaced Hi Is fc« Lennartson as
Sylvester's deputy on April 19, 1965, was received by
correspondents as a welcome change. Whila thara wara faw
differences in Pentagon information policies, opan
controversies with newsmen seemed to daclina under tha naw
fcSDlPA). fte refrained from what tha press called "baiting
newsmen" and taunting congressmen and senators. 74
It was not long, however, before Goulding himself
bacama tha target for press criticism over two major
incidents. In June 1967 tha Russians said a Soviet
merchant ship had bean attacked by U. 8. aircraft in tha
Tonkin Gulf off the coast of Sorth Vietnam, killing one and
injuring others, rfter an investigation, DO© released tha




Bat two waeks later BOD r*v«reed its position when
it was learned that a o. ft. »ir force colonel nad covered
up for his pilots. Officials discovered that the aviators
had boon forced to strafa anti-aircraft gun implacements in
order to escape being shot down and the Russian ship was in
the way, one* again* to tha press and to th« public, it
appeared that POD had lad than down a crooked path, avan
though Befanse officials had not boss in fall possession
of all tha facts. 75
following tha Soviet ship incident tha 0. 8. «avy*e
•hip isa Utmrty was attacked by Israali aircraft and
torpedo boats in tha Naditarranoan Sea on June 8. thirty-
four *zaarienns wars killad and 73 othar »avy man wars
injured, fc^ain tha Pentagon was accused of attempting to
tall an "untruth." It was announced that tha Liberty was a
"research vassal" that was in tha *rab-tsraeli war sons to
assure communications between U. *. government posts in tha
•liddle &ast and to assist in relaying information ooncorn-
ing tha evacuation of American dependents.
This applanation was later called a major blow to
tha 0. «. government's credibility sine* it was eventually
exposed that tha ship was, in fact, an intelligence
collector. Because of this and related statements,
Seymour Harsh referred to Goulding as being famous among
the press corps for his explanations of a series of contra-




On July 4* 1967, tint freedom of Information (W>I)
law went into effect* but—to i3att*-nmfl to have bad
little Influence on the daily newsgathering process in the
Pentagon.
fleo in 1967, Meltamara abolished the interview
taonitorix^i rule that required all Pentagon officials to
report their contacts with the press* The media speculated
whether this was prompted by the naw FOX law or simply a
change in policy under the Goaiding team.
* veteran military correspondent told the author
that he had been told by Sylvester that when the monitoring
directive was canceled* defense officials boasted it was no
•a
longer needed because they had things under control.
Hail Sheehan* tffttt Xoxk llmm* agreed i
In other words officials are now so well indoctrin-
ated that McHaaara did not have to worry about
subordinates expressing disturbing sad possibly
independent opinions to journalists. • • • Pentagon
officials are as cautious as ever and most still have a
public information officer present to protect theor
selves* 79
Another experienced Pentagon writer told the author
in 1970 that even after the directive was rescinded* the
system was still alive
t
It*s a universal practice now /l$7&/ and it's a
good example of what happens in a bureaucracy. You
remove the piece of paper that said monitors were
required* but the institution continues to survive and
perpetuate itself. s0
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POD has an obligation to vjuarantse that full and
prompt information is made available to tha J^serican
people aa a basis for thair and«rstanding of national
defense and the operations of this department. This
responsibility ia mat partly by insuring, on a daily
basis, that a great mass of information la released aa
rapidly aa possible, oonaiatant with national security.
Additionally, my responsibility la to inaura that tha
facta which ara made available cover all aides of tha
issues. • . . Tha public interest ia abused by half-
truths and distortions. a*
Reporters apparently ware uniJBpressed by this
policy statement. One senior military correspondent said,
"Sot only is national aecurity interpreted in the broadest
and most ingenious ways to block information but informa-
tion is withheld for national interest* personal interest,
policy reasons* and privilege for • * • reasons as VLBJ
won*t like it.** The reporter continued that the MoSamara
memorandum did little to relieve the barriera for newsmen*
instead it made amply clear that the legal barriers to




In March 1966* Clark Clifford succeeded Hcflamara as
secretary of Defensa. Leaks were one of the first problems
tackled by the new secretary. »mong his earliest official
actions was an order for a security investigation throughout
DOD. Pentagon sources described him as "unpleasantly
surprised* when he read stories about mattars he thought
were classified.




author that when Clifford came to DOS), the military relaxed
for a few moatha and actually opened up. But Whan tha new
Pefenae Secretary fait thinge getting out of hand, tha
aituation tightened up again.
Tha press suggested, however* that Clifford was a
general improvement over MeHamara mm far aa tha news
climate was concerned. This waa exemplified during 1966
whan preea criticise was lighter than in pravioua years.
*n exception waa madia reaction to certain information
released in conjunction with tha capture of the U. S.
tfavy*e ahip J6& ftidkia*
The credibility of &GD waa again caat in doubt
after tha Kavy's ship and ita 83-man craw ware aeiaed by
tha north Koreans in January. Tha Defease ftepartment. aa
wall aa the White House, immediately and emphatically
inaistad that tha ahip had bean operating in international
waters "at all atages according to every indication that we
have."85
But on February 4, however* McMamara and Secretary
of State i>ean Rusk acknowledged that the Pueblo had bean
under radio silence for a ten-day period before the capture
I i
and "might" have entered Worth Korean territorial watera.
Whatever tha oircumatancea behind the scenes within govern-
stent—and obvioualy there were many—the public could only







As President ttixon prepared to take office,
Moulding prepared to leave POD. The in-coming Secretary of
Defense* Melvln Laird, wa« strongly ur<jed by Qoulding to
keep Dan ttenkin—his deputy since 1967—aa hi© successor.
According to Goulding, Henkin had allies in the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and both previous secretaries of
Defense*87 President Nixon and Laird withstood heavy
Republican political pressure and nominated Henkin—a life-
time Democrat—as the new *£D(P») on *pril 30. 1969. Be
was confirmed by the Senate on may 20« and sworn into
office on May 25. Prior to his new appointment* Henkin
served as Acting AED(tft) •
Benkin was a Coast Guard combat correspondent
during World war XI* Following the war he worked as a
reporter (1945-1948) on the q*Kl*re* **p$app in California.
In 1948 he became assistant editox—and later editor—of
the JtoWUi&l &l tfcfi. Lzm& XsxtSMM. covering the Pentaoon until
he joined the Defense Department. He served as Director of
Operations in the 0?SD(PA) from October 1965 until he was
named Deputy T&Di&r) in March 1967.
Richard G. Capen* Jr., assumed the position of
Principal Deputy AsDtPP) in January 19*9 and Jerry It* Pried-
heim was sworn in as Deputy /-8D(P*-> in March. Capon* who
served eight years as a corporate director of public affairs












Secretary of Sefenee for legislative Affairs in January
1970. Friedheia* who served aa Ifrees Secretary and Mili-
tary Affairs *ssisrant and later £xo>eutiva *aaiatant to
Sanator John Tower* R~Texas, replaced Capan as Principal
Deputy in January*
On March 3i. 1970* Brigadier general Danisl
*Chappie" Jasaea* Jr.* wae aworn in aa Deputy &8D(F*)*
Jaafcea--a career U* S. Mr Force officar—caae to SOD after
serving a yaar aa Coasaander of tha 7272nd Flying Training
King at Wheelus fc&X Baae in 2*ibya*
Both Freaident Nixon and Bafanaa Secretary Laird
entered office daterminal to eliminate the credibility gap
and Maintain an "open* adminiatration. Sixon appointed
Herb Klein aa director of Coosiunic&tions for tha executive
branch and Ron Xiegler aa White Bouse prsea aacratary*
Klein atatad* -Truth will ha tha hall&ark of tha Hixon
administration. **®
In February 1969 Klein aaid ha flatly rejected tha
1962 statement by Sylvester that tha government **haa tha
right to lie* to aave itaalf in tha approach of a nuclear
confrontation, like tha Cuban nlaaile criaia* instead ha
fait that tha government in that kind of epot must *s«y
nothing that it can't back up* and decline comment if a
truthful anawer will compromie© or jeopardise national
a
aecurity.






generated critic!** during the sixties. Be &aid h© will fee
the only person to invoke executive privilege to withhold
IN Iinformation from Congress. During that same month.
Secretary Laird-*~she tenth Secretary of Defease—issued a
•at of public information principles which w^re prefaced by
it
To asaura that tha American people ara fully
informed about matters of national defense* X intend
that tha Department of Defense ahall conduct ita
activities In an opon manner, consistent with tha need
for security. This means that unclassified information*
othar than that exempted by tha Freedom of Information
Act* must be readily accasaible to tha public and tha
i.91
One of the major changes mada by Laird and Rankin
was tha elimination of routine background sessions for tha
pr*9» as they wara oonductad under McHamara and continued
undar Clifford—held at 3*00 p.m. every Thursday Cor
Pentagon reporters md personally conductad by the secre-
tary of Dafensa. Another stop initiated was tha daily
lit 00 a.m. briefing for tha military correspondents*
usually conducted tyy Jerry Friedheiis.
The level of media criticism of Defense news activ-
ities declined during 1969. Media representatives not
affiliated directly with the Pentagon initially felt that
While the situation generally improved at the White House*
tha situation remained about the same at DGD under the new
administration.
Frobably the most critical attack aimed at DOC
during 1969 was Sigma Delta Chi*a annual report by the
H I ';;• |iM MB
I mH
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committee on freedom of information. It accused Lairc? of
reopening the Pentagon's credibility gap with an *exagger-
ated" adscription of the sise and threat of tact Soviet 9S~9
missile and its "first strike" capability against the
United State*. On other issues* tils committee said that
suppression of information, as well as resorting to deceit*
would apparently continue to be standard procedures at the
92
Pentagon.
Critics felt that the defense Department's elabor-
ate process of classifying information prevented oven the
Congress from gaining access to the facts it need** in
order to make informed judgments on matters of military
spending and policy in 1969.
Xt was stated the Pentagon "was still controlling
the content of the news with methods developed and refined
1
1
in the 1960s** On the Vietnam issue* critics suggested
that SOD's credibility remained as suspect as it had been
under Laird's predecessors.
The Defense Department's public affairs structure
also came under fire in December 1969 when Senator
fulbright charged that BOB was spending millions of dollars
on public relations programs that promote military activity
rather than merely furnish information about it. He said
that the 000 was spending about $27*0 million for public
relations compared to $2*8 million ten years earlier* ---
response* Benkia reaffirmed Laird's position that *g»ropa~




Xn general* VQ& information procedures and policies
under the Laird-Hankin team have not mat with the level of
criticism experienced throughout th& sixties. Unlike
pravioua *$£(?*) s* HenXin has not boon singled out by the
Washington press corps as a target of personal criticism.
Potentially explosive incidents casta ana passed
without stirring up heated debate within the madia over
DOO*s handling of the public affairs aspects. $&e such
instance was the shooting down of the wavy's 2C-121 air-
craft by the North Koreans while on a mission from its base
at *tsugi* Japan* on frpril 14* 1969. This crisis did not
create the negative reaction observed during similar inci-
dents during the 1960s.
garly in 1970* ilenkln said* "booking back, in the
past 1$ months we have made additional information available
to the public in significant areas where public discussion
previously had been restricted*'* He cited chssical warfare
and biological research, activities in Laos, and the growth
of the Soviet Navy as examples. Recognising this policy
may draw criticism from a certain quarter of the media*
Henkln saidi
There will be those who will charge that this
represents "saber rattling" on our part. We feel that
this is an unfounded charge. To those who make it* we
ask, *Do you want us to stop this flow of information?*
The answer is invariably t "HO ...*.... Nonathe-
less* you will see some editorial criticism of this
open news policy. ... X see the importance of mili-




resources probably steadily decreasing. X see this
against the background of the Soviet threat* the
Chinese throat* the complexity of tfca world ia which wo
live* and the International responsibilities. . • . 95
2a Itet* Phil Gouldiag called the Bepajfeasat of
Defense information organisation the "biggest public
affaire kingdom" on earth.
In his study of public relations and government
published in 1951* J* JU ft. Pimlett noted*
It is one thing to say in general tanas what
government information may and may not do. It is not
so easy to interpret the generalisations in practice or
to guarantee that the boundaries of the admittedly
legitimate are not transgressed. 97
This observation is equally valid 19 years later
and particularly applicable when assessing the public
affairs activities at the Pentagon.
In retrospect* two veteran regulars from the
Pentagon prmmm corps gave the author their recollections
and impressions on how the environment of the sixties beers
on the newsgathering process in 1970.
One reporter said that when Mcxastara first came in
to office* top oofease officials became more accessible—
although the newsman was not convinced they were terribly
more communicative*
mttsmara wanted complete control. *ll during the
1950s men in uniform did a lot of talking. It was a
natter of policy then for the military to explain things*
such as the evils of Communism* fteSamara came to the
Pentagon seeing no reason for military leaders to say
anything in public* but also saw no reason for them to
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appear before congressional committees* Be -jot set
straight fast on that*
The reporter said the Monitor directive had its
affect
i
They did it and then* with fanfare* they announced
they were doing away with it, bat really haven't—it
•till exists. But, don't try to saddle Sylvester with
that one* X don't think he was silly enough to order
such Monitoring i JtcKsmara ordered him to do it.
Consenting on McMamara, he stated* "Truth to
was what he said it was. He thought tie had
se
s at his finger tips to everything."
Another experienced regular viewed the climate at
the Defense Department in 1970 mm it was influenced by the
sixties* He 9*16 there has been a "swothering on free
discussion*—but not necessarily "tussling -—of the laxamm
starting at the beginning of the decade* "It was a care-
fully organised and coordinated campaign after 1961,'* he
said* Speaking to the current situation he added
t
X find you cannot get to see people as easily*
Even old friendships don't produce contacts; people are
hesitant* They find it easier to avoid a meeting with
newsmen and face questions that come up after a story
appears, than be asked who did you see, what did you
talk about* That becomes annoying*
It's the whole procedure of investigations;
explaining press contacts and that whole process which
started out with a controlled monitored interview and
which has persisted to this day* That whole process
works against frank discussion of news material and
news Information that should occur and X feel did occur
on a much wider scale before l»fel.
I won't say a free flow /of information/, but it
seemed X could see more people with less inhibition and
discuss their fields better than X can today."
: . - • -.: -C •,«.•
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The first reporter described how military and
civilian officials ware influenced by the sixties
t
What is really distressing is what has happened to
the military men and indeed to the civilians that run
the services as a result of the legacy of the McHanara
era. If the Secretary of Defense determined that he
would settle everything* that he knew it all* this is
bound to have a deadening effect in the services;
stiffling initiative and all that sort of thins
•
B At the_jsame tine he was doing this* his *SD(P*)/Sylvestax/ wa& under great pressure and did the seas
thing /control/ of the information system* So the
information officer in the service got the feeling that
he'd jest do his tour and make no rippl&s until he was
transferred. Yet • . , the civilians /today/ are
starting to loosen up**®®
Press criticism of Defense news policies has been
plentiful since the department was created in 1947. The
•beer volume of critical press reaction did taper off
during the period 1*60-1969. The bulk of criticism was in
the early and middle part of the decade*
Hewsmen appeared most concerned over the increasing
threat to their informal contacts at the Pentagon. Without
these sources* the military correspondent would have to
rely on sources outside the military beat* news releases*
or simply take the word of those officials who advocate the
party line or Defense "policy." Their concern is under-
standable. HI worse this could lead to the demise of the
watch-dog at the Pentagon* at best it would mean super-
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charged a "brass curtain* bad been lowered at the Pentagon
and that a "curtain of censorship* enveloped the place.
See gditag & ^hUa^t, o«c. 15. 1962* 14. ?s part of its
report, the SXUC committee said that &©& had a weakly stack
Of claeaified documents "higher than tha Entire State
Building.* It added that tha Pentagon relied on executive
privilege and mattars of aseurlty in order to withhold
_.
material. moss aaid that tha present attitude /in 1960/
of tha Pentagon appeared to he "when in doubt* classify J*
See The Moae Ctotamittea* 1955— , * University of Missouri
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29
It was felt that government seereey represented
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llftlP^Ti+f- Vol. XXV, January I960* 21. Seereey was—and
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the Pentagon because of the multitude of legitimately
classified material which hears on national security*
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press corps was at odds with Sylvester during his six
years in offlee (longer than anyone else has held that
position) * reporters closer to him wrote that he was a man
of loyalty* courage* and selfless dedication who took the
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feelings of the Prasident and the Secretary of defense.
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coxrespondents and a man who fought for newsmen behind the
scenes*
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342bM*« 263. Although the immediate debate over
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President Kennedy wrote McKamara on F&b. a, 1962* H I do not
intend to permit subordinate officials of our career
services to bear the brunt of congressional incruiry into
policies which are the responsibilities of their superiors.
'
See Mollenhoff . "Managing the Mews. tffifflHtfm Rapport&.
December 1962* 4.
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the U. S.
3d
2*Jmm« «ay 19, 1961. 21.
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*
rtopsTtmsnt- sit timtamti ClaBCti.vs Wu 5,23ft»U* May 31. 1961*
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This feeling was not unfounded since DOC and the
State Department were forged even closer together in the
decision-making process involving U. 8. security shortly
after World War XX. With the emergence of the Third World
countries neither departwent had the freedom to fonc policy
or make major decisions on its own. This relationship had
been cemented by the early 1960s. Both departments were
strongly intertwined with the mission of executing U. ft.
commitments abroad. In addition. White Souse occupants
began to play a more prominent role in daily determinations
involving international involvement. More coordination was
required and at higher levels. This was—and still is—an
obvious irritant to correspondents. The immediate impact
of this intra-departmsntel coordination on reporters was
further delays in receiving information.
41Many critics charged that C*BD(P*) was too large
and the number of military mo& civilian personnel should be
cut way down. The reference in the text is found in John M.
Swomley. Jr.* Ihtt Military fitlW.rtBmt.t (Bostons Beacon
Press. 1964)* 127.
42Gerry Van der meuvel* "Reporters Don't Bee £ya~
to~£ye on Freedom of Information. WAt*** at EttfeUtfaitf*











t tA am »t< os
•
.. .:. i J ,
Much of the criticism against Sylvester's
positions was not aimed at the issu«s# but rather that ho
publicly admitted what tha pr ?as already knew and had
learned to live with. See appendix C for a description of
Sylvester's comments.
J&K XflKfe Xiamm* Oct* 31. 1964. 0an Ximmo wrote
"The news 'weaponry* concept implies a combination of the
worst of both worlds—the use of secrecy to avoid letting a
reporter in on what is going on and the use of *plmm»&
publicity' in order to exploit correspondents as a tool of
bureaucracy. » See Ifimmo* MWStilitftflirlntf JL& Washington* 192.
es
witcover. "The Surliest Crew in Washington
*
n 13.
Sylvester's directive reads "The substance of each inter*
view and telephone conversation with a media representative
will be reported to the appropriate public information
office before the close of business that day. ft report
need not be made if a representative of the public informa-
tion office is present at the interview.
*
4Sruce Ladd. SjJjUjsl JUbl cr*AL^Li i*y (new York* The
Hew *aeriean Library* Inc.* 1968)* 33. There were numerous
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Polaris submarines to save money. George Wilson of the
£OSJL wrote that those officials questioned were asked to
take lie detector tests but refused to do so. The Moss
Committee conducted an investigation of the case and
announced later that DOC officials stated formally that no
polygraph exams had been given > none had been requested.
sad that none was required since the source of the leak had
been determined through other Investigative means, during
an interview* Wilson agreed that such tests were not given
but that officials certainly were threatened with them. Me
said that one of his sources told him of one person who was
placed in a room by himself and told, "You »T0 the only one
who has not agreed to take a lie detector test.* tflison
thought that if his story had not been printed, the persons
under interrogation would have been ^xm9m\a£^6 to take the
tests. See Report of the 1969 Sigma Delta Chi *dvance«ent
of freedom of Information Committee* 17.
47&aport of the 1963 Sigma Delta Chi Advancement of
Freedom of Information Committee* 7.
48Clarfc Mollenhoff* BaSWilngS &* nsuflfTilTy t***w













of th*3Se feelizvjs are found in tha Sigma
Delta Chi Report of th* 1963 Freedom of Information
Committee. 5.
5 San H. Bagdikian. "The Jtews Managers. * Saturday
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—only tapering off at the end of the decade.
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true in 1965 was not true during the second half of the
sixties. Most correspondents that covered the conflict
found littla in the form of unrealistic practices that
could he termed censorship, those rules on reporting that
did exist verts mutually agreed upon by both the media and
government officials. During the entire Vietnam conflict,
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1966. Wb established a Southeast f-sia Division in mi to
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Pentagon reporters.
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^itcover. "The Surliest Crew in Washington. 14.
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zaoyd Norman. ammmmlmmfc's Pentagon correspondent,
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Goulding. Confirm fi£ Usw., 15. This appeared to
fee a deliberate deception to the press end the public*
However* Ooulding—the acting *SD(?*) at the time—stated
that the information immediately available indicated the
aircraft did not in fact enter the French forbidden sone
and COD released this fact* lie said facts that cans in
later proved this assertion wrong and the COD set the
record straight*
**Viec Admiral Rlekover (USu-retired)— father of
the Bevy's nuclear'-powered submarine—was cited as an
example* It was suggested that had it not been for the
press , he probably would never have been heard of and he
would not have received the congressional support for the
development of the nuclear submarine program.
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Report of the 1966 Sigma Delta Chi Advancement of
Freedom of Information Committee , d*
lki&. . reporter not named in report*
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Fred Hoffman* Associated l*ress military corre-
spondent, "The Close-Mouthed Pentagon, " Patella* jftfefe .
Overseas Frees Club, 89.
66Gary im Roy Werner, *The 'Credibility Gap'—1966
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Prestige Gatekeepers View Government Handling of Vietnam
Information'* (unpublished master's thesis, University of
Wisconsin, 1967), 57*
67Morley Safer, CBS, Xb& mtXsm* «*«!» 6, 1966, 24.
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"Tad Ssulc, Hsm York, Xiflstt* quoted in "The
Trumpets of Government, * ftcsadom ft£ information fift&tsx
Report Hfiu. £31* University of Missouri, November 1969, 5*
I IGoulding, c^^rm or. &a&&* 49 and SI* Goulding
also wrote that for all practical purposes, Spain called
the shots for 30 days* He said Sylvester was asked by
State Department to do everything he could to avoid blaming
the Spanish government for our silence* Sylvester honored
this request* Goulding added that as time passed the wrath
of much of the press corps turned into incredulity and the
incredulity into disgust* It was not until the chairman of
the Spanish Huclear energy Board let word out during an
interview—44 days after the crash—that the W* $• govern-
ment could finally admit a bomb was lost* See Goulding,
Con^fw or, D*»ny. 39-40*
70
Report of the 1967 Sigma Delta Chi Advancement of
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7Sfor additional information on the incident see
Goulding. Confirm OK £ftU£. In his book, Goulding wrote of
the importance to the U. «. government of an isolated
action in the field *in thla day of instant world-vide
communication and sensitive irit«rnational maneuvering. " Ha
added that a second lesson learned from the Soviet ship
mishap is thatt "In this age, what is said and how it is
said can often be nore important than what is £&&£•*
J2ai4.# 143.
76Ladd, Qu»Jja« 138. Goulding noted that Me^amara's
personal preference was to call the ship an intelligence
collector, but yielded to security and diplomatic arguments.
See Goulding. ConUna son Esw* us.
Seymour M. Hersh, "(But l>on*t Tell Anyone X Told
You) Prom the Pentagon, " Xfet JttM &*&ubli£* *>c. 2, 19*7,
14. Harsh used to cover the Pentagon heat lor Associated
Press.
MCorrespondent "H, * personal interview, Washington.
P. C, June 1970.
7
*Mm Xocfc SiAdm editorial. Oct. 22, 19*7.
soCorrespondent "R," personal interview, Washington,
D. C, June 1970.
8IReprinted in the Report of the 1967 Sigma Delta
Chi Advancement of Freedom of Information Committee, 8.
8aiftid-
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*fiULtaj£ * FtfhU«h«r . *pril 20, 1968, 18.
^Correspondent "I.* personal interview, Washington.
D. C, June 1970.
85McGaffin and Knoll. Anything fiu& ihm X£ii£J*» IS*
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"Superchief of Information, * Xi£i&» Dec. 6. 1968*
30* Klein had b*en xiitot of the San {&*«& Union, since
1939.
Jules *ritcov«r, "Washington* focusing on Uixon, "
gpltaaalft JQumnllsa asximtt. winter. 1968~69. is.
JtEJttdfia fll Information idmXL (Columbia, mo. t
FOX Center. School of Journalism)* Vol. X, Ho. 6. March-
*pril 1969, 2.
it
"Public Information J?rineipi«s, * Office of the
Secretary of Defense Memorandum for Correspondents,
&mLM&l &&lmmft& MOm. 153-69. March 5. 1969. The Laird
memorandum was addressed to» Secretaries of tha Military
Departments* Chairman of tha Joint Chiefs of Staff t
Director of Defense Research and Engineering* Assistant
Secretaries of Defense; Assistants to the Secretary of
Defense* and Directors of the Defense Agencies. Laird also
said. "Because of the importance I attach to this matter, X
want to state certain principles which X expect to be
followed in the conduct of public affairs activities of
this Department.* They ares
1. Our first concern must be the security of the
United States and the safety of our Anted forces.
Therefore* information which would adversely affect the
security of our country or endanger our men should not
be disclosed.
2. The provisions of the freedom of Information Act
(5 USC 552) will be supported in both letter and spirit.
3. Ho information will be classified solely because
disclosure might result in criticism of the Department
of Defense. To avoid abuse of classification proca-
duxes, we must adhere strictly to the criteria set
forth in Executive Order 10501.
4. Our obligation to provide the public with accur-
ate , timely information on major Department of Defense
programs will require, in sons instances, detailed
public information planning and coordination within
the Department and with other government agencies.
Kowevcr* X want to emphasise that the sole purpose of
such planning and coordination will be to expedite the
flow of information to the public. Propaganda has no
place in Department of Defense public information
programs.
92fceport of the 19e9 Sigma Delta Chi advancement of
freedom of Information Committee. 16. The 56-9 could also
be cited as an example of how the new DGD team is trying to
get more information on Soviet capabilities out to the









"You may have noticed this saoming on the front page of the
WsShiaytOn £fiftt« a photograph of a Soviet SS-9 multi-
warhaad missile reentry. In tha past it would have been
impossible to hav* mad* that picture available to tha
American public* but we ware abla to gat approval for
declassification. . . •" fcaniel Z. Henkin, ft£Z>(PA) * talk
given at Thomas Jefferson Symposium held *pril 23-24, 1970,
at tha State Bepartmant in Washington* D. C, for about 300




SsS* XSBCJL HmM.0 Dec. 2* 1969.
95Benkin at Thomas Jefferson Symposium* <*prijt 1970.
MGoulding, Co«**ir» or. &&&£« 158.
97
J. A. fc« PimlOtt* fful^^g ttftlitfrionfl sjq£ *—^ig*«
(Princeton, is* j. t Princeton University Press*
1951)* 73.
Correspondent "H* * personal interview* Washington*
C. C. « June 1970.
99
Correspondent *E,* personal interview* Washington*
P. C. , June 1970.
100Correspondent *H«* personal interview,
Washington* D. C. * June 1970.

CHaiTOR II
STUDY PBQCKPURBS *HD m&BBm*TlQU
Data for this study were gathered by personal
interviews and mail-questionnaires.
Study fftrticipftnfi
Military news correspondents covering the Pentagon
in June 1970 ware selected for this study. The official
list of the Pentagon press corps compiled by the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public r ffairs) was
used as the guide. This was updated in Ppril 1970* when
the author visited the Pentagon and had discussions with
the Directorate for Defense Information (DDZ) and his
Deputy Director. Based on these sources plus constats by
Lloyd Norman, BswsjratfK (considered by Defense officials to
be the unofficial spokesman for the press corps), it was
determined there were 29 "regulars,** 15 "irregulars. • and
nine •military journal** correspondents who covered the
military beat.
Thw Mm of Zntanim TnGhnlqun
Since the study concentrates on "regulars,** I
decision was made to conduct personal int^rvi^ws with as
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many of them as possible, file use of mail-questionnaires
for the sole data gathering technique was ruled out since
Washington correspondents are extremely busy. The study
would he of limited value unless data were successfully
collected from most of the regulars. Therefore* two
primary considerations dictated the use of personal inter-
views j (a) the amount of material requested from regulars
would have meant a lengthy and time consuming mall-
questionnaire and (b) since these are busy men with demand-
ing schedules* it was felt that being there in person to
conduct the interviews* at the correspondents* convenience*
would increase the participation of regulars.
See appendix B for a sample of the interview
schedule (guide) employed during interviews.
The tt&ll-Qasitioraaijca.
Since it was not possible to spend more time in
Washington than the two-week period in June 1970 for inter-
viewing newsmen* and because much of the information
requested from regulars was not applicable to irregulars* a
modified version of the interview schedule was pz*pa&*& for
irregulars and military journal correspondents.
Appendix F contains the questions included in the
mail-questionnaire.
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An extensive survay of pertinent literature was
conducted to establish what visits ware sxpr***«*£ by the
media about Department of Defense information activities
and military correspondents during the period 1960*1969.
This provided mn insight into general media reaction
to the handling of public affairs on & routine basis* as
well as their opinions on the barriers and news sources at
the Pentagon. Data collected serves as the basis for
Chapter 2 of this study which offers a setting for the
primary data gathered.
fpril Visit to the Pentagon
During the period April 7 through April 11* the
author visited the Pentagon and discussed the proposed
study with officials in Q».SD(PA) . Personal interviews were
conducted with Daniel 2. Henkin. Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Public Affairs (AAD/PA)? his Principal Deputy*
Jerry K. Friedheimr and public affairs officers in OASD(PA)
and the navy Office of Information. Their views were
solicited on the newsgathering process at the Defense
Department, including barriers and news sources.
Informal discussions were held with a number of the
regulars in the Pentagon press corps to gain further insight
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also served as an opportunity to get initial reactions from
correspondents to the proposed study and gain acceptance
snd support of the project by veteran correspondents.
Their reaction to th«* proposal was favorable.
This trip also helped to refine the author's own
observations made while serving as a public affairs officer
in the Pentagon.
Initial Letter Sent in May
On May 18, 1970, individually typed letters were
sent to regulars and three military journal correspondents
who work out of the press room. This correspondence
outlined the project, described the general areas to be
covered by the study, and sought their cooperation.
appendix contains a copy of the general format
used for this letter.
Pro-Testing the Interview Schedule
Another trip to Washington, D. C, was not feasible
before the June trip when interviews were to be conducted.
Pretesting the interview schedule on local Madison nawsmen
was not appropriate since the information desired was
relevant only to Washington correspondents. Therefore,
four officers (three navy Lieutenant Coamanders and one
*rmy Lieutenant Colonel) who had tours of duty at the
Pentagon as WOs and who dealt with Members of the press
corps, were prs-tested in Madison, Wisconsin.
i* bents oil-*8
Immh - ' '










Interview Phases June 1970
Between Juna 5 and June 1*. 1970, 29 interviews
vera conducted with military newa correspondents. Twenty-
six of tha respondents %fara regulars and three were mili-
tary journal newsman t&£na& 9aaeg*^9 J&IUU&X* RFMiy~><*tfY~ft4E
•COCCA 2*Ass> and fiJLA£A anjjl stgipefl l
.
The author was permitted use of an office (21739)
just down tha corridor from the press room. This served as
the base of operations during the period* Seventeen inter-
views were conducted in this space * seven were conducted at
the correspondents downtown Washington bureaus (three at
the national Press Building, one at Time-Life Building, one
at CBS and another at ABC Building). The remaining inter-
views were conducted at the following places i two in the
Pentagon press room, one during a luncheon engagement in
the Pentagon, one at a correspondent's homei and one on the
Pentagon mall (area outside but on Pentagon grounds). Cms
of the regulars was out of town during this period, but the
author was able to interview him by telephone for half an
hour on June 19j questions not covered at that time were
answered by separate correspondence*
The author prepared an interview schedule composed
mostly of "open** or unstructured questions and several
"closed* or structured questions* To gain full benefit of
the opinions of correspondents, ^n effort was made to allow
the interviews to run their natural course* Essentially
dV
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the B&B& questions w*r© asked, but not necessarily in the
sane sequence* This enhanced the interview by delving into
specific areas thought to be important by the correspondent
without cutting responses short in order to move on to the
next question* The interview focused attention on the
"what" and "why** behind acre superficial answers of "yes"
or "no."
Because of the nature of this interview technique
("focused* interview), not every question was specifically
asked every reporter* Esther* basic opening questions to
key subject areas were asked of ail newsmen and* depending
on the responses that followed* numerous "probe" questions
were used to clarify meanings or pursue an area considered
important to the individual* Effort was made* however* to
ensure each type of media was asked each question addressed
in the analysis* frequently* the respondent covered a
subject area during the discussion that overlapped another
topic*
This technique proved successful* Mi those inter*
viewed were highly talkative and informative* They were
cooperative and seemed to display greatest interest and
become more candid as they relamed and the interview progres-
sed* Whil* alasost all of the interviews were conducted
during normal working hours* interviews ran in length from
45 minutes to three and one-half hours; the average time
spent interviewing each correspondent was between one and
".OH" *0
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two hours, four of the interviews were completed in two
sessions*
h tape recorder was used daring ail but four of the
interviews. Hone of the respondents objected to this
device* utilised to permit an informal relaxed atmosphere
during the interview and eliminating the cumbersome task of
taking lengthy notes* which—besides extending the time
involved—would have kept the interview from flowing
smoothly from one subject to another. It is recognised
that the question has been raised that a tape recorder
creates an on-the-record atmosphere which might keep
respondents from expressing frank opinions. However* the
Director of the Wisconsin Survey Research Laboratory*
Professor Harry Sharp* agreed with the author that the use
of a recorder for this study would not be detrimental or
necessarily affect responses.
Cooperation received from the correspondents during
the interview period was excellent* Only one of the 29
regulars declined participation in the study.
while not actually engaged in interviewing* the
author remained close to the press room, normally one or
two interviews were conducted before the 11 100 a*m* news
briefing and two or three during the afternoon* fc normal
day ran from (MOO a.m. through esOO p.m. (latest was
3*00 p.m.).
*i v- i





Xnt«rvi*-sws ware coded during the summer months and
the mail-quasti©nnair« was prepared and sent te IS irregu-
lars and two regulars who the author was unable to inter-
view in July plus the one regular who was partly interviewed
by telephone i six military journal correspondents and three
foreign media representatives*
The package sent included a six and one-quarter
page questionnaire* cover letter* and self-addressed
stamped envelope* Twenty-seven questionnaires were sent to
military news correspondents; 14 were returned completed;
two returned the questionnaire with a letter stating they
could not participate because (a) one foreign media repre-
sentative was too new on the job and (b) one military
journal newsman said he could not add anything to what was
given the author during an interview with the reporter
assigned to cover DOD for T-nay-aavy~?±r £px£& Xtaaa* ?He
exact fog*** of participation is shown in Appendix A*
ftgaaflntatlan
*t the outset, ail correspondents were told their
responses were to be presented anonymously in the analysis*
Because of their continuing contact with Defense officials*
this was considered the most advisable way to get reporters
to be frank* therefore* quotes contained in the text are
attributed to the correspondent by other means* e*g*«
"regular*" "irregular** '•newspaperman*" "veteran reporter*"
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etc. Footnotes refer only to Correspondent "A," *B, " «
ftesportses are presented separately for regulars,
irregulars* and military journals correspondents. Where
there are meaningful differences the data wer© further
reduced and presented by media type under "regulars"
category, plus irregulars, and military journal newsjsMjn.
The use only of percentages throughout the analysis
would he misleading when categories within the press corps
included only a few correspondents* Therefore, when
percentages are used, the corresponding number of reporters
is included. However, in most cases* the terms "most of,**
"about half," "one-quarter.* etc. are used. Tables are
presented mostly by frequencies for the same reason.
Findings are illustrated with direct quotations
from the newsmen in order to help clarify meaning and
enhance readability.
Cadiag Frocatiarsi
All coding of interviews and mail questionnaires
was done by hand. Interviews were initially transcribed
in longhand, ensuring all blanks in the interview schedule
were filled in with corresponding responses (during inter-
views, the author had taken as many notes as possible).
Kent, Closed* questions were coded, while *fepen-
aaded* questions were reduced to a phrase or two for the




refined for final presentation*
The author worked frost two d<*vic*3» during the
initial draft of the study analysis* la) coding sheets
which indicated th*s quantitative type* results in each
question or subject araa and (h) questions vara saparatsc
and paraphrased cosuBaiits listed under each—enabling quick
access to opiiuoos beyond tha *yes w and "no'' stages.
Tables were &xts%>*x:*4& for ready reference* unstruc-
tured questions were coded* and representative quotes
ware chosen for each question or topic. Reference was
made to tha tape recordings in order to fat accurate
responses aade by respondents.
Included in tha study arai 2B of tha 29 regulars*
six of tha 15 irregulars, and 6 of the 9 Military journal
reporters* for a total of 40 military n*sws correspondents*
Sine® only two of the three foreign isadia roprs-
seatstives w«*re abla to participate* the decision was made
not to include their responses in the study. There would
be no justification for including them in totals since I
project concentrates on the flow of information from COD to
the American public through Pentagon correspondents.
Foreign correspondents have problems unique only to thesa
•tld this srea could faaHa a study in itself.




corps in 1$60 are still covering the Pentagon in 1970,
Sevan of them participated in Underwood's study sad
include i Charles Corddry (than l»I # now wit!* aiat&tacxt
tU&) i Charles fcaadal (then Pairchild Publications* now with
ana), Ray Crowley <HRA) Lloyd Norman dfewsttssk) . Clauds
Vitas Uix Earcst Magasine) » Robert Schweits (then *&aar*S*3QT*
six foxes fc&fcistetL. now with &rar*K«vy~&i£ Force titans)
«
and fe. Edgar Frina (then Wjuahin^toa £J£oa*s& fitsx. now with
Copley Mews Service),
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Writing in the ftflhiffifoifl Journal i«« a^v^y in 1965*
Jules Witcovor described the corps of Pentagon newsmen.
Calling them the "surliest crew in Washington," he wrote*
By and large, the regulars see themselves as a
squad of guerrilla fighters in a journalistic army of
desk jockeys. They consider their beat to be tougher
and store complex than any other, and they rate the
department news policies under which they must function
much more restrictive than those anywhere else in
Washington. The Pentagon regulars bitterly resent the
occasional suggestion that they are cry-babies, in
their view* fighting—and criticising—these restrictive
policies is a continuing and major part of covering the
beat. 1
Phil Goulding discussed the military correspondents
at length in his book gojafirm, or. &aa*. published in 1970*
The ex-*&D(P».) and former Pentagon reporter wrote that the
Pentagon press corps generally is underestimated *in the
curious strata of Washington newspapermen. Moulding made
the following observations about newsmen in the capital
t
Men covering the State department, men interested
chiefly in the "Big Issues,** smoke their pipes, speak
from the depths of their bellies as good diplomats
should, use the word "pragmatic*1 in their stories and
33
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look down their noma* at the hardware-happy Pentagon
reporters who lack real understanding of the importance
of sensitive international relations.
Man covering the Whit® nous* sip a handy wins in
the parsonal relationship they almost establish with a
President ... and look down their noses at the inter-
national thaorista assigned to State* who lack real
understanding of practical political presidential
realities.
Kan covering Capitol Bill slip into a soft-shoe
intimacy with Congressmen and senators • • • and* in
their confidence that Congress in the true source of
power and true Manifestation of democracy* look down
their noses at all reporters working in any part of the
bureaucratic Executive ©ranch.
£11 three of these groups write news stories on
major defense issues* most of them with an appalling
lack of preparation—although in their own fields many
of these reporters are excellent. 2
on his study of military correspondents in
early I960. George Underwood concluded j
The representative Washington military corre-
spondent is a skilled* seasoned* competent journalist
with a commendable m&rmm of responsibility to the
nation and the reader-listener"-viewer.
Under great time pressure and considerable specs
(time) restrictions* he di^s along an enormous beat for
the essential military facts and their meaning. He
grapples daily with an incredibly complex story which
somehow must be made both interesting and cosqprshensibie
to the average citisen. He encounters more 9m& higher
news barriers than do other journalists* primarily
because of the massiveness of the organisations and the
sensitiveness of the story he is covering. 3
Press Corps Composition
In 1970 (June) there were 10 types of news media*
SI separate news outlets* and 57 correspondents in the
••tie.- .»/**• to
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Pentagon press corps. The categories of media included!
daily newspapers (14) ? wire services (3)r newspaper chains
(3)j feature syndicate (1); news magasines (3); radio and
television (6) t business sad special interest publications
(3)? military journals (6)j foreign media (3); and govern-
sent outlets (2).
Exclading the government and foreign news outlets*
there were 29 regulars* 15 irregulars* and 9 military journal
correspondents. Underwood found that in i960 there were 34
regulars and irregulars* plus 10 military journal reporters
—he did not distinguish between regulars and irregulars*
*lso« in 1960 there were 31 news outlets* compared to the
51 in 1970.
Personal Data
Military gorragpandanta ' fgs
Reporters in the Pentagon press corps ranged in age
from 26 to SO. The mean age for regulars was 40 years
i
median age 43 years. Mean age for all correspondents was
42 years and the median age was also 43 years. This makes
members of the 1970 press corps somewhat younger than the
1960 group. Underwood reported the mean age then to be
43.5 years and the median age as 41.0 years.
*s Table I indicates* in June 1970* five reporters
were under 30 years old* one*fourth were between 30 sitA 39*







ftGK OF HXhltmY 0&*Sma90MmW&& (June 1970)
Q. What is your present age—closest birthday? (a*40)
Under
Correspondents 30 30-39 40-49 50-S9 60 plus
*iM+p
.iu.wiIwmii m i*«»»—«.-— »< ii M i» i iw imrtmiBW 'Mill »')|i»i''» i iiiti*i»ii j^LJ ii«»i«»«iWii^ M«««iir-.i»i»»i.WMM^ r> I 'wij jMWMFum i mum 0m w wwm* - n -in^ .^nwM-r '
Regulars 5 7 12 2 9
Irregulars — 2 2 1 1
Military Journals ~- 1 3 2
Total*2 (n-40) 5 10 17 S 3
mwrnmrrmammmtm niiw,tni« in m
years old
Siof June 1970.
Mean age of regulars i 40 years old; asedian ages 43
oldest was
Mean age of all correspondentss 42 years old;
age i 43. The youngest correspondent was 26 and the
60 (three reporters)
•





were between SO and 59, Three correspondents were 60 years
old at the time the survey was conducted.
teffaa ,nf Birth
The 40 military correspondents included in this
study caate from 20 states* 2 foreign countries and the
District of Columbia. Six reporters were born in Illinois*
4 in Hew York, and 3 in Hew Jersey* Two newsmen a&ch were
born in 6 other states and Canada* The remaining 12 states
and Japan were birthplaces for one reporter each*
Xn I960* Underwood found that 11 reporters were
born in the state of Hew York* while 3 were born in Mary*
land* the second-ranking state at that time*
Table IX lists the birthplaces of all correspondents*
broken down by regulars* irregulars* and military journal
reporters*
.»a indicated in Table XXX, 68 per cent (35) of all
military correspondents surveyed (40) have at least
bachelor's degrees and about one-quarter (11) completed
some graduate studies; nine reporters hold master's degrees*
Only three of the 28 regulars did not graduate from
college*
This level of education is higher than either
Underwood (i960) or Leo ftosten (1936) found in their
studies* The data from each are compared belowi
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Include* 20 states* two foreign countries, and

























MfgtHMW GR&Z& OF SCHOOLING
Q* What was the highest grade of schooling you completed?
If attended collage* What was your major field? If
graduated t What degree (s) do you hold? (n»40)





























Total (n-40) 1 4 35 2 9
One regular was majoring in Journalism and the
other in Business Law. One military journal reporter was
majoring in History and one in Journalism*
This column includes those with graduate work
and/or H*/MS degrees. Majors for the 19 regulars Who
received only a bachelor's degrees Journalism (&) t English
(4) i Political Science U) t International Relations (1);
Liberal *rta (I)i Economics <l)s Psychology (l)y Philosophy
(1); and £nglish~History-Political Science CD*
Majors for the four irregulars who received only a
bachelor's degrees History (1)* English tali Math and
Huclear Physic* (1)? and History and Literature of England
CD.
Majors for the three military journal correspondents
who received only a bachelor's degrees History (l)i
Journalism (1)? and English (1).
Postgraduate work was in the field of Journalism*
another in Math and nuclear Physics*
jt
The six regulars with a master's degree majored ins
Journalism (5) and Political Science (1). Majors for the
two Irregulars with M*** wares Journalism (1) and History
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Thus* there is a higher degree of education found
in the 1970 press corps. Mother indication is that
Underwood reported 8.3 per cent of his respondents held
master's degrees, coopered to 22,5 pwc cent of tbe 40 news-
sum in this study.
Only 16 of the 44 total degrees (bachelor's and
ester's) were in the field of Journalism.
Table XV shows that English was the second most
chosen major field. Th«i other major study fields are cited
in the table.
fcyaqth of Tivm In Urn
As Table V indicates, military correspondents had
been in the field of journalism an average of 19 years;
median was 24 years. Reporters ranged from five to 43
years experience in journalism. The mean for regulars was
only 18 yearst median was 24 years. The 40 newsmen repre-
sented a total of 747 years experience.
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Math and Unclear Physics X
Sub-Total 26






*Does not include correspondents with advanced
decrees.
Breakdown of degrees received by regulars,





or ¥E**S X* JQmmhXSH (tm of June 1970)
Q. How long have you h&nn in tha field of journalism?
(n~40)
*aw—casa» w in ii ii iwwBswwMt8W»WMww . iiiiii i ii , i l i —eawwc—Pinnnn < n,,u i i m ii/im—pb—
Yoars In Journalism Field
Ondor Over
Correspondents 5 5-9 10-19 20-29 30-39 40
Regulars* 4 12 9 1 2
Irregulars ••it*" 1 1
Military Journal* 3 2 1 —
Total* (n~40) $ IS 11 3 3
iiiiwi i rm i m i ii iin iM iiiiii niwwwiwiriiiiiiiinin i rr run miimrmimii mi i i rnirrniT—inirTiir~iir—
*Mean for regulars t 18 yeers in journal! ass.
Medians 24*
Moan fox all correspondents s 19. Median for alii
24* Ons military news correspondent was only in tha field
of journalism for five years* The one with the most experi-
ence (a regular) has had 43 years experience. Total years
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the length of time in journalism reported for the 13#@
press corps (mean was 30.2 years and mediant 20.0). Forty-
three per cent (17) of the 40 correspondent® lied over 20
years experience as a journalist* While only 12,5 per cent
(5 newsmen) had under ten years (4 were regulars).
lition Held an fore
^saicmrttfnt to ffnahingtan
Fourteen of the regulars were femoral assignment
reporters before becoming Washington correspondent*, th®
others held a variety of positions including* bureau chief.
Vietnam reporter* copy editor. TV station chief, student.
and editor of a government-sponsored publication. Qn& was
with Voice of America, while others were in the lew York or
central bureaus of their current news outlet.
three of the irregulars were general assignment
reporters, one was a Far sast correspondent, another a
bureau chief in 8009 Bone;. aM the sixth was a city editor.
Two of the military journal reporters were in the
service before going into journalism and becoming a
Washington correspondent. Two were general assignment
reporters* Another was a Sunday editor, and one was
assistant state editor for a large newspaper.
Military news reporters had been Washington corre-

















Mean for regulars was 10 years and sm&im was IS.
Total experience as a newsman An the capital ranged from
six months to 29 years (one of the regulars)
.
Underwood reported the average number of years for
correspondents in I960 was 12.3 (median was 11. 5 years).
*• Table VI indicates. 45 per ©ant (IS) of the press
corps in 1970 were Washington newsmen for less than five
years. The figure is about the same (46 per cent) when only
regulars are considered. Length of IIm spent in Washington
varied greatly within each media type, ffer instance, there
was 53 years experience between two of the wire service
correspondents (one WP and one API) while the other two
been in Washington less than two years. * wide z*&$® was
generally the case for other news media groups.
ft ffflntftsran
The 40 newsmen had covert the military beat an
averace of seven years; median was 12 years. For regulars
only the mean is seven years? median 12 years as a Pentagon
correspondent.
fct the time interviews were conducted (^Tune) one
regular had been assigned to the Pentagon for only about
one month, while two other regulars hi&& 24 years of experi-
ence on the Defense beat.
hm Table VX2 indicates, 14. S per cent (7) of the
military newsmen started to report military affairs after
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Years a Washington Correspondent
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*ttsan for regulars t 10 years a Washington corre-
spondent. Median score t 15*
bMean for all correspondents « 9 years; median* IS.
One reporter (regular) had only been assigned in D. c. for
six months and another (also regular) had 29 years experi-








or Y8*BS * FEwrfcooa oowRjisiom^iir
0* When did you b&gln to cover the Pentagon? <n**40)
Years as a Pentagon Correspondent
within
Last 1965- 1930- 1955- 1950- IMS-
Correspondents Year*1 1969 1964 1959 1954 1949
^*——
—
— " --—— .,..——,.,-——.» -> [nT.. 1 ^.T . |nT r - r . ^.. .- f -rr r - i rtij.n... . .minr nl - | i r iw^i mu m '. i ' nyienwim
*sgularsb 5 11 6 2 1 3
Irregulars — 2 3 — — 1
Military Journals 2 2 1 — 1
' " ' " » — »i«I M I ii.ii i .M.>——
»
II I 11 1 .m i n i -. iM i .m i ,,.,
Total <n*40) 7 13 10 4
*Since June 1969.
Mean for regulars* 7 years as a military corre-
spondent. Medians 12 years. Kt tine of interviews (June
1970) one regular had only been covering von for about a
month* while there were two who had 24 years of experience
covering military affairs*
ffi&an for all reporters t 7 years* median* 12. *
total of 13 correspondents have covered the Pentagon heat
for at least nine years. These include i 24 years (3)j 22
years (1); 21 years (l)t 20 years (1)? 15 years <!)* 13
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Pentagon press corps sine* 1961. Six reporters vers
veterans of 20 or saor-s years at DOT »
Until a few years ago, radio and television cover-
age of the Pentagon was limited to assigning various
correspondents on a part*time basis* as needed , or siiaply
to cover a specific story. One of the television reporters
described the situation to the authors
There was * lag before the networks started
covering the Defense Department. • • • Xt was not
economically desirable in earlier days. Alio, it was
just snore difficult for TV unless we had something more
than the wires and before we couldn't get this at ail.
There's a willingness for officials to talk under
Laird? not so under MeMsara.
Today it's easier to get information but still hard
to £et things on film. He must try to get interviews
or stories nobody else has* This takes more effort
than at the White House or Congress.
The change /shift to having full-tixae TV corre-
spondents assigned to ftantagon/ took place because EOSP
is aore of a story today; Vietnam had a lot to do with
it* But the ?aain Defense story now is really sway
from Vietnam. 4
Daniel Henfcin, £8D(*A), talked in March 1970 about
the ir«pact of TVi
We have costs a lone way in this area, but still
have a long way to go. The network* only have a front
page; no pace two. also there's the problem of eossr-
pression. Radio end TV news presentation does not
permit interpretation. The public gets msmm so
condensed. This leads to distortion. 5
Television correspondents said the Pentagon is too
big to cover when networks have only a minute or two to
devote to one story. One reporter recalled that the
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minutes on the My Lai incident.
Reporters admitted it is sad if anybody relies
entirely on what the networks put out to understand* to
appreciate* or to get background on international develop"
slants. Some suggested that the answer to this problem is
programming such as *60-Kinut«s H or "First Tuesday.
Another said it would help if local TV stations
listened to Washington news and filled in the gaps that
cannot be covered on national air because of time limita-
tions, instead of simply passing alon* what comes out of
the capital in synthesised form.
Henkin added to this points
Local media around the country do not query us /JLn
0*&fc(P»l/ as much as they should. That's why we're
hare. Yet they are not accustomed to dealing with us
directly/. *
One of the radio correspondents said that money
reasons prevented his outlet from assigning a reporter on a
regular basis to the Pentagon. Be began to cover Defense
in January 1969—'the first to do so for his employer.
While they now cover the Pentagon regularly* radio
newsmen are still spread thin and are responsible for
several beats t
My beat* per se* is "diplomatic correspondent .* My
base of operations tm the State department* but mili-
tary stories so often intertwine that 1 spend several
hours each day at the Pentagon. Similarly* when there
is a policy story out of the White Souse* 1*11 double-
team with our correspondent there. 1 mp^a& time on the
Hill when Laird or Rogers testify* again doubling with
one of our regulars on that beat. • • • The arrangement
at DOG is different because we have no full-time
^ 06* ao 99tanks
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correspondent there. »nd so, of necessity, I will also
cover domestic military stories from time to time, over
sad shove foraign policy related stories. 7
franqth Qt Tiffin with fltewi Outlet
Military correspondents said they had worked for
their present outlet an average of eight years (median of
11). The actual length of time ran from eight months to 21
years with the same media outlet. Mean for the regulars
was seven years and the median was 11.
Zn 1960. the average time with the present outlet
wai about the same* 8.6 years* but the median was lower
(5.5 years).
*bout 43 per cent of the 1970 press corps was with
their current news outlet less than five years in June,
while the same percentage (17 newsmen) had a tenure of 10
or more years. Table VIXI illustrates the data.
Rfltfurtine an tan .Military fimfflt
Regulars begin to arrive at the Pentagon between
9i00 and 9s 30 a.m. to start their daily routine. &? then,
some have already stopped by their offices iu the downtown
bureaus* Others check in with their bureaus by telephone
upon arrival. Each regular has a desk* phone, and file
cabinet in the press room (electronic media representatives
have a separate sound-proof room adjacent to the press
room). See Appendix s for diagrams of both rooms.
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of tBUBS with wmtsm warn owrxjsr
Q. How long have you been with your present outlet? (n»40)
Years with &ews Outlet
Under
Correspondents 5 5-9 10*19 20-29
--r-Mia r--r -i ur i t—T--n--ni iiiih i il l ir~ '- ir — " nw -nnn i j -i " i i 1 n r'Tinn i m nni iiiiiiwui i "" i - i«it t'-
Regulars 14 2 11 1
Irregulars —• 3 3 —
Military Journals 3 12
Total* <n*40) 17 6 16 1
sMean for regulars a 7 years with present outlet*
Mediant 11*
Mean all reporters : 8 years; medians 11. One cor-
respondent had only been with his news outlet tor eight
months in June 1970; a regular had been with the
outlet for 21 years*
) *x»
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Directly aeroti the hall from the ps&ma room are
•pac^s occupied toy Defense public affairs officers <P»Os)--
both Military and civilian—under the Directorate for
Defense Information (DD2).
By the time most newsman have arrived* ??Oa already
hava brought themselves up-to-date on national and inter-
national events that have taken place during tho evening
that may influence tha Defense fcepartm&nt. They than com-
Plata preparations for tha morning news briefing at lit90
a«m*
some regulars try to arrange one interview in tha
building befora tha brief. Others spend the morning
completing a story? gathering information for several
articles? arranging interviews! placing queries through
DBXf reading congressional testixsony or other related
documents t and scanning the Vietnam summary of actions
during the previous day*
Some stay at their downtown office relying on tele-
phone contacts to gather material* Others go to different
departments in Washington to talk with one of their
contacts, while some simply make the rounds of Pentagon
offices to chat informally with either $>$0s or their own
personal contacts* They seek no special piece of informa-
tion* but possibly pick up tips that may be explored later
if nothing else breaks*
Most of the regulars attend the daily briefing
conducted by Jerry Treidheim* Deputy *&>(»*) that im held
i g*l«UOOO MMfl
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down the hall from the press room la DOfc's audio-visual
studio. This session may last from a faw minutes to an
hour depending on what stories are breaking that day*
Thirty rainutaa is typical.
Bsgalars may return t© their desks, check any ass-
sages left for them, then phone their bureau to advise what
the story possibilities are for the day, end in some cases
receive guidance on which to pursue* If the briefing
produces a hard news peg, many immediately prepare their
copy and phone the story in.
If things are relatively quiet, reporters take
leave of the press room to have lunch with other newsmen or
possibly proceed to a luncheon engagement with a defense
official. Regulars are confident they will not miss any
announcements through lunch time because of the agreed-upon
news embargo on routine information.
The tempo of operations usually begins to pick up
by mid-afternoon, which generally is the busiest time of
the day for both officials and newsmen*
Deadlines dictate a reporter's pace depending on his
media outlet, newspaper reporters and chain correspondents
may work against early deadlines for p«su dailies, while
others keep an open mind for possible story leads through
the afternoon; only to lock in on their news report by 4 i00
or 5 sGO p.m. several regulars face deadline* throughout the









radio or television spots several times a day. 0£ course*
wire servics reporters face the continuous deadline to gat
their copy on tha %?ira before their competitor.
*n entirely different problem in gathering military
information confronta nowsmen not dealing with hard, fast-
breaking news. Mews magaslne correspondents with a. dead*
Una only once a weak spend their time delving into the key
issues, attainting to provide a different slant and inter-
pretation to major stories of the week«
Reporters with military journals and special
interest publications operate in much the same manner, hut
concentrate on a limited sphere of interest with their own
Select audience in mind*
Most newsmen naiee it a habit to be around the news*
room at 4 100 p.m., when the daily Defense contract releases
are made* while not all news channels give time and space
to routine contract awards, quite a number do* however,
newsmen realise there is always the chance that a major
award will be announced that merits top priority*
It is not unusual to find regulars still busy at
their desks past e«00 p.m. Many newsmen who already have
filed their story for the day remain because they said
officials have a habit of wiping their desks clear at day's
end* This frequently results in late afternoon news
releases*
Others return to their bureaus to write the main
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story of the day* working against 7tOQ or 8 3 00 p.m.
deadlines.
OMD(Pft) maintains an overnight duty public afiair*
watch. This officer im available throughout tha evening
to respond to media queries or if a story hreaks in a
raaota region overseas, ha is one of tha first to know. In
conjunction with *ttD(f>) Hsnkin and othar Defense officials,
a spacial *calX-out* (notifying military correspondents at
hosts or through their bureaus) may ha coaplated at any hour
of tha night, if officials think tha situation warrants.
Thus, whila requirements, interests, and deadlines
vary with tha diversified corps of regulars, they all hava
one thing in consson—thay keep busy avan under normal
conditions and. for most, a hectic paca during a "flap"
(fast breaking crisis situation).
"Leisure" time between gathering matsrial for
specific stories is spent studying—manuals or official
documents! conducting interviews with knowledgeable military
specialists in areas they feel weak on* or simply talking
with their informal contacts—swapping opinions tkn& pieces
of information.
Frequency of Pentagon Visits
Table IX shows that during a normal week. 22 regu-
lars (79 p9x cent) are at the Pentagon daily, five said it
varied between two and four times a week, and one reporter
visits BOD only once a week under normal conditions.
i$iaa*vo ** mmkntmkrm {JMMM0
-•
;**•* mttrnt **vs vw< on ?>; .ut* •**
ti**9 ***Wad **Jtf "«**J
m*odm XX »I*ftY
105
FfcSQUEIICY OF PKHT^GOI* VISITS
Q. How frequently do you actually come to the Pentagon




Slumber of Times Oo to Pentagon
2*4 Times Once a































aOne reporter said 3-4 times.
One radio correspondent said 3-4 times.
cThe reporter that is at the Pentagon daily has
torn* in the press room which serves as his base of ope:
tions for gathering news on other heats as well as
military.
Three reporters have desks in the press room.
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Four of the six irregulars said they frequent the
Pentagon for the purpose of gathering news less then once a
week.
Three of the military journal correspondents have
desks in the prose roots and usually are thara daily.
Others generally work out of downtown offlees.
Other Government Agencies Covered
Twenty-two (?9 per oent) of the regulars report
exclusively on military affairs. When irregulars and soli-
tary journal reporters are also considered. 70 pms cent
(28 of 40 newsmen) cover only Defense matters.
this compares to only 16 correspondents (excluding
military journals) in I960 that concentrated exclusively on
military reporting.
ft* indicated in Table M$ sight others said in order
to cover defense »n& National Security matters, they may
have to go to other agencies. Congress (6) ma& State
Department (6) were most frequently cited* The Unite Mouse
was named three times r *M* and selective Service twicer
the £EC (atomic Energy Commission) and «SC <National
Security Council) were named by one reporter each. Another
regular who reports only on Defense said he goes ail over
town to different agencies &tiA one simply covers anything
related to the military.
The six irregulars participating in the study do
report on other government heats in Washington. Two said
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Q. Do you cover any other agencies in addition to the
Department of Defense? (n«40)
mm MOM
Correspondents
Cover Other Government ?g«neies?
Only as related to
defense &epart»ent
or National Security






























*0nly Apollo mrnm&& space program t nearly all time
devoted to DOS.
bfciso covers 11*8* # ABC. Selective Service? fO per
cent of tiise devoted to BOfc.
also covers White House* State* Congress? one
also covers Congress* 8AS*» Justice* and HStf* 90 per cent
of time devoted to &OD? and one covers White Souse* State*
and Congress i 25-53 per cent spent on defense news.
d











they cover Whit© House. Status, ana Congress*. Another
reports on the** three beats, plu* Interior and agricul-
ture. One irregular covers the Justice department . in
addition to White Hou*e« Congre*** and State, A fifth
reports primarily on £tat*. while the other concentrate* on
Congress.
Four of the Military journal reporter* *aid they
may go to other heat* while gathering or reporting Defense
new*. Three named Centres* and one said he may visit the
Unite House. Congres*. and the Courts during the course of
gathering material for Smtrntm* stories.
to BOD Enport inrx]
*. wore accurate gauge of the degree of specialisa-
tion in reporting at the Pentagon i* illustrated in
Table XX. fithough six regulars said they also cover other
beats in addition to reporting military affairs, only two
of then (radio correspondent*) devote leas than 75 per cent
of their working time to Defense Department matters. Beats
covered by these regulars are also listed in the table.
Thus. 92.8 per cent (26 of 28 newsmen) of the regu-
lar* devote all or nearly all their time on reporting news
about the Pentagon. Includi»g the irregulars and military
journal correspondents, this means 32 of the 40 reporters
(80 pox cent) specialise in military reporting.
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Cu In a usual week, what percentage of your working tins is
actually devoted to reporting BaJfaase news? (n»4Q) a
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Total (n*40) 3 1 32
Only those r*portars who initially indicated thay
cover other bsats vara asked this ouastioru Thorns that
first saici none wars include*! in *?S$ or MX* colmnn*
bOne irregular said »Z$% and up d&panding on the
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Beats Baeful to Military Correspondents
Twenty regulars war© asked, "Excluding the
Pentagon, give two government agencies that you find useful
when reporting military nsws.* Moot frequently naraod wore
Congress (10), State J&partasnt (3), and Whits tfousa {?).
Wo other beat was oit.sc! more than twice. Corre-
spondents also named* CI* (Central Intelligence Agency),
Karitims Administration, Selective* Service <2), embassies,
»C (national Security Council), snd one newsman said sll




Table XII Indicates that about half (12 of the 23
asked) the regulars said 50 per cent or wore of their news
reports were based on interpretive reporting* More
reporters (8) answered "less than 25 per cent* than those
who originated "more than 75 per Coat" interpretive stories
(5).
Daily newspaper and wire service correspondents
stick more to straight news reporting* while newspaper
chain and TV newsmen tend toward greater interpretation.
Only one off the news asagasine writers said that over 75 per
cent of the stories he had written during the paet year
resulted ffrosa interpretive reporting*
One of the television correspondents saidt
torn
.
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TUBUS XIX
Q. During th* past y«*r« ssoufc wh$t pareoa
military storias woulo* you consider
interprativa reporting? (n"»23)
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It'm hard to say. *lmost every story has some
interpretation. I1loo wo only havo a minute or minute*
and-a-hal£ to tell a story and explain it. Normally
wo gat in &hs position of getting two or three items
from the /il.OO a.ja./ sxioX* Wo tai& to our producer
and decide which ^tor^/ to play* /Betwork name/ has a
naws bank that we might draw fro® for stock footage*
but a po? is still needed. I don f t have any say In
positioning on the air... Too flow of naws dictates
positioning. Hare /airy tins would bo better. Sat if
X ca*» ps i point across* ay job I
License to bo Objective
Regulars were asked if thoy thought most military
correspondents havo lieonsa to bo completoly objective in
tho selection and raborting of military nows, or if they
folt oditorial poUoios of thair naws outlats dictated
differently.
This open-ended question was phrased In such a way
so that tho Immediate reaction would not bo defensive (it
is doubtful that any newsman would freely admit he
personally is not objective). Of the 20 regulars asked,
only four answered tho inquiry as worded—"concerning "other
newsmen.* Six spoke only to how it applied to themselves
and 10 addressed both "other reporters * mn& their "own
freedom* to be objective. Those that responded only to
their personal license answered* HX don*t know about tho
others* but I . * *•
fcs Table XI12 indicates, none said oditorial policy
forces them to select certain stories. Hor does it dictate
how they will play a story.
Most reporters said newsmen are fairly free to use
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their own discretion in selecting stories to be covered*
However, they added that a news peg obviously is required.
Regulars said reporters try to prepare news reports
objective ly, tout many said editorial policy is more evident
when positioning a story (either on certain pages in a
newspaper or the attention it receives during broadcast)*
Some said certain correspondents do play their
outlet policy, but they are very few* Overall, none said
they are directed to select news items because of outlet
policy*
wire service correspondents indicated they are more
"tethered to the news** But beyond this inherent part of
their job, they said they do have freedom to work up a
story that interests them*
tfews magasine correspondents said they »xm not
limited to the selection of certain stories because of
editorial policy, but by the nature of the media
t
Most newsmen, including the wires, pretty well do
determine what is to be covered with the possible excep-
tion of news magasines* X have a slight influence but
not often* With news magasines you have the iiew York
office—the centralised office—which originates
stories*^
Another said. *W* are peculiar in that we don^t
compete for hard news* We must give the reader interpreta-
tion! put things in perspective and give a dimension beyond
the news break."10 the other news magasine reporter added*
I don't think there is too much constraint* My
magasins looks for certain types of stories—not daily
hard news, but more interpretive* X feel most newsmen
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*""5©V C-' .1PtfWMFX& •WMf Oil V**»'i'«"> bA*S Y«SC"^ «tfo£. XilOCfjt
**. it til-
t &e wicn eft* y »i-Ioq »»£ <so*lfc*
talk
:*-"i*vo-> sa ft* ! 3o<ta «n,fcro»*»b
pc»( mrnXmrnvm evou rfjlW
Alio fer
1* •%
*oaQ«ft»q «i •faitfi *uq mol*
*mo» rfooai ooi
115
have freedom. Yet If a correspondent for /natse of
swnaaaina/ ha» a story completely different than the
&•. X^ X*aa& or WMfeingtQn gaaiL* the jaagasine will want
the atory double-checked. 1*
Television network correspondents are in another
catcgoryt
Setworks don't have an editorial policy, tent a
local station may. I am never directed to handla a
story a certain way or told to $et certain stories.
Tfcey sometimes ask sm to do a specific story for • • .
/tiw evening naws show/* X try to get a hard news
angle nobody alse has. There is a certain amount of
interpretation in all ety stories? like, what does Laird
really m«an? 12
Two oosassats mads by voteran regulars reflect the
responses of many of their colleagues* "Host newsmen "hmrm
the freedom to cover the Pentagon as they see fit* but
13there is pressure to he critical. * The other reporter
said 3
!•» almost sure that reporters subconsciously write
stories they think will land on the front page. Thus
he nay select stories backing editorial positions*
It's saore a play than story selection. 14
In 1960* Underwood reported that 62.2 per cent (23
reporters) of the 36 newsnes in his study said editorial
policies of their outlets had no affect whatsoever and it
did not reduce their objectivity in reporting military
news*
Tho regulars* responses in 1970 substantiated a
1962 study by William Elvers which updated Leo 8ost*n*s
193? book, IflMheffigtoj. €oxgfl»gvndffI,fc«« Elvers noted that of
all the changes in the Washington press corps during the 25
years preceding his research, none was wore significant
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than a new senses of freedom from prejudices of the horn©
offie*. 15
Ho Consent vs. Confirmation
Government officials—not only in &0f>—•have b«^in
criticised for responding to reporters* questions sissply by
saying "no eotatnentr' without further amplification.
Both Arthur Sylvester and Phil Gouiding have implied
that an answer of "no comment* has the same meaning to
newsman as a confirmation of the information being cheeked*
Xn this context* reporters were asked if they
thought a "no comment" response generally is accepted by
military news correspondents as a confirmation* -*s
Table XXV indicates* about half (12) of the 23 newsmen
asked said "no. Only four correspondents agreed this is
the case*
A reporter fro® a daily newspaper said, uThere*s &
strong tendency to think that way. But X wouldn't run out
and print it. Friadheim gets around saying 'no comment* by
17
using 'have nothing to tell you on that at this time.**
Others agreed that Jerry Friedheim* Deputy J*W{&*h rarely
uses the phrase during his daily news briefings* but
answers the question without really saying anything*
One of the radio correspondents suggested it all
depends on the spokesman,
State department spokesman Robert HcCloskey has
three different ways of saying *no comment*" each of
which carries a different meaning to the reporter is on
the code* IS







SO COMMBMT VS. CONFIRMATION
Q. Both Arthur Sylvester and Fhil Goulding have implied
that an answer of "no consent** has the same meaning to
newsmen as a confirmation of the information boiag
checked. Do you agrs« or disagree that *no coRsasnt"
generally is accepted by military correspondents as a
confirmation? (n*23)
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One reporter agreed , but ad&ed that it deisends on






* correspondent who does not consider it as a
confirmation also gave an example of how a "no comment* c*n
be misleading to the media and the publics
X do feel that it's worth continuous digging when
you get a -no comment.* I certainly don't assume that
it's a_j=onfirmation. There was a good example recejjfcly
when /reporter's name—not a military correspondent/
wrote a very exciting story about this amphibious
operation with two divisions that was supposedly
recommended by Admiral Moorer /then Navy's Chief of
Naval Operations (CKO) , now Chairman of the JC£/. MI
understand_.it* the Defense Department said
Mno
comment « /this reporter later told author the no
comment was_based on "we can't comment on JCS recom-
mendation*?/.
But if you had called the Wavy Department you would
have gotten a flat denial. So in that case I think
this may have resulted in the Washington SJLSX putting
it on p9qa one on Sunday morning—giving it a big ride.
Whereas* if they had questioned the Bevy on it they
might not have done it. I understand the I*. JU. XXmea
and 1U X*. 3£bb* did ask the wavy and they did sot use
the story.
t\ 1Afe*ffy e^*««pQ"d*»at:tt Biscuas
Other Rftgpxtarg
specialist vs. ©eneralist
The generalist reporter in Washington is becoming a
thing of the past. Major media outlets cope with the
problem of government complexity by assigning correspondents
more or less permanently to one beat. These men become
specialists in their field. Smaller bureaus faced with
manpower and financial inadequacies satisfy their immediate
needs with roving generalist correspondents.
Some critics of the mass media suggest the main
handicap of the specialist reporter in Washington is he
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knows more ana more about less and loss. In this
context* regulars were eskad, "How would you compare the
specialist to the generalist correspondent in Washington
today?- (n»24)
Most said government can be adequately reported
only by a specialist* Specifically* they considered the
specialist even more essential when covering the Pentagon.
Regulars suggested only specialists can immediately assess
a Defense situation and put it in perspective for the
public* They said the gen&ralist often misses the meaning
of key issues and is in over his head on most complicated
military decisions or actions? generalists simply cannot
keep up with military affairs. ?s a result regulars
suggest SOD is inadequately reported to the generalises
Pentagon regulars generally know more about a lot
in the broad framework of foreign policy, congressional
relations, etc. They are more accurate than the
generalise who flits around only writing broad stories
which in itself causes a credibility gap of its own. 20
* veteran correspondent with well over a decade of
military reporting behind him saidt
Ganeralists miss the meaning. Like ftarguis Child*,
who writes a column on Defense. X don't think he has
the faintest understanding of underlying issues.
Joseph Kraft is another? no clue of what's going on—
across the board they are off base * 2 3-
ftnother observed. •Really pure-all stuff is written
by ganeralists. M and one of the television correspondents
saidt
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Have to have specialists, it* a a fact of life
today in D. €• * reporter just can't cover all
agencies. It's all I can do to cover Defease if X have
a few things going at once. Xt would be a full-time
job for three or four men to cover EGD for one outlet*
I'd have two men for *&ch network i£ X could. The two
or three man bureaus Zin Washington/ are unfortunate—
they have to be generalists. 22
While just about all regulars said the Pentagon*
than roost other beats in town, can be sufficiently
covered only by specialists* a few describee* weaknesses of
such a correspondent • I newspaperman said* "Specialists
are needed # but here in DOC some fall into the pit of
23knowing so lauch and expect the public to understand."
One of the news magasin* writers agreed, but did
not consider this a major drawback*
There are no dangers in the specialist* except that
he way try to tell too tauch in detail. But his editor
controls this. Today the specialist is a necessity*
while the generalist is in over his head. 24
Specialisation also has led to some collective
reporting. Xf a specialist at the State Department lacks
background needed for a story* he calls his counterpart at
the Pentagon for additional information. Or the two may
discuss a story sad exchange ideas. » few said this may
produce a better story because editors are not getting only
one reporter's viewpoint; he gets several.
Others suggested the generalist has certain qual-
ities that sOEBetiaes are overlooked. One said the
generalist can* on occasion* present a fresh outlook on
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My Lai incident was cited by 1 few a* an aasan-pie. Two
regulars said ther« is a danger that: the specialist; way
loss his natural skepticism after a while or accept a sub-
ordinate role.
£ relatively now correspondent in the press corps
offered this observations
It's a problem in CO© where you have reporters who
have been here for years* It tanas one or two years to
just learn to get around the Pentagon. Yet after four
or five years they lose their effectiveness*--they
aren't skeptical enough. This is stronger in the
Pentagon because DC© is a harder nut to crack. *ft*r a
while* reporters don't know who is right and who is
wrong. 25
But the regulars are not blind to possible pit-
falls of being a specialist in Washington, from discus4"
sions between the newsmen and the author it is Obvious they
are aware of the dangers inherent to their own brand of
"over-Hill," including specialising news reports out of
reach of the public. The past reporting record, generally
shows they have not fallen into these traps subconsciously
or otherwise.
Caliber of Military Correspondents
Hewsmen were asked to rate the caliber of military
correspondents (regulars) coarpared to the rest of the
Washington press corps.
*s Table XV indicates, three-fifths (22) consider
regulars to be on a par with other Washington newsaten.
Seven said they are better or the regulars rata "excellent*
#1
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Q. In general, how would you rat* the caliber of military
correspondents (taa regulars only) coe^areu to th& rest
of the Washington press corps? (n*»3S) /Open-endeH/
Regulars Compared tot. C. Press Corps
Better/ Same/ worse/ Some ftwtter and




















compared to other reporters? three said worse or poorly.
amplifying remarke add a different perspective to
how reporters viewed other imwim&. while many of the
regulars took issue with criticism aimed at the Santagon
oraaa corps, aavaral said some regulars do not do as wall
aa they probably could
i
w< J*? ««***«* *• pratty high. FrofassioaaUsm Is
doStful &*
•h°uld ***• quoationing and
* veteran regular and seasoned Washington reporter
with a wire sarvioa spoke from isjillum
Over tha years, I have spent time on all majorboats in B. C. and contrary to tha myth* tha Pentagonpress corps complains less* most ars mora combative?
and most ara mora skeptical than anywhere else. Hill
reporters just report a Sanatoria /or congressmen's/
ramarks. Bars /at tha *ontagOfi/, officials swaat ovarquestions saked by correspondents. Pentagon reporters
ara a vary tough brasd.27
Another raspactad regular with a daily newspaper
qualified his feeling*
It's hard to be objective. I feel the bast of tha
military writers compare to the bast of other bast
!£?*?*• *" *«»hington. I wish there ware mora topflight reporters in 00© than there ara now; just as %
wish there were more in other agencies in &• C.
Overall, they compare vary favorably with other press
corps***5
Several regulars addressed charges made about
military correspondents being a «fcept" press or being "lap-
dogs* instead of "watch-dogs - of no©. One of the more
experienced newsman who said the caliber of the regulars im
just as good aa any other group of reporters in Washington
put it this way
i
-a ,.uti»m ******* * •*• ******* «°
^Clt rtffl^,.--! dMi w^Vfv. -.IV
j m oo t*a ©v **** **** A*******
>?lv rfnw
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***
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The run of the nU.il Pefense reporter works hard to
get a story and winds op being criticised by mm for
getting It and by the public for being in bad with DC©.
X baliava this is a fact and X*ve boon astonished that
bacause of the mood of tha country, there hasn't hm^ti
more of it. Tha lap-dog thins im ridiculous. People
axa as antitlad to know Laird's thoughts as . . ./those who criticisa £Qf> and military correspondent*/.
Ms ara conveyors* What government /Pefeas*/ says it is
doing
, people ara antitlad to know and government is
antitlad to havs said. 29
i similar viaw was offarad by another regular. Bm
said a certain amount of healthy skepticism toward &*fense
reporters is good, but he questioned the rationale of
singling out UQ&
t
*isaost everyone in the Pentagon press corps knows
two or three areas well. But nobody is the caliber of
Mark Watson /covered &QD £or tteifei^ffiffi fiur> and dean of
press corpaj now decease^/. Each one is a specialist
in one or two things. I don't think regulars are lap-
dogs i reporting fro® D. C. is nothing sensational
anyway. There are not many doves in the Pentagon press
corps. They get to share the attitudes of their sources
and need to be liked or they won't stay long in BOB.
The fact that the Pentagon is the only place
criticised seems ridiculous. £o one knocks down a
story that hurts DQD. Their /regulars/ job as
conveyors is to tell military views. That's one
reason that I want to leave DOD. 1 don't like to fight
a battle with my own newspaper as well as with 00D.
Some simply don't fight the battle, but play along with
Defense.^
Most reporters echoed the thought that in SOD there
im no more lap-dogging than in any other beat. There mt&
lap-dogs in other agencies. It does not only apply to the
31Pentagon." Many said this charge was perpetuated by the
anti-military environment that exists today which is
reflected on the Hill and in the media. Some feel it is








who cover the Hill.
* regular with a daily raatapapar illustrated how
this criticlata is misguided t
There Is far less lap-doggiag in DQ£t than other
agencies in Washington. On&e /recentlyj a«Whits House
female reporter cause over /to the ?'?ntagQi]/ and
attended one of the daily noraing briefings. Later she
remarked that (1) the brief actually starts on time and
(2) *you guys really try to gat information*
*
32
On this sasta thought* another saidt
Pentagon guys 9ru just as good as at the White
Bouse where they get their daily feeding. There is
cms feeli . today that any reporter covering SOD is
naturallv iand-maiden* of the military, t don't
agree. In fmst most reporters here are liberals in
general. 33
Pn uncommon view was expressed by a regular who
also covers other beats in Washington
i
there are more lap-dogs in SGB than elsewhere. The
reporting quality is lower also. DOB is complex and
many reporters do not do their homework or don't dig to
find out the meaning of some Defense actions. *bout
half don't Heap up with the rest of the regulars. $*
Some military correspondents are said to have
certain limitations. J» regular with over 20 years experi-
ence as a Washington reporter saidt "I'd rate the regulars
highly $ although many of the newer ones X can't rank. Soma
»^m& almost anti-military. The older regulars *s* better
I
I
than any newsmen in town."
Another veteran reporter said the press corps has
not done much to influence defense policy* but has
accepted a subordinate roles
It would be better if reporters showed more inde-
pendence than they do. I'd rate them algout the same &m
the rest of the Washington press corps.
-• s>d*
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In such a diverse group as the Pentagon press
corps, opinions often run counter to one another. While
one said regulars are far better than the White Souse
correspondents, another said:
I'd rate then slightly behind the Unite House, but
on a par with State correspondents. However, the
difficulty in such a comparison is that State officials
are specialists in their own field—desk nan can alwost
writs the story for newsmen. It's not like ttite, where
newsmen must get information fro* many officials. 3 '
Generally, regulars favorably compare their
Pentagon peers with all other Washington newsmen. They are
said to be well informed, know more about their field, and
work harder to get information than any group of reporters
in town. *P<3sntagon newsra&n cannot simply to® concerned with
the 'what.' but more of the •why' and 'how,** one said.
Irregulars regarded the caliber of regulars with
more caution. But their responses ranged from "only fair"
or "mediocre to average" to "quite good" and "excellent.**
Pentagon reporters tend to identify with the mili-
tary. The military-industrial complex stories and Hy
Lai had to be uncovered by irregulars.*®
Another irregular observed t "The biggest sin is
that after a while they get taken in by the military."39
One who has covered COD for several years said the caliber
of the regulars is guite good, but added s "I think that
some who write for the general news media and also moon-
light for military magasines have a problem in maintaining
a dispassionate viewpoint.*40
Finally, a correspondent with almost 25 years of





















Washington reporting vi&wed the regulars in a mora positiv©
light t "As a group* probably the best in Washington. X
cover White Bouse* Stats and Congress and these are the
best of the lot."41
Military journal correspondents generally gave
regulars a high rating. However* one said the distribution
of talent by media manageuient creates a problem at BOP*
X will never understand how a newspaper can mmnd
five experts to a football game and one ill-prepared
reporter to cover the Pentagon* This is their great
failing. 42
? response typical of the majority of regulars 1st
••Overall* it'i a snart group. X respect their 'know-how. •
Th., «»*t ,oof »«ch.-"
Routine Performance of Other
Military Correspondents
Reporters also were asked if they are usually
satisfied with the routine performance of other military
correspondents. Table XVI shows that slightly more than
half (57 per cent) responded Hyes." £bout two-thirds (17)
of the regulars are* but most of the irregulars are not
satisfied. Military journal newsmen are evenly divided.
Sven those regulars who generally are pleased with
the performance of most others said some reporters do not
question the Defense "line" often enough. But* they recog-
nise that other variables influence performance. % member
of the corps of regulars for about five years who is
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Thar* seems to be pressure to 2s« critical of the
military end of the Pentagon* There's a tendency to
think you are not doing your 300 unless you are
exposing something wrona or putting somebody in jail*
This is the general expose type that holds true for
most Washington reporters , but the greater tendency now
is on Pentagon reporters* *4
Others agreed that, at tunas, a few regulars had
done an inadequate 30b of reporting* Three of the store
experienced newsmen suggested* if anything, the caliber of
reporting has slightly decreased during the last decades
There has been no improvement since 19eQ and might
even have been a deterioration in performance* There
axe not many like Elton Pay /*£/, Har& Watson _
/Baifcjjuora &jn/# *nd Hanson Baldwin /Mm. X*. Uwam/
around todayT*5
Another observation was made by a newsman who spoke
from about one year of Washington reporting experiences
There is no real difference in performance of
regulars and other Washington newsmen. One of the
problems is that military reporters find it more diffi-
cult to relate to the public* State Department cannot
be measured in hardware or numbers. We have to do this
in COD* The public doesn't associate with Defense like
certain areas around the globe* Thus State reporters
have the advantage Of reader identification. 46
One toox issue with the approach regulars taJes when
covering BOl>s
Ws fail to give the full picture* A broader look
is needed* We "cover" &QD. The press axm not doing as
good a job as they could. Today regular coverage is
less interesting* The moment-to-moment reporting is
chick*n_feed. The broad tread is what makes page one
• • • /of certain newspaper^/. We should give editors
what they want**7
Generally » regulars found it difficult to evaluate
the press corps as a whole because of divergent interests
inherent to the various types of media representations
lay**** *** It **
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ft11 of the® /regular*/ are so different. Some I
think are good; some ere bad. X Co have ssore respect
for this press corps; score than any other group—White
House* the Kill, etc. Pentagon regulars are very well
informed. Even the biased ones are well informed. 48
Another saidt
performance i*7 generally 900*2. There's a great
number of different types of publications. Thus
different kinds of information get out. Most people
don't realize this. 2 think sunny critics stake mistakes
about the regulars. For instance, ttoll&nhoff follows
only the congressional angle and doesn't get the
complete picture. Uowever, there is a tendency for
newspapers and wires to specialise and separate places
/beats/ vice covering the subj&ct. But thers* is no way
to get around this. X feel a better job could be done
if newsmen were allowed to follow the subject instead
of a physical beat. 49
Clark Hollenhoff—one of the most prolific critics
both of DOS) and military news correspondents—was singled
out by several regulars for their own brand of criticism!
ftny place you cover, newsmen are identified with
that area. I'm getting the Defense view, sure: But
our State man gets theirs. I'll offer DC© ration
and he'll offer State's. It would be silly for us to
do anything else. Some reporters at the Pentagon are
very critical, nollenhoff m&v&x goes to the Pentagon,
yet takes outrageous stands. 50
Irregulars took a more negative position with
respect to regulars
t
Reporters are not critical or analytical on complex
subjects... There's limited media interest in details.
^They ar*/ too friendly with sources or (the opposite)
knee*jerk opposition. 5*
Other irregulars said coverage is too fragmentary
or lacks perspectives "Reporting by most regulars is highly
superficial because they are victims of intentional plants








all of us need to know mora and that we sometimes write on
the basis of inadequate information*
*
53 The one reporter
in this category who is generally satisfied with press
performance admitted that "most don't have time because of
deadlines to go as deeply into matters as they would like
and should." 54
Military journal correspondents expressed mixed
opinions! Too much anti-military bias in straight news and
a failure to recognise significance in evaluating import-
er
tance of developments. M J Another said*
With few exceptions, they lack expertise. They
don't know What happened only a few years ago. Red
Smith has been writing about sports for decades, and
you will learn from this survey, how lone the average
Pentagon reporter has been on the beat. 5s
two journal reporters said they are happy with the
performance of regulars, but not irregulars*
Irregulars write a lot of trite—either bjLajtt or
completely, ignorant ._ You don't see Hoffman &$J or
Beecher ZfiU. X*. lifflfix/ writing like that. Regulars are




One correspondent summed up the aggregate opinion.
even though he is not generally satisfied with the routine
performance of military correspondents, he said a
But /they arjB? «°t jus*, sitting on their tail.
They don't take the word /of DOSE/ «» final. The out-
side impression is that they are lap-dogs. But that's
not true. They are honest—not apologists or a public
relations extension.m
One regular who was quite critical of Washington
reporting in general suggested that military correspondents
,. *» mr . f**o» **• *HMrfl »U to IX*
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in 1970 are pressured into superficial coverage of many
Defense issues
i
They have a "Fade of the Month Club." One month
it's the Orson Berets* another «y l*&i. This takes up
space. These stories are picked up because they're hot
issues* not because the press is interested in Green
Beret tactics. Many reporters are not serious about
coverage of Defense matters unless it involves w&ste.
This is because everybody in I>. C. has gotten dran<a~
tXzed. It_goas through cycles. ? lot of people
/reporter*/ are talking about issues* but little about
real concerns.
Then the press gets caught up in words; Laird *ai<$
this* Rogers that. There's pressure on them to pick
apart rationale of officials. £ver since &SJ created
the credibility gap* we have been extremely sensitive
to words rather than deeds.&
Aggressive Reporting
Bewsmen also were asked if they felt more aggres-
sive reporting was needed by military correspondents.
Sixty-four per cent (25 newsmen) agreed there should be
sore aggressiveness »n& 28 per cent (11) disagreed. The
remainder (three reporters) neither agreed nor disagreed.
* total of 12 newsmen "strongly-agreed* while none
*strongly-disagreed.
*s Table XVII indicates* the regulars did not feel
the need for more aggressive reporting was as acute as did
both irregulars and military journal reporters. Vet 52 p^t
cent of the regulars said the press corps should be more
aggressive—four were in the "strongly-agree* category.
However* eight of the 12 irregulars and journal correspond-
ents responded "strongly-agree."
p*«*l 44*4
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Opinions were aixad throughout and within each
category of regulars? only newspaper reporters came closest
to being in agreement. Six of those nine newspapermen
either "agreed'* or "strongly-agreed,**
Pentagon Press Association
Military correspondents have never had a formal
organisation such as the finite Bouse or State Departsaant
Correspondents Associations. In 1965 * Jules Witcover
described how one attempt to form a unified body failed.
Be wrote that when the Cuban crisis In 1962 precipitated
charges of news management* White House Press Secretary
Pierre Salinger called a conference of reporters and high
ranking government information officers. Invitations went
to the White House and State Department Correspondents
Associations, but none could be sent to the Defense apart-
ment Correspondents Association because none existed.
Witcover said that Pentagon regulars felt they had
better send someone and called a meeting to form a group
for their representative (Mark Watson) to represent. Sow-
ever* regulars felt such an organisation would undermine
the freedom and individuality of Pentagon reporters and
most felt any such organisation was out of the question*
according to Witcover. Finally, Watson was given an
informal, temporary* one-shot-only assignment to represent
reporters at the White Bouse conference, but not any
S0
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The author asked military new* correspondents if
thay thought Pentagon reporters should organise formally to
advanea their interests. Results in Table XVXII show that
currant members of the press corps do not hold the same
strong desire not to errata a formal group.
Seventy-five &%x cant of tha newsman (2?) bava
definite opinions and are just about evenly divided on tha
ieau<& (12 for, and 15 against). One-fourth {9) of tha
praas corps do not have a preference either way.
¥h« regalara »x^ almost evenly divided (9 for* 10
against, and 6 agra<r-diaagrae) , On* of tha dissenting
regulars added • "It's a funny thing • *his has been a
painful subject for tha Pentagon prass corps. 2 don't know
why.*61
Typical remarks included t "Competition im a good
thing. I'd rather do things alone" and "I'd rather be
competitive. It works to our ultimate disadvantage to
organise. The moat frequent reason given by those who do
not want to organise formally was that the interests of
Pentagon newsman are too diversified and not all that
compatible.
h f Mil ill B*mfW*Qm* HOQfilT





Q. Tell ne the extent to which you agree or dissgre^ with
the following state»@nts Pentagon correspondents should
organize formally to advance their interests? <n»36)
-ai.a^ 'iir'UBiwn r
Should fora Pentagon Correspondents
Association
iim i m il i-ir i nn i—j—— m i i n » . im ,iri mini 1 . 1 , m m*mmmmammmmmmmmmm
Correspondents
Strongly* Agree- fcis~
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radio* television, and &aqas£it@ correspondents are equally
important as the print media. Rivers • *aa$»Xa was larger
than ftosten'et 273 ummamn coaypared to 127, the sassa
techniques %h»r« used (interviews «*** questionnaires) audi
»any of the ease questions were asked.
laBefore the Moss Cess&ittes is March 1963,
Sylvester implied that an answer of *no cofsavent** by an
indorsation officer would not have the same effect as a
false answer because saost newsmen take "no cessment" as a
confirmation of the information they are checking. See
Martin Gershen, '•The 'night to Lie,"** CotuaihX* Journal j^
BMSlXau Winter, 1966-67, IS*
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is interpreted as a confirmation, although the government
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*t this time, we can neither confirm or deny the report."*
see Goulding, Qsm&XM ox Itefig* xii-xiii.
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WtfiXtmm OF DRFSNSE OFFZCI^i^. XMfORMWKNS
omsmi&TZQm. **© mm mucx&s
Daring an interview with the author in ftpril 1^?0.
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.
Denial 2. Senfcin. explained his view* on the information
procedures at the Fentagon.
"The newsgathering process is about the awtm now as
it was 10 years ago whan X was a newsman. Although Vietnam
has changed things a lot." ha aaid- Henkin »tat«4 that the
Fentagon ia not aa tight a source or boat as ©any critics
hava suggested* *lso. ha aaid that a correspondent's bast
sources ara his own inforaial contacts in EOS.
In addition to classification* which ha thinks will
always be a barrier, HenXin suggested that the slse and
complexity of DOC. plus the Fentagon*a close relations with
State Department and Congress handicap the military news
reporter. Also he said. MWto doss require specialisation
/on the part of newsmen/* But even then there is too much
material a correapondent must know. n
Concerning the news jaanagasaent question. Bsmkin
stated that as part of his job. ha manages the news. But
141
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he calls it *judgment* rather than "news managing."
Editing and the timing of a n«ws release wer« cited as
examplea of how ha exercises this judgiaanfc.
menkia emphasised that ha is trying to ©pen things
up and* together with Secretary Laird , has encouraged
freer discussion on sensitive areas* such aa Laos and
Cambodia. Whan asked why tha weekly backgrounders for the
military correspondents war* canceled* ha said* "It's
fsixer for everybody whan more information ia on-the-
record.* Tha Assistant Secretary pointed out that both ha
and Defense Secretary Laird ere in complete agreement that
thia is the best policy and should help with the Pentagon's
credibility*
fcs noted earlier* Bankin ^&b not agree that the
Pentagon preas corps is composed of reporters who
unquestionably echo the word of Defense officials*
Reporters say things they do because they are
reporting Defense Department views* thim Lb part of
their job* There are regulars who are very critical of
DOB at times* but such stories are forgotten by those
who say that military reporters are merely a "leapt**
press corps* He don't forget*
nankin explained that this basic conflict between
Pentagon correspondents and officials is healthy for the
military establishment i "The Secretary of Defense uses this
conflict to help manage DOC*"1
One of the veteran regulars described how he views
the change brought about because of the situation in South-*
east £sias "The Vietnam war has changed perceptions of
> :>x*w imlti mm • %© f«i«ii mU bmm









reporters with respect to believing information pat out by
Jerry W* Frledheim* Principal Deputy *«&(?&)« told
tha author that classification--not only Military, but alao
aa related to national security—is probably the greatest
barrier facing newsmen* Urn added that some reportera lack
an understanding of 0fc8D(P*) 'a relatione with the State
Department t This cause* newsmen to be irritated when
information ia delayed because of the coordination
required*
Stat Priedheim said efforta to maintain an open
administration are beginning to pay off. "JSews&an don't
agree with all the news policies of COD. but now we are
saying more and trying to get more information to the
public. Xt helps that Secretary Laird understands the
press* He tries to see them as often as possible*
*
Commenting on the daily 11*00 **m* news briefing*
he saidt "We found that the briefing is good for us as well
as the newsmen* Friedheim pointed out that there is not a
big story every day at the Pentagon* therefore* the briefing
gives both correspondents and officials a chance to meet
face to face every dayi "Reporters can ask whatever
questions they want and it forces us to do our homework and
prepare for the questions**
Ms© in April 1970* the author talked with a number
of public affairs officers in G*SP(P*) to obtain their
views on the new Defense information team. They generally
i * *fc noq0M
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•aid tnat now there i. batter iatarjull o^^^^
between Defen.. inflation officer, and «m-WO official,
in 08B. a. wall ., b.tt., cooreiB,tion botWM|) W|n) w-
other gov.rn-.nt agenci... .^ wo. fcu tM. i^.,.^
the afficiency of th« Defan,e w, operation.
They .aid that H.nki„ and rri«Jh.i» are .or.
«cc...ibl. than tboir predece..or. and now DOD i. «*. op.,,
with th« pre... They called thi. a reflection of H.nia„.,
policy toward public affair..
* veteran ailitary public affair, officer in th.
navy'. Office of Information (CHiHfO)
.aid.
-H.„kin na.
al«o proved the rel.tion.hip between
..rvice information
officer, and OPSD(PA) official.."4
On. veteran regular military corr..pond.nt pointed
out that ev.n though Secretary fird »d H.„kin are trying






During th. .ixtie. POD generally wa. accepted by
WMhington »«.„ a. being the mo.t difficult beat to
cover becauw it wa. the tighf.t. Military new. corre-
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tighter boat—with respect to gathering informstio»~-than
the State fcepartiaent, tfhite Bouse, or Congress.
.*e shown in Table XIX. the majority of reporters
considered tha Pentagon as being tighter than the other
three beats* The State Department Cod pmx: cent said COD
waa tighter) and the White House (71 per cent) were thought
to be tighter than Congress (91 per cent). While two-
thirds agreed it is easier to get information at the State
Department (21) and White House (22). almost ail reporters
(32) said it is easier on the Bill (Congress)* Only three
said Congress is tighter than DOD.
Tightest of Ml?
When asked if they considered the Pentagon the
tightest beat in Washington, just mare than half (9) of the
17 regulars asked agreed it ia. Host of the irregulars (4
out of 6) and the military journal reporters (4) said it is
Although the regulars who responded "yes* were
quite emphatic, several suggested that this simply is
because of security. Typical responses were a *lt*s just
the nature of the military and DQD—you have to dig a
little harder.* / "•Considerably a»ora tight." / "Far tighter.
Hoetly from security! not public affairs policies.*
* regular with a dally newspaper said. ThatU the
nature of the beat. Security is always there. Uo question












* CQKP»RXS023 OF THE *EOT*OOK WITH CTHEK B£~*T£
«>• Would you consider the fcintagon a tighter beat—with
respect to gathering inror»ation--fchan (a) State £ept.#
(b) White Bouse* and (c> Congress? (n«3e)
State Dept* White House Congress
Correspondents Yes m Dm m Yes Si©
Regulars (a~2S) 16 5 IS 5 23 1
Irregulars (n*o) 2 3 $ 1 1 1
Military
journals (n«5) 3 2 2 3 4 1
Total® (n»36) 21 10 22 J 32 3








security* it's zuore open than other agencies. The military
is especially good.*6
?>nether of the regulars summed up the feelings of
•any of the full-time Pentagon reporters
i
I think it's the hardest /&&&£? in the world; aside
fro© covering the Kremlin. Everywhere else in town a
reporter can get a story by telling what someone
thinks* That's not true here /at the FentagooA where
you need facts. 7
While in agreement that BCD is the toughest beat.
one newsaair—a regular
—
j^u?. part of the Classes on media
stTfiTKtssianT t
The reason the Pentagon im the hardest beat is 50&
the fault of DQD sod 50* the fault of the newspaper.
Zt wouldn't he such a strain on the reporter if news-
paper management didn't just throw him /reporter/ in
and lock the door. Newspapers don't understand Defense
matters. They should have two or three sen covering
the beat and let them 90 to the Sill and elsewhere to
get Defense information.
®
"Mors Openness How—It's bird's Way"
While isost of the regulars credit Laird personally
with making an effort to loosen things up at the Pentagon,
Table XX shows that loss than half (12) said UQL i* more
open under the Ifixon administration. The irregulars (5)
stated the Defense Department's "openness" is about the
same and military journal reporters were evenly divided on
the question.
Overall, almost two-thirds (24) of the military
correspondents said the Pentagon hM not opened up more







fc .-fj i«tatf »*>»^
14*
TABLE XX













-ik> you eonaider tl*i» adadaiatrat
24
imniiii' i. i i nt- iW |,i u,BI „.
I*}* *»j»g




it wor... Th. .IrnpU >»..- "no.* or "about the mW
r«,pon.ee. ho.evor. «r« dociviog. wmn MM why thoy
f.lt the way «»y dio. the .«rll,r r«.pon.o, took oa . ««,
por.^tivo. «»• followi*, co-..„t. illu.trato thi« point,
u> »«aul«ft who g««i nnn i» «»•„ »mn nf1w ,
Ss*J*J!rTy~*l^. ** if. h«d to »» ^
i^ro^Lnf!" " *UCh ' bUt th"e '« a •"«**
It # » battor* you have to qriva credit to Laird i.
If
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It's about the »a&tt« There's generally the same
tendency to shield operational people from the
press.
(4) gxjuacta tstm maUfcaxy, journal saaortagat
Yea /£*>£ la mora open/. There's a shifting away
from McKamara's bureaucrats.
Ko. I believe defense officials do l^ss. so they
talk less. There's too much politics.
it's too early to judge, but it's batter than
before.
One of the regulars offered a different sag lei
It's etmy for a new administration to open old
books and say they are exposing scandals /reporter
used cost overruns as an example/. Yet as tine goes on
things are starting to tighten up again. 9
A typical response came from a veteran military
correspondent i
1 think Mr. Laird is on-the-record declaring that
he was going to end the credibility gap and he was
going to open up the channels an?? ^ive freer access to
news, lie's made several statements that on the subject
of over-classification of information, ha wants the
problem solved, its wants more information declassified.
I think this has had a 9000 Affect down the line; not
all the way down the line. But I think it's reversed
the atmosphere and trend. We are getting Bsora access
than we've had in many areas. 10
Summarising the feelings of many of the regulars.
another correspondent saidi
Even though Laird sees a lot of newsmen and has a
lot of press conferences, much of this is more form than
substance. It's his technique for producing his form of
understanding of what he's trying to sell. On the other
hand, he has produced a lot of information. In order
to sell his ideas, he's had many programs which give
the appearance of a free flow of information. The
trouble is that you can't get information on othor
areas* such as Vietnam and the Vietnamisation effort.











5£°*£ K^Rt?! a»*^^?S40R- •>*•»*»*houLu y «w«4Mf they can't ap*f*i a half
*Can # t See Wh© y©u want. s*hsn ¥©u Kant"(Reporters* Access to Officials)
In a word. the regulars considered their access to
Pentagon official, aa "listen.* As Tata* XXX indicate.
none of the raster* aaid MM Xm e*oellei*t. but half
U4> described it aa good. They 9ave i^ird a *pius» for
getting the word oat to officials to grant am interviews.
»ut once access is gained, reporters said they 00 not find
much difference—the exchange is still guarded. The other
50 per cent of the regulars consider access ranging from
fair <3) to adequate (10) and only one said it is poor.
The irregulars were generally aore critical, and
the military journal correspondents appeared to have fewer
access problems.
The Majority of regulars said that access to top
level Defense officials is not as good as it should be,
although several qualified their comments by admitting
these officials are very busy people. Hut. not **eim
these officials when they want can work against the
reporters-particularly in a sensitive situation-because
»«*«»*n suggested the higher the position of authority, the
»©re open is the official.
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The greatest coapiaint awmg ttm r#guIara im th||t
it takes too long to get to sea anybody, 'atom* to top
level people ie unsatisfactory. *ou must get on * waiting
list and that aright take weeks.* 12
Sven though WtMN generally believe they can
•ventually get to eee just about any official, the delay-
for whatever reason—aeema unreasonable to theau
-If I
can't see the guy quickly, it's usually not much good to
«•" and "You can't see the peopl* you went, when you went*
•re typical of the (Miliums aade during the interview..
A television correspondent expanded thia thoughts
L« J!T?JH tl?l*laiddi* lmy*X ** «** bad. The problem
£ay taS two**or'SSl ®v™ tfl* »***• **»9* SaCaST
.?.!! y #^ Xf * eaa t see thara quick it's not »uch
c^Iii^^f**1^ "****?* « 2r« better £nan***ivil ans, but isore suspicious of newsfeen.13
Any Change in Accessibility?
Maws^en also were asked if thare had been any change
in accessibility under this administration. Heeponses are
about evenly split. As Table XXII indicates, about half of
the regulars <12> recognised mn increase, about a third
CS) aaid access is the MM and three reporters said there
has been a decrease.
Those regulars who stated accees had increased,
•ingied out ***** in particular, and Henkin for their
efforts to sake acre information available to the aadia.
However, one raguiar who said access had gotten better
3*«Bi«£J*s/fJJ •! •!*©•* leva!
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A *^SSJie»a '•••wd^^fc
HAS ACCfcSS TO OFFICIALS IHCiUSAaEE OR DSC&EASEE?
Q. Has the access to military and civilian officials
increased* stayed about the mmam or decreased under the
Uixon administration?* (n«32)
tasmmmmmammm
Any Change in Access





Military Journals 3 1
" H i ammm^mmm 11 i i i,m n n ——«——— —,.« .».. n i n
total (n-32) 16 11
\hose reporters covering the Pentagon less than
two years were asked i "From your own recent experience*
would you say accessibility is generally increasing,
remaining about the same* or decreasing?"
.* .
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stated, Thra rtMii» problem.. Xii MM m*m, such a.
IMA. monitoring interview*/ i. constant and access is
quit© controlled. -»i4
On* reporter said it waa worse b^cauae the
•fcepublioana «r« mora oautioua than ISemocrata."*5 One of
the irregulars, however, stated MNNMI increased* *lt is
that Republicans foal less defensive about the couraa of
•vents ainca »«,•» a ««w. magasine reporter's comment
*•• representative of m| of those who said thinga are
•bout the same
i
UmSSS^JSl!^^^ b°th ow«*IJ ** officiala.
Fou luaToaeau^ ^ ^" P^oaalitiaa. Some talk to
"
^ £!£!-?^ *® yo* r*P*®«*«t • . . /neaasine's nasaJ
really want to give tha reporter tha Oft* of day.*?
Tha regulars compared Laird's lnfluanoa a help.
«o«t agreed it ia at least encouraging to gat to top lavai
P^le, even if it take, ao long and thair responsiveness
h*s not greatly changed. Several noted that now civilian
officiala ara more likely or more ready to talk to new.***,
hut fewer hava tha kind of information a newsman wants.
Concerning military officiala, tha regulars said
that although sens are acre open now. in general the access
to military man still remains bad. Thia confounds tha
correspondents
•
problems because many suggested that
military officers have mora of the kind of information they
went. Also, the military official was generally viewed
aowsmon as being more competent and aiqssrtsaasi in his
><*** «* Mir
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specialty than civilians in XX». A few noted, however.
that once a reporter gains access military man usually are
wore candid than civilians—especially if not quoted.
One of the regulars expressed it this ways
The trouble with covering the Pentagon is that
officials Who know tha answers are often too busy to
talk, or reluctant for other reasons* and those who try
to shield them from having to bother with the press are
frequently not adequately informed. X have not run
into rsuch of a problem with people who are deliberately
trying to sislead* Xt is usually possible to see the
ri$ht man if one tries hard enough and is willing to
settle for whatever source happens to be available on a
short-term basis. iS
Regulars usually agreed that things had improved
,
but said there is still a long way to go. Access in 1970
is considered better than during the Kennedy and Johnson
days. A fesw of the experienced correspondents indicated
little resistance at all.
The majority viewpoint on this question is repre-
sented by the following response from an experienced
newspaperman and regular at the Pentagons
Xt # s spotty. Depends on who the guy is? Laird and
Packard, for example, are awfully hard to see or get to
on a regular basis, although Laird has been relatively
accessible—in the number of news conferences and the
times he meets with groups of reporters. Frequently,
though, you'd want to talk to him every day and $et
guidance of things, which you can't do. If X want a
specific question answered, I'll find somebody who is
frequently high ranking who is available within a short
time to talk to me about it. Xn that 9»nmm they're
accessible. But then you run into the question of when
something is hot and you really want to know something;
then nobody's available. And there are occasions when






Why Officials do sot Talk with Sewsaen
The correspondents wero asfced what causes officials
not to grant interviews or engage in conversations with
newsmen*
Tabla XXIII shows that ''ingrained cautiousness" was
most often named as the reason officials are reluctant to
talk with reporters. This was cited as a cause 24 times
(62 per cent)* followed by "distrust of correspondents"
(17 times or 44 per cent) and "misunderstanding of media
role and/or requirements" (15 times or 33 per cent).
Underwood found in 1960 that "ingrained cautious-
ness" was naned by 79 per cent of the press corps* followed
by "shielding by overly protective aides" (67 per cent) mit&
"excessive centralised control of the news flow1* (61 per
cent). 20
In 1970* 15 reporters included "other" reasons in
their responses. These wares time pressures on officials
(4) j officials dislike being annoyed by investigators (1);
bias of official for one media or another (1); officials
feel they can only lose if they get with the press—they
feel safer dealing with reporters through information
organisations (2): official interest in the party line (1);
refused for genuine reasons (1) t all of the above causes
(2) i don't want to be bothered (2); and it is just easier



































On® regular stated. *I #d to© surprised if the




Another of the regulars who said the main reason
was ingrained "hyper*** cautiousness added
i
Many sources* after being burned once by an
irresponsible newsman are seared to death to take
another chance* This fright decreases in direct pro-
portion with the rise of a source's career. Those «.t
the top feel more secure* It affects us* however*
because you don't call a Packard or V* Alexis Johnson
at home on a daily basis* You only hit them on a
business basis in time of crisis* On a daily basis you
normally deal with siiddle and lower-u$$»er rank raen.
This simply means a little more mosaic work before you
can put a story to bed* 22
"normally I Leave Hungry*
Reporters were asked, "Once access is gained to an
official* does he normally meet your need for information?"
Table XXIV indicates that once a newsman gets to see an
official* more often than not the information received does
not satisfy his requirements or he only gets part of the
material he seeks* Only seven reporters (19 per cent) said
officials generally meet their need for certain informa-
tion* Twenty-one of the correspondents (56 per cent) stated
it depends* or said officials only marginally meet their
need* Nine reporters indicated they raroly* if ever* are
satisfied with the exchanges they have with officials*
A few of the typical remarks weret
I generally get most of the information I want.
Mhen I don't the reason is usually legitimate* like the
material is not available then*
•if* SJt oooJxqxtm orf .oo*o#o x
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TABLE XXTV
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Yes, when the official ha* been through the fir«
with the reporter, trusts hias* and feels h»*ll not get
the *spin" /miequot*(l/.
75*80 par cent of tha time I get the information 1
want* The rest are bombs*
"Moat Ara Honorable Man 6*h© Don't &ia"
or
*You Trust Your Mother, But You Cut the Cards'*
(A Question of Credibility)
The criticism of D01> news policies throughout the
sixties constantly referred to the practice of deception or
lying to the press and the public by Pentagon officials*
However* as indicated in Table XXV, military correspondents
generally do not feel they are intentionally told lies.
Eighteen correspondents or 46 per cent said
officials do not give the whole truth, all the time, or are
reliable about half the time because of this omission*
Seventeen newsmen stated officials are usually reliable or
their credibility was good and three said credibility is
excellent or officials are almost always reliable* One
reporter responded that the entire government *s credibility
is very bad*
Rather, the credibility problem is based on bow
reliable sources are in providing all the pertinent facts*
The Pentagon press corps as a whole is more concerned with
"omission* than lies*
This was strongly stated by almost all th» regulars*
The entire line of questioning on the subject of officials'
credibility was changed after the first few days of
aj^vf «M UN Ml
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interviewing because newsmen said that no Defense official
will stand up and intentionally lia to a newsman. The
original lino of questions based credibility on tlis
"accuracy and truthfulness" of Defense information. But as
one reporter said: *We really should be concerned with how
truthful they are in giving all the information—reliability




Initially* reporters were asked to evaluate credi-
bility of several categories of officials (OASD/PA.
military service information organisations* responses to
inquiries* etc.)* After getting the same basic response
from several newsmen the question eimply was left at *I»
general* how would you rate the credibility of SOD officials
today?**
The regulars recognised two basic problems relevant
to CGD's credibility. Many said that officials are told to
answer only What has been ashed by a newsman. The other
problem is defining "truth.* Quite a few reporters stated
that the military establishment is composed of human beings
who think they are doing the correct thing by omitting
certain information and justify their motives by saying* *I
haven't lied. None of the information Z gave out is false.
There's just more to it that the press doesn't really need
to know about." There; were sense* however* who simply said
DO© officials are honorable wan who try to get it as
tm&eG mi *m» M«« ****** mam**« *r i»i«i
i»«
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straight as they cam
Their credibility today is pretty good. The
government &Q&/ tries to tail the press reliable
stuff._ But t'txn trouble is what is truth and to whom?
Bach /official/ thinks ha*s right. 24
Henkin admits that wrong information may be given
out at tissea* but not on purpose. "If we are wrong* wa
will admit it. We are careful* and work hard to provide
only truthful information. Ma nay give out information wa
think is right * hut is wrong. But it's just like a news-
paper that prints a correction. The nawspapar didn't make
th* arror on purpose*" ha said. Henkin told the author
that such wistakas are quickly corrected.
Raforring to source credibility, a radio corre-
spondent addadi
Again* you usa all of them /sources/ • hut you
cross-check. Even those Who will not lie* make honest
mistakes* either because of haste under the gun* or not
being privy to a certain key piece of information. You
trust your mother* but you cut the cards •*'
A wire service correspondent said* "It's not a
problem of lies. Half-truths and omission are the biggest
Mproblems.* A news magasine reporter feels officials are
all individuals. "There's truth and there's political
truth. I*aird is a politician.* he said. One television
newsman said* *&ighty per cent of the people Z talk to. Z
knew aren't telling ma the complete truth. M
Contrasting the previous administration* a radio
correspondent said* "It's /credibility/ not as good as 18
months ago. Vietnam and the ABM /£ebat&7 hurt credibility.

















A few newsmen mads specific reference to the differ-
sncss between military and civilian officials* A regular
with a newspaper chain said, "Overall* credibility is good.
Usually the military /official/ is a little store reliable*
X get straightor answers from them; non-political
•32
Others agree and add that there is more of a ten-
dency for civilians in OSD to distort information*
A daily newspaper correspondent summed up the
problem in one succinct phrase, fie said* "ffe're not given
li©s* but VMTOKW.*33
The following viewpoint exemplified the responses
of several regulars. "Credibility also is affected by
reporters* especially Irregulars. They don't give an
34
adequate picture of things."
Another Question of Credibility*
December 1970
On December 2* 1970* the Associated Press ran a
story by one of its Pentagon correspondents which editor! al*
Since taking office nearly two years ago Secretary
of Defense Melvin R. Juaird has been particularly
sensitive about any doubts cast on the credibility of
the Pentagon.
Laird periodically likes to remind newsmen of his
efforts "to restore and maintain the credibility of
this department. M Be cites the establishment of daily
-it, >. • I - • .... •
•*
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Pant agon news briefings and the abandonment of back-
ground briefings attributable only to unnamed sources
in favor of his frequent on-the-record news confer-
ences.
fiut. despite these efforts, the credibility issue
ia haunting the Pa fansa Department, just aa it did
during tha yaara of President Lyndon Johnson's adminis-
tration.
Three cases stand out in Which it appearad tha
Pentagon was saying one thing and doing another t Tha
U. S. bombing raids in Cambodia, tha denial that u. S.
ground combAt troops vara in Laos, and last week's
disclosure of tha dramatic commando raid near Hanoi.
When it was disclosed last spring that U. S. planes
were hitting North Vietnamese and Viet Cong targets in
Cambodia, congressional opponents of the war feared the
new action represented deepening U. £. involvo&tent in
Southeast Asia*
But tha Pentagon insisted the raids were being
carried out only to cut off enemy troop concentrations
and supply lines which spokesmen said threatened u. S.
forces in South Vietnam.
It wasn't until newsmen in Cambodia witnessed U. 8.
planes flying support for Cambodian ground troops that
the Pentagon acknowledged the air strikes were
incidentally helping Cambodians*
As for y. 6. troops in Laos, it has become common
knowledge that some American forces are in that
country, but the Pentagon refers to them as advisers
and not "ground troops. M
Laird acknowledged last week the reason he decided
to tell of a daring but unsuccessful commando effort to
rescue American prisoners of war was to avoid a
credibility problem after the sorth Vietnamese accused
the United States of bombing civilian targets in the
In his initial explanation. Laird said only that
Savy planes dropped flares along tha north Vietnamese
coast to divert the enemy's attention from the
commando raid.
It wasn't until after President Nixon let word slip
at a Thanksgiving Lay dinner for wounded servicemen
that the Pentagon confirmed 0. S. fighter-bombers hit
targets in the POtf camp area.











5°* *• U h*m on ^v*rel occaaione throughout the
Hit*** "2' theJ^^on "»"* °* c°*tt*«iS in part,charges Bade by Hanoi. *«*•*•
-^ ^^ - tail the senators and tho ptabl,About th« air stxitw ^
„ 4. -J?
*'' * *»swer questione, but I only anawm tquestions that are asked
. . . ^ that particulaTRation was not asked. - he told a news ceiifereno*Konday
-Otherwise,- ha addes,
-I think yo^lttimthat I've bean aa forthright as one could possibly bean answering all queationa . " 35 xu aarox o
The article, authored by Robert A. ©obkin, la
reproduced for the aole purpose of illustrating that (a)
Laird'a efforts to maintain good credibility are recognised
by the ft**la and (b) that the regulars at the Pentagon are
critical at ti*a«%e of DW officiaie.
Thia one wire atory doea not aeceaaarily reflect a
change in attitude on the part of solitary newa corrsr-
spondenta with reapect to Dafena* officiaia' credibility.
The firat two incidents mentioned in the copy above
happened before the interviews were conducted and mail-
questionnaires were aeot to reportera.
The author talked by telephone with one of the
raaulare abort ly after the third incident and received some
sdditional data by mail ftej December, neither of which
reflected any major change toward the general credibility
of officials.
GMBfPA) vs. the Services
When comparing OMD(PA) with the military aervicea*








little diffaranee in edibility bat***, the*, othsra
etatou official, U OAKXpa) hav. . highel. cradmut.y
beeauaa they ar. not Mimw to apeak out one do not to.
to worry about being
-boaoc^l.- whlla other, aaid BiUtary
information official, have ^ttax cradibiuty^^ they
have to try l«rd.r hMH J^jc ar* .oared to gat "boaac«d..
Q*t reporter painted out good pointa in both.
There 'a • alight difference, a^ecially if only one
aarvio. i. involved. The aarvtee, oftan put out aoru
information than COD. but tbay hava the tendency to de-
eophaaize bad thinga. However. 08D sake, up for it.
Neither ia par fact. " 56
One of tha irregulara expanded hi. feeiin,, o„
edibility to include «« anfeil., 9toammm Qt^^^
officials,
aourMa^neli^L'ha^1^^ I **"*<'* *«*«SO»
half of the *i»rsL^5 *?". *"* TOan" that the o*1 '
the» ia verv EZ 5*1 ff*^1?9 *° S? "* pinion of
.%^'ossir^^^""—^^r-E^V°^—^" C-^S-oftna^
Srt^aXoTss: trr1™ with ot,»' ^Sslsst"
"aaTShen vou Zt ttJt^f t0ma« a liM P "4* »**«*
D
™'
"2? **• »"e **» »*«» an information "monitor"
oa^2l t^Sl I"*' *" <Soo»n ** »ay anything. In
E£ror^J7 **•*«*«» *° ««. i« • diSaforLtion
Modify Information?
Half of tha regular. (14) ware asked if thoy






Of •outre© credibility* Ail but on* said they did. The
newsmen stated if they ere unfamiliar with en official*
they will check sore sources to ensure the information is
correct* The problem is not as acute if they know who will
give them a straight answer—and most of them feel they
know.
A newspaper correspondent said, "X rai9ht check sore
sources* but won*t change information because X think a
source is wrong. M Another regular with a newspaper chain
stated t "Certainly X assess information based on source
credibility. I'll believe Laird over a military informa-
tion officer. Hs*s /Lairii/ the higher official and ought
39
to know."
"Be Knows the doss Knows 44
Twenty-three regulars were asked if they thought
officials are "fearful of reprisal'' if they are candid in
expressing their views* even if they differ with current
&Q$ policy. Seventy per cent of the newsmen (16) said they
are. Most frequently mentioned as the reason for this fear
was that it is a holdover from the mcSsmara period. £lso«
reporters suggested that the general conservative nature of
military officers makes thorn even more cautious than
civilian officials. The Umvx was singled out hy many to be
more cautious than other services.
One of the regulars gave an example of how this
fear is displayed*
to
win woo* •**** 5 *» ** *«» »* *#Xdr*H •*»
*30tt rfOSlffi :»rfjr* •,-; j^e--|»-.
ffi»V» »m». **«
aJ O." va.-: ••' • Ivlo
•••olvie* xtifUo null MfC
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1 was going to have lunch with * three-star
admiral. It vw canceled abruptly. It uaa sacplainee
that an article
. . . in the Washington/ toat about a
submarine
. • „ had caused some inquiry a* to the
source. Tha admiral felt that it was unwise to fee
•aan with a newsman. Sobody aaic to tha admiral,
•Don't see that guy.* But he just called it off.40
A natwork TV reporter saiSi
Officials are fearful concerning policy matters.
The general conservative attitude of thm military is
•tell reporters only what tbeyifeilitar#/ think the
press needs to know.* Military men are more tight lip
now; civilians not. They are more wide open because
they want Laixti** view promulgated in the press.41
One newspaperman's remarks were typical
t
Sure. I've had enough people amf "don't get see in
trouble by the way you write this* to think that
there's a feeling that something baa mmy happen. This,
I think, is frequently a nervousness about how their
views are preaanted—either accurately or if on back-
ground basis, not to identify him. And I would think,just knowing how government works, that a guy night
grant an interview with somebody and not know qui;
how it's done; then get a phone call the next morning
from his boss saying, "hey, what did you tell that
reporter?" That's one of the things that leads to the
prevalence of the monitoring system.
I've found sons military officers quite candid;
especially if they know they're not going to be quoted.
X think a slight tendency for civilians to talk to what
they think is in conformity with government policy.
I would expect assistant secretaries to talk in
conformity with current government policy, whereas some
admirals and generals may speak in broader mmi»» that
would be mere critical of current policy— perhaps a
tendency to be more candid in that sense* ret some-
times there's a tendency of the military not to talk at








Thirty-aeven raportere were a**^ what they thought
ia the eiagularly greateet contribution OHB(fA) mafcea to
the military corraepondent? iteaponaae from thirty-aeven
aewamen fall into throe hxoad catagoriea. Forty~ei* p*r
cant <17> aaid OJW(FA) beet eervae the reporter by *«ing a
"reeponeive giver" of information regueated. Thia
tncludeet anewering guariee; «^i«iaing or giving guidance
and background matariai on eeneitive or complicated
•ubjecta and major iaaueey and. aa a wire eervice corre-
apondant aaid. »tranamit information which ia determined
•omawhere elee to be raleaeable and answer reporters*
qucationa. Thair job ia not to originate information, but
ba reaponaive.*43
The remainder of mewemen were evenly divided
between thinking the graateet contribution ia (a)
-juet
being there- and <b> acting aa a Uiaison* between reportere
and officiala. Twenty-seven par cant of the newsmen <10)
aaid OASD(PA) providaa a central point of contact for
routine news without which they could not keep up with
daily military affaire. Thus "just being there* and making
routine material available ia m important ingredient to
the reporter* a ability to adequately cover COB.
A daily mewepaper correspondent aaid. *I don't
1!





oo«M cov.r MP Without tham A»(i-*) official.W Fantagon i. too big.-« <** „*. ^^^ wlt-r
•fldad to thia fueling,
nature of his job to do it7« raijuirad by the
The ramaindar of th. praa. corp. (10) a<uus o*»«»l
boot aarva. th. corr.apond.nt. by ft*!* „ , u<Uoi| „
linkMM th. pr.*. «d Oaf,™* „HlcWl. singl^ ^
•oat froguantly i. that OMDOA) «w ««^ i»t.rvie»,
•ith official. wh.n
. raportar U an.ur* who i. th. ba.t
contact on a givan Mjw or *» ta WJlnt, to talk „lth
•• of th. higher ranking officials.
d.var.1 notad thi. Uaiaon function save, th.
r.port.r II. that ha could batt.r us* ia oth.r v«y.,
unclasaifiad. fLt^i -Ll????^ "' IS "***• •*• tor
would takalorf't^t^^i^^JI^^ °< "*
Ouita oftan. raport.ra find official, will actM
talk to aMM unl..s th. raportar ha. mad. 1 in...l ..
for th. intarvisw through OMP(M).
°na of the irregular, saidi
•tio^i'Si^-^^^fi*1 »Burco ot «Nitin« infor-
"ilaSaT Ef^f?* **iCh fch* «*«ini.tration want.'»iaM«i. in tha caw of ao vast an onulufiin
asssri^/Lrrs^3^^^










Putting forth a Good Xmaga
Twanty ragulars Wara asked wh*t thay thought DOE)
policy-makars Ca*aluding *N»f*ii officials) feaiiava i, thgt
primary mission of OASDCPA). Ahmmt ^lf (9) 8ajus ^ u %Q
»•** ©QD look as good as possible or put tha JNmtagoa in
tha bast light, avaa whan things go wrong, or simply to
*eraata a favorabla ia^sa." Ona aatwork TV corraapondant
stated ha faais tha mission i. to
-put out as much informa-
tion as possibla that will do tha military soma good.
tublic affairs is public rslaMona-~that«s part of tha gam
w» Play. -4S
Kany, howavar, said that officials viaw OM»(*Jg*s
aiaaion is more isgitiaiata ISAM, such m maintaining tha
ehannal through tha cantral information offica to inform.
aKplain. and justify tha activities of W. UhUa sons
raportars apacifically aentioaad that officiala singly want
OASSXPA) to h« tha ehannal through which thay can axprass
thair viaws and gat Its* accsptad. several raportars Ijnii
it should ba this way siaca avery othar govarn*aat agaacy
doas tha sama thiag.
Many said Laird's aaparianoa as a congressman
(K-Wia.) aada his wall awara of tha importance of tha madia.
Thay addad ha usas thasu but usaa thaa fairly, four of tha
regulars made spacific II
I
U that Laird is sincere in
trying to gat tha Befense story to tha public and gat as
such information as possibla to tha prasa.
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One news magasine writer said high ranking
officials MS the mission aimply in straightforward terms
of providing Defense.- information to the publics
1« J?Z lh!± «*"*ai»tratioo /talking about i*ird/ cam
*L £ „f, ?f?Ie °f •"*«*••• Officials wanted to cat
*w fSdlbxi?*r f4** ^^ Qm* Aa wi«* «** impression
The Funnel—A Help or Hindrance?
Correspondents wars asked if they fait tha ©antral
control ovar naws dissemination as it eaiats toa*r~-having
military information funnel through oa8©(?&)~~binders or
helps their ability to cover tha Pentagon.
As illustrated in Table XXVI, about half of the
regulars (11 of 23) said it hinder*, one-quarter said it
helps then and the rest stated it makes no difference.
Bewevar. nine of 11 irregulars and military journal corre-
spondents said the central control hurt* their ability to
report military affairs.
Overall, only about one-fifth (7) of the corre-
spondents stated it actually worts to their advantage. An
e*»al number think it doss not affect their ability to
report, and the majority (59 per cent) find their job more
difficult because of IWs central control of military
information.
On routine matters, reporters said the existing













CEBTKAL ODaHPBOL OF tf&WB BEL*S OH HZSBERS?
Q. Co you feel that the central control ove»r n«ws dissem-
ination as it exist* today—having military information
funnel through OASD(PA)—hinders or h&lps your ability
to cover the Pantagon/ (n»34}
Correspondents
MM

















*Ona 'don't know" rasoonsa not includad.
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But newsmen stated when a correspondent wants to yet the
military services* side of an issue* nu finds it takes too
long to 90 through QASD(PA) channels. He will try instead
to get his material directly from the service involve.
This does not always mean he gets service cooperation.
Reporters said military officers are reluctant to talk
around OSE*
A wire service reporter summed up the majority
feeliny
1
There should he some control. But now the services
are reduced to eunuchs. It hasn't changed since
McBaaara* It was instilled and it stayed. This setup
is a cumbersome thing. 2 think &OD should simply give
policy and let the services answer a newsman's queries
directly* Most newsmen 90 to the services direct
anyway 1 can't plug up all the holes* But now the
information officers in the services clammed up. 50
Policies and Procedures
Regulars were asked if they are generally satisfied
with the current DQD information policies »n^i procedures*
More than two-thirds responded negatively. These 16 news-
men were asked why they are dissatisfied* Print-oriented
reporters said that information and officials are not
forthcoming enough*
Although the mechanics are established in the
organisation of OASD(PA), reporters suggested that informa-
tion and top level military experts are not readily avail-
able to the press* which makes it increasingly difficult to
adequately report on Pentagon activities*
—«
ui -*ojq©© to I##a •V*»*
ami mBV 4 imtrnwam
••soov&anrt tam »©A©ii©*
attioJtXeoi «•!«•«•*** ©*** ©•w
r-©All* .©•U©!*©©©*© ©*• ¥©«** V1* *©**• **** *•"
«*»• 0i» nlfurtTi©© ©d© *B©©d©XJl
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Reporters said that on key issues or new hardware
systems they are not exposed to military experts who are
capable of putting things in perspective nor are they
getting the military services* views on major events
i
The tendency has been to centralise that kind of
thing in a few civilians while the military was given
the back seat. Laird has said he*s trying to get them
back into the picture but 1 haven't seen any real
evidence of it. We've not had a real press conference
with any of the service chiefs in a long tima.^*
The electronic media are not satisfied with the
procedures set up to meet their special needs* They
expressed concern over the fact that OA&D(?A) is primarily
print-oriented and consequently they are treated like
second-rate citleans t "I don't see why audio-visual guys
/newsmen/ have to be treated as a separate entity."
Another comment wast "nobody understands TV. They expect
us to deal through the audio-visual branch /the section in
OASP(PA) structured to assist radio-TV reporters/. That's
just one more layer between the reporter and the news and
I 3
should be eliminated, tie should be treated as equals. *
One correspondent expanded on this views
We give them /audio-visual branch personnel/ a
query. They, take it to DJDI /Directorate for Befense
Information/. I don't see the point in two desks.
There's no advantage. Although people are very
friendly when you ask them something* they say* "Just a
minute* 1*11 go check with &DX* M It's just another
stumbling block. Maybe they need it in their organisa-
tion* but X certainly don't fm®& it in mine* 9*
The radio-TV correspondents also felt they are








steaned from tnair physical location. Until Fail 1970 thay
were situated in an office sojae distance from the main
press roouu Surimg a fast breekiag story the electronic
Bedia were *\*oecii»tfS forgotten and officials would only give
Initial key announcements to print rcadia, according to
reporters. Thay have since boon relocated in new quarters
adjoining th* press roost.
la suranaxy one of tha regular* sale;*
There is a general lack of interest in getting
information out? no drive or desire to get information
tha press desires—a ganaral brushing off of tha
problem. Tha Motivation has changed over tha yaars
which has resulted iu gettiny lass inf&r&ation to tha
prass bacausa thay /&A&b{9h) officials/ don't want to
upset tha cart.*-*
Performance of WX
Nora specifically* regulars also wars asked if thay
are ganarally satisflad with tha routine performance of tha
news division (DDI) of O^SD(PA). aalf (12) said thay era
not* »ore than one-third (9) answered yes, and three said
thay are Monly sonetiaes" or specified that it depends on
tha situation.
Those who responded negatively ware asked with what
were they dissatisfied. Tha aain criticism was that i®l
slows things down rather than expediting the flow of raws.
Tha inquiries that reporters submit to BBl are raost often
cited as an exanples "The process is too slow, especially








is - nadia will W# ! NMMftMl > y ** •#*•
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necessary." Another u*Lu t 4*y h*vs» too many people out
there /in 1*4/. . . . Although I normally go through the
services, if I have lots of time sag it's nothing urgent.
GAS£(t»A) helps.*57
They Also are dissatisfied with public affairs
officers themselves. They feel while there are exceptions,
as a whole PAQ* do not stake an exerted effort to aid news-
sen in gathering nevst "It depends a lot on the 10
/information office*/. Some are great, they fcnow the





Several regulars said that information officers in
OASD(PA) do not try to set <**tails needed for stories.
Since many Defense officials will deal with the media only
through JPAQs, newsmen suggested the information officers
should make it their job to delve into a topic and get the
"meat** information required.
Military aarvices' In formation ^amlmafeioma;
"The fowar of 8sa«Uv« AttfrhftrjUg"
The regulars said that during the last 10 years,
the service information offices have been continuously
weakened. Kewsmen suggested that more and more of the
services' responsibility moA authority were chipped away as





Offiea of th. »a*r.t.ry of Cfow. (ow» . Mo-t racognilB
that th.
-rvica.. rola in tha n**,.*^^ proCa„ eouW
ba axtraaaly aignificant. but agraa that today it i. not.
"Tha Cuban «i.«il« wteto ^tobar 1963/ saally WM
th. banning of it .11. - ..id , v.taran military corr.-
apondant.
-Hobody but Sylve.tar oould put out anything.
Thing, hw. nav.r gott.n changed back to th* aarvica.
having openna..."59
Mawuaen generally agrae that Mtam1! "ona-voica"
philosophy graatly raduead-and ha. naarly
.tifflad-tha
•arvica.' ability to ind.pandantly eoaaunicate with corra-
spondentss
tbm Kennedy period was the point in ti«« *v»*
•tarted th* decline. Thin9. w«S ^ttL!^ vLuabl*before then. I think what'. n*,™L«L* ?I *J2: aia fi»**
centralisation a* i^.^JfL JW*11*^ *« that the great
ha. r^V^L* ? f *•*• di««**i»*tioii in the Pentagon
getting
n ^grading the kind of lOs that yo«?re
cualii£*Q#*L^ d0 W^h th* lac* °* ±*<**»tive. Th.q ty of people refleets this lack of ine»n*iv*» ta-
tloVtr SSrST?,* *~*** ^cifeoareenftnlorma-*!«?* riCh *•*•** aurrounding a story. Thev ere
Going through the chain of commend in order to get a
response or release "chopped" (approved) ia a .ore subject
to just about all the correspondents. They said the delays
caused by this procedure are unwarranted. Counting on
the service information organisations, a newspapermen said.
The services can be very good When you ask a
^*!i?a th*y wf?t to ** «•** *** wfuily bad if youare after something that's embarrassing. JUst have to
;oc ml *****
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keep pushing thess* but not always oaay to succeed.
Life* any large organisation* you have too many people
involved; too many layers to cat through.
Sometimes reporters run up against the power of
negative authority; that is* too many people in posi-
tion to say no* but not enough people in authority to
say yes. X find often if you get to the top first
—
the guy who's not seared to death—your chances are
better of getting an answer. 6*
Wewiaen stated that this "power of negative
authority 9 ; the degradation of responsibilities vested in
service secretaries and service chiefs; and the lack of
motivation that exists in most military PWa at the
Pentagon have all led to the demise of the proper function
of the military services and their information organiza-
tions. The press owe this to QS&'m stiffling of
independent dealings with the media during the 1960 's. One
of the veteran military regulars described how he evaluates
the effect of the sixties
s
Officials today still see the danger of service
squabbling again. X don't think that's true. Me have
become alienated from the services. Except for one or
two guys. X don't get to see service information people
much any more. But even when X do* don't really get
much. Mo new ideas are generated by the FAQs any more.
The military* including CHXWfOs* have hemn told to
stay out and have been pushed into the background.
This is not a complacency or apathy on military's part*
but just a recognition of their new role. Xt boils
down to thist if you don't exercise the function of
that particular faculty you have of providing informa-
tion* after a while you lose incentive to use that
faculty. After a while that faculty disappears. Today*
information service offices no longer have the capabil-
ities they used to have to turn out information. &*
As the result, the regulars said that the conserva-
tive nature of the military, the unfavorable public reaction
k*MM I
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to Vietnam, and the tendency on the part of 03$ daring the
sixties to keep the military services in the background,
all have mad© getting meaningful information fross the
services extremely difficult*
This iM farther taxing on several reporters who
said military officials know More about their field of
specialty than their civilian counterparts in OSD.
Another regular expressed how PAOs let the official
down at tineas
X would think the CHXSfOs /chiefs of service
information offices/ would be more sophisticated than
they are today. They should realise that if officials
in the military would bust loose for just twenty
minutes with a reporter recommended by a service 910
it would be worth it? it pays off. • . . What they
don't know is that 50 per cent of a "flap" is in the
newspapers. If they bust loose for 20 minutes today,
a lot of their flap two days from now would be tfown.63
Correspondents, however, find it hard to generalise
about military PAOss "You'll usually find one or two guys
/in each service information office/ that are very good and
try very hard." Another said, "Civilian PAOs are not as
good as military IQs, excluding high officials. •
Most said if it were not for the FAQs they deal
with most frequently, usually on an informal basis, quite
often they would have even greater difficulty trying to get
the military services* side of an issues
Military people feel they're running the tread mill.
But you do find dedicated people. It is especially
good if the services get one man and make him an expert
in a field so he wins the confidence of officials.
This helps the press. Often PAOs fail because they











HO overt attempt was made to ascertain views on how
newsman rank the performance of Individual service informa-
tion organisations because not all correspondents nave had
equal exposure to each service. But during the course of
the interviews* several regulars volunteered their impres-
sions. Although no generalisations are attempted based on
the several remarks made* they at least offer some insights
into the service information offices.
However* the regulars were asked if they perceived
any difference in credibility between the services.
Generally none were noted. But one veteran regular said*
Credibility is about the same between OASD(PA) and
service information organisations. The tendency of
service 10s is to cover up, These are usually new XOs
in the Pentagon. They would do better for their boss
if they simply were straight with the press .66
Another experienced regular stated t *PAOs generally
make an effort to dispose of a newsman in a "satisfactory*
67
manner only.*
A news magazine writer described £AOs this wayt
In the military* there is more experience in the
information business. Military officers have had 10
to 20 years experience. There's more turbulence on the
civilian side. ... A real danger in public affairs is
that to da the jok* the 10 must satisfy the asjsfs of
someone /reporter/ who doesn't control his /JQ/ pay.**8
Some volunteered their impressions as follows
t
a newspaper reporter said the Army was best overall; a
newspaper chain correspondent ranked the Army aa being
"moat open*" then Marinas* Air Force* and Kavy in that
order; a reporter for a news magazine put the Mavy first
wc- .•:• i «,* >i } lis:. "•: I'- 1**3 W&« /./:•-.-.: r .' •<
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and Army a close second with the Air Force last* and a TV
newsman ranked them (1) navy, (2) tony, and (3) Mr force.
Others brought up differences between the services*
information structures or PAOs in various context*
s
It's hard to generalise. Some PAOs are very good;
others are useless. The llavy as a rule takes longer to
get answers. Air Force is best for me—perhaps because
I deal more with them. The Mavy goes through so many
chops; their answers are so wishy-washy, they're not
worth anything. * deal less with Marines. Army
officers in OCX are best of any service. They really
stay up on things. The backgrounding they give us is
invaluable. 69
Another full-time correspondent at the Pentagon
said, "The Havy is excellent. X get the greatest volume of
information from them. Army also is good and Air force I*d
put third.*70
One other said:
The information shops in the services are both good
and bad. They have very great potential if properly
handled. I»d aay Navy is of the greatest importance to
me? Army is little importance, and I'd rate the Air
Force as very little importance. 71
And finally, another stated: "Savy has always been
more free and easy about being identified with common sense
—especially when you reach the admiral level. This i*
ore true in the Havy than Army and Air Force. n72
More on Pentagon PAOs
Correspondents were asked if they would agree or
disagree that Public Affairs Officers in the Pentagon
generally do everything in their power to assist newsmen.















Overall, 49 per cent (18) disagreed, 24 per cent (9)
agreed, and 27 per cent (10) held no opinion either way.
Tabla XXVII shows that 44 par cant of the regulars (11)
disagreed that PAOs do all thay can to help get tha Defense
story told—two of thaaa answered they strong ly-disayreed*
"JPAOs in the Pentagon do everything in their power to
control information; how and whan it comes out. 1*73 five
regulars (20 par cant) agreed with the statement and the
remainder (9) aaid that scats do and soma do not.
Propaganda Show or Greater Flow?
Having discussed the centralisation of news*
reporters were asked what they think would happen if the
services were given back the power to release what they
want, when they want, and to whom they want.
Responses fron the 22 regulars asked fall into
three categories (with answers about evenly distributed in
each). The larger number (9) said that such a move would
work to tha advantage of the newsmen. Another segment of
reporters (7) said it would be bad and probably result in a
propaganda war between the services. 74 The remainder (6)
stated it would not work because of two reasons t (1) the
military is too cautious today and (2) they have not had to
exercise the information function for such a long time they
probably could not execute such a plant they are used to
OASD(PA) taking all the responsibility.











assessment of public affairs officers
Q. Public affairs officers in tits Pantagon generally oo
everything in their power to assist newsjoan. Tell me
the extent to which you agree or disagree with the above
stataatant. (n*37)
Assessment of PAOs
Strongly- Agree- Dim- Strongly-























giving the services more independence in getting things
released, there are now too many man hoars spent coordin-
*>lt
ating and chopping to get an innocuous story out."
One of the wire service correspondents said;
It might be better for newsmen* the public* and the
services themselves because we'd get snore accurate and
understandable information. For instance * tO per cent
of the answers given at the daily 11*00 a.se. brief are
"I'll have to check. * They just don't know. "?<*
Others feel it would make the newsman's job easier
and the military services would display more initiative.
The following responses are typical of the negative
comments t "would get mere stuff* but it would be tainted"/
"Bad. Just public relations propaganda that would help the
military**/ and "probably result in « flap."
A few pointed out that even if there was a steady
stream of propaganda xt still would be advantageous* since
newsmen are able to detect such tainted information.
During Flap—Go to Q£SD(PA) or Service?
With regard to a specific issue involving one of
the military services* 20 regulars were asked if they most
often prefer to get information regarding that issue
primarily from 0A8D(?A) or from the service itself.
Almost half (9) of the newsmen go to the service
first* while one-fifth of the group (4 newsmen) usually
contacts both and three stated it depends either on the
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OAS©<I>A) first.
The reasons n«anmmn go to the service first range
frost •! trust military roen more* to *D0& gives sterile
responses. ** However, most frequently they expresses mors
confidence in the service to give a straight answer. The
following responses ere typical* B 2 90 to the service. It




One of the TV correspondents said he goes to the
service because »OA$2>(FA) goes to the service and chances
are the answer will gat watered down by OSE."78
A specific example was cited by one of the
regulars*
-During the /Toss of? Scorpion &. s. Kavy sub*
marine that sank in 196&7* the »avy was delayed in getting
information oat because of the process of going through
OASD(fa) . *79
£ven some of those reporters who first go to
OASD(PA) or check both at about the same time said it is
not always because they srjtfar. it that wayt "Usually I'll
cheek OASD(PA) first to see what they* re putting out. Then
I 9 11 go to the *9rvice. m@® Another indicated he checks both
to see if he gets the same informations "X can normally get
more from the services.*81
Several stipulated it ^p^nAa on the service 1 "If
the issue concerns wavy or Army, 1*11 go to them first? if
Air Force, I'll go to OSP instead. H&2 Others are similarly









Overall, the correspondents generally stated they
would prefer to get the initial infonsation from the
services, but this is not always possible because military
officers do not want to rock the boat in many cases. Other
tiroes OSD siasly tells the services not to get involved
—
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74Phil Gouiding wrote : "Remove the central control
over the dissemination of news • . • and the result would
be a propaganda nightmare. In ninety days* the Department
of Defense would be an old-fashioned public relations
shambles." See Phil a. Goulding* Qo&iXxft OX &JUS& i&&*
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Military newa correspondents have a vide variety of
news sources from which to gather information on military
affairs. Sources are broken down into IS categories for
this study. These categories were derived from (1) research
of secondary source material, (2) informal discussions with
newsmen and OASD(PA) officials in April 1970, (3) the
author's own experience as a public affairs officer in the
Pentagon (1967-1939), and (4) partly from the 10 sources
used in Underwood's 1960 study. 1
The productivity and usefulness of six of these
sources generally depends on the reporter's own initiative.
These are j informal contacts in the Pentagon and at other
government agencies or departments i industry sources;
congressmen or their staff members; other reporters; and
social gossip, while reporters may elect not to utilise
certain of the remaining sources, the nine other categories
are largely controlled by DOC officials who greatly
influence the flow of information from each.
Sources available to the Pentagon press corps first
are explored collectively as viewed by newsmen. Then the
196
.
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merits and demerits of each are amplified separately based
on the correspondent*' opinions.
l0ds4&fMl
x * toftmniii ^ant agftn gmirfnua t personal contacts
(civilian or military) in the Pentagon that the corre-
spondent coals with directly and unofficially to obtain
information. This source may ?ive the reporter a solid
lead or background material that is unavailable anywhere
else. This relationship is based on trust (by both
parties)
.
The official talks freely off-the-recorci and not
for attribution. The correspondent soon learns who he can
rely on for accurat« and honest information; the informal
source soon learns if a newsman is unreliable* The number
of such informal contacts maintained by a correspondent
depends largely on his own ingenuity and credibility.
2 * Congrtfis iiifmftl Hsarinris. aom^nt^ m? x^y^^
CanqrsssmffQt Correspondents receive from OA8D(PA) trans-
cripts of hearings conducted on the Hill that relate to the
military. Also, many committees or subcommittees release
their own documents based on formal investigations.
Individual congressmen and senators or their staffs also
provide reporters with useful information.
3
* gQEiml Maws CfHifflrmnrrrftn Scheduled meetings
bstween fe^MM officials and media representatives, either
for a specific purpose or the Defense Secretary may make
himself available to the media for questions on any topic
•3* it***
; 4i*i »' *1 i.»~ i nU r.©
ci mop Umv*
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related to military affairs.
4* formal. tatarv jaws, > Discussions between a
correspondent and a COS official—usually arranged through
one of the information organisations in the Pentagon. Such
interviews tend to have a store on-the-record atmosphere
versus those contacts with informal sources the newsman has
cultivated himself.
5* WmiMAL* Refers to OASD(PA) as a source in its
entirety compared to other elements of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (CSX?) or other Pentagon offices* e.g..
CASS (PA) compared to the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (for Manpower and s,^$mmxY% Affairs) or (Research
and Development).
6. BflCfcqgPunrifiCfiH This term may refer to large
group background sessions or discussions with only a few
(or even on&) newsmen. The information disseminated
through this channel is not for straight attribution to the
spokesman hut rather to "Defense Officials" ox "Military
Spokesmen.* There are many reasons for E&i&nB® officials
to conduct backgrounders* including t trial balloons*
information to clarify a complicated issue* give out
information not available anywhere else but which Pentagon
officials wish to see reach the media. These sessions may
be initiated by DOD officials or requested by the corre-
spondent (s).
7. Military gurvica Information Organisation!*
Refers to the individual services* public information/public
.*•.
is Imutm 111 ill***






affair, office* which are part of the Defeat Department.
The Amy, Air Force, navy and Marine Corp. each maintain
such organisation*,
8 * Informal tom** \ n o*H*r g^^r—^^ figm^ ,,.
Those personal contact, cultivated by the military corre-
spondent in any of the other government department* or
agencies in Washington that assist in providing information
relevant to Defense affairs. The Pentagon reporter may
also solicit information from such source* via his news
outlet's beat correspondent at a specific agency or
department.
** frUWOTliM to Inquiries t Question* asked by the
military corre.pondent. The** may be in the form of more
formal written reque.t*
.ubmitted through one of the
information organisation* in DOC or they may be asked of a
Defense public affairs officer verbally <i„ p»r#0tl m ^
Phone). Inquiries (or .imply
-queries «> are normally
submitted to the appropriate *ervice or OSD information
desk in DDI (Directorate for Defense Information) or asked
«t the daily llsOO a.m. new* briefing. 'Responses to
Inquiries* refer* only to tho*e submitted through appropri-
ate public affair* channel* and not queation* reporter* ask
of their own informal contact* in the Pentagon.
l° 9
-Ui ,QQ g ,m , Hffiwa nrli i ff i^ t ®very day at 11*00
o'clock in the morning, a *pecial new* briefing is con-
ducted for the Pentagon pre** corp*. Thi* session normally




i» conducted by Jerry w. Friedheim, Principal Eeputy
ASD(PA)
.
ll * XfflSuatry Scmrfiam t suffers to civilian industry
personnel whose companies are either prism or sub-
contractors for the Defense department or those seeking
contracts with DQD. As previously mentioned, the Pentagon
lets about 200,000 annual ma}or procurement orders to
business* There were some 100,000 prists or sub-contractors
under contract with DOfc in 1970. s*hii® these sources have
an obvious vested interest, they do provide the military
correspondent with a valuable channel of information,
especially on hardware systems (production, research and
development)
•
12 * IftfrsnUanal "Iai ateml t to+t*tm% information that
is given to a military correspondent (or group of Pentagon
reporters) that the source does not want to be (or cannot
get) released through official channels on-the-record. One
type of leak is when a military official wishes to make
Public, through the media, a bit of information that contra-
dicts official defense policies or positions on a given
issue. Another is when Defense officials wish to clandes-
tinely get information out in the open that may be an
attempt to refute a congressional committee's charge or
clarify a sensitive issue, the information on which cou
not be released officially without repercussions, do© may
also use the leak as a trial balloon, to test the public
NM »C--rr?
• fc
.v -,-... .j • ;;"»v.-' v»
hMMl#l *#
reaction on a proposed course of action.
*3
- *«** ftftlfiasauu Refers to Befansa information
originate fey OSD or the military eervice* that is dis-
seminated to the news madia through the OAS£(PA).
-rha
material may include! actual releases on a Z&B topic?
speech texts; information on defease contracts; fact sheets,
reports; photograph** or any other related material, *fce*e
releases are referred to a* "Biue^oPs*r«---information
handed out in this manner is put on official OAS£(pa)
release forms which have blue mastheads.
14
• ffthtr ftftMtftittEiM Safers to other military
eorrespondanta in the Pentagon press corps.
15
* a°£ifi\ Sosalp * My information the correspond-
ent may receive during social engagements in Washington.
Xmnorf-anp* at aw ftmirraji
Sewsmen were asked to describe how important each
source generally ia to them in covering the Pentagon on a
routine baais in terms of
-very great, great, moderate,
little, or very little" importance. A five to one scale
was employed, with five (5) meaning "very great 4* and one
(1) "very little" importance*
A few reporters judged some sources as ranging from
"great* (4) to -little- (2) importance because they did not
foal a generalisation was possible, to this situation, a
rating of









Tibia XXVIII indicates that only "informal Pentagon
sources" remain in th* "very great" importance clasaifica-
tlon (4.0 to 5.0) when means for all correspondents ware
combined. With th« exception of OMD(PA)-fourth position
for each group of newsmen—there was little agreement
between regulars, in *g«lars, and military journal corre-
spondents concerning the weight giv,,n each source. Overall,
and in addition to informal Pentagon sources, six source*
ranged between "moderate" and "great insertance," eight
between "little- and «modar«t«. " and one ia viewed as being
between "very little" and "little" importance.
Regulars said seven were between moderate and
great (3.0 to 4.0)
,
while only thrae sources fell into this
grouping for irregulars and just two—formal interviews
and OASD(PA)—had means between 3.0 and 4.0. as judged by
military journal reporters. The latter group of newsmen is
the only one with two sources rated above 4.0 or great
importance* other two groups cited only one aource above
4*0.
Formal news conferences ranked second for regulars,
but eighth in importance to irregulars and sixth for journal
In general, the regulars considered a wider range
of sources to be rather important to them in covering DOB
on a daily basis—onlv seven sources are below "moderate"
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3*0 (moderately important) for only four of the IS
sources*
A comparison of ranks based on means shows that
generalisations with respect to how military correspondents
view the sources available to them Is somewhat misleading*
For instance* informal sources in other government agencies
rank eighth for regulars but fifteenth for journal newsmen*
Responses to inquiries are fifth in importance to military
journal correspondents but ninth to regulars* Even the
regulars' views differ with respect to their sources
because of diversified requirements* deadlines* and special
interests determined by their media type*
Many regulars were quick to point out it is rare to
use just one source when gathering material for a story*
More likely they turn to several* checking facts and
opinions against one another until as complete and accurate
a picture as possible is formulated*
One of the regular correspondents saidt
The_Jlong line of "moderates* /the ranking he gave
sources/ indicates that some sources within each of
your categories are better than others* Some sell
straight lines consonant with their own interests;
others lie* After one or two dealings with any given
source* however* you can easily gauge utility and
truthfulness* You may still deal with known liars*
because occasionally they're on the money with a big
one* But you always take the precaution of carefully
cross-checking a tip with other reliable government or
industry officials**
A network television reporter addedt
I'd love to play one against the other? back-
grounder parlied into an interview on the air.
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(tonerally worsts like this* usually get a tip somehow*
then flush out information with inquiries and conduct
the interview for use on the air* Almost any combina-
tion of ways to do it.*
And an irregular gave a different slant to
evaluating sources!
The nest place to find out what's really happening
in DOB is on Capitol Hill* X speak here* of course, of
Washington decision-staking* Without our corps of
Vietnam correspondents* we might still fesiieve we^are
covering the war* ... The rule here «£Dn source*/ is
that the official information office sources are
generally reliable if the information handed out or
sought is not sensitive* If sensitive* those sources
often are poorly informed themselves; or if they are
informed, they will often be evasive or attempt to
mislead* 4
Sewsmen next were asked what three sources would
they most often "prefer" to use if all things were equal.
e.g.. accessibility, willingness to give untamperad facts,
and reliability* Mao. they were asked to rank these
sources in order of preference*
Table XXIX shows that the top four "most preferred
sources" aret informal Pentagon sources, formal interviews,
formal news conferences, and responses to inquiries*
Regulars, as a group, view news conferences, interviews,
congressional sources, and responses to inquiries, in that
order, after their "nsost"preferred informal Pentagon
sources* irregulars would rather use the interview first.
followed by informal Pentagon sources, responses to
inquiries, informal sources in other agencies, backgrounders.
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and then congressional sources. Military journal reporters
said they prefer their own contacts in BGD first* followed
by interviews* then news releases third and OASE>(P&) fourth*
with responses to inquiries next*
As Table XXX indicates* the regulars prefer
informal Pentagon contacts far and above their next choice
"news conferences'*—the former was named first 11 times and
the latter source only six*
Meat ffciUgftd fSguygftg
Reporters were then asked to rank the top three
sources they actually most often "utilise* on a routine
basis and rank them in order of importance*
Table XXXI shows that overall* informal Pentagon
sources remain the most often used source. But the second
source most frequently used by all correspondents is the
11:00 a.m. news briefing* which is only seventh on the
preferred list. Hews conferences drop from third most
preferred to the ninth most often utilised source* While
the Pentagon press corps gave backgrounders sixth priority
in preference* this source is only thirteenth on the
utilisation list; ahead only of "other reporters** and
"social gossip.
*
While irregulars most prefer interviews as a source*
they said this source is fourth among the top sources used*
Military journal reporters would like to rely on informal
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0* What three sourcas would you most often prefer to us®
—
if all thing* were equal (accessibility, ate.) and rank
in order. (n*27)
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Pentagon Correspondents!- Regulars Only





























































*If two or more sources we** »*"** the same number
of times* rank order was based on number of times named
first* second* third*




















la Table XXXI I, the contained views of regulars show
they both prefer and! use informal Pentagon sources aiost
often. But the daily news briefing i« used second, while
they would prefer newe conferences* Interviews are both
preferred and used with the sane frequency—ranking third
on both lists*
Regulars said their fifth most often used source is
OASD(Pfc) when, in fact, their earlier remarks show there
ere eight other sources sore preferred than the central OS©
information office (ranks with intentional "leaks* on
preference list)
• Sews releases were given little prefer-
ence* ranking twelfth, and tenth among those sources most
often utilised by the regulars*
Only eight newsmen in the Peatagon press corps said
they actually utilise the same top three sources that they
prefer to use* More often, correspondents indicated they
mem forced to turn to other sources In order to get the
minimum of information needed to complete a story. At
times, this means newsmen use sources they would otherwise
aot be likely to rely on for accurate or complete
information*
But, as mentioned earlier, generalisations, when
applied to such a variety of interests as those held by
media represented in the corps of regular newsmen, may be
misleading. This is evidenced by the following breakdown
of top three "preferred" sources mm compared to the top
lap* j to SVfetv o«-i*»'- V '* •XdftT al
".
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TABLE' XXXII
SOURCES MOST OFTEN IttlhZZZ&t HSGUURS OMX.Y
Q* What three sources woulci you moat often prefer to use
—
if all things were equal ( accessibility, etc*} and raa&
them in order* (n»27)




Mews Sources Top Thraea First
i mw1' wn •«••
Informal Pentagon
sources 1 11 16
11*00 a.su news
briefing 2 11
formal interviews 3 2 3
Responses to
inquiries 4 2 7
OASD(PA)-**as compared
to other Defense







congressmen 7 •** §
Military service
information organiza-
tions 8 •* £
Formal news conferences 9 1 5
Sews releases 10 — 4
Industry sources 11 1
Intentional " leaks" 12 — 2
Backgrounders 13 -- 1
Other reporters — **~
Social gossip
a
If two or store sources were named the same number
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three "moat often utilised* source* nm*& by regulars in
the six types of media outlets composing the regular press
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in Dan Hi**©., atudy, **aimymuring: la Kashi^^,
fee interviewed Washington correspondents daring 19el~m2
and found that II I Hlllii preferred first the interview and
then the newe conference. Xa actual practice, ha found,
aewsmen also moat often utilised the interview, followed by
the nave conference, news inquiry, backgrounder, mm
releaaa and leak, in that order. 5
The stx«3y conducted by Underwood in XUG found that
the Pentagon prase corps recognised the too three news
eourcas-based on quantity and significance
-as* informal
sources, information organisations and congress.®
ttoUfifl inmraw
Having determined preference and utilisation, the
«uthor asked military correspondents about the amount of
information they received from various sources. Specifi-
cally, the question was,
-With respect to sheer volume of
^formation you receive or obtain, which would be the three
sources that are most prolific. Ran* 4* crd*r, with number
one being the source that produces the greatest volume of
information.
*
Table X3PUIX reflects that congressional sources
provide the most information, followed by releases and
informal Pentagon aourcea. Regulars named Congress and
releases, first and second, but consider** the daily news
briefing as the third most prolific source of information
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information from congressicnal sources, but said news
releases are the second greatest contributor* followed by
interviews and responses to inquiries* Military journal
reporters indicated saost information flows to them from
releases* military service information organisations*
informal Pentagon sources, industry sources* and congres-
sional sources* in that order.
Overall comparison of those sources that produce
the most information—usable or not—with the list of
sources generally considered to be the most important*
shows that some sources judged to be very important do not
necessarily provide a great quantity of material* for
instance* news conferences are among the top sources said
to be important on a routine basis* but rank at the bottom
of the list with respect to sheer volume of information
produced*
ftpjjrgmi ynrylbdlng, Halt ftignifigaufc. Iafogaafciaa.
Heart* reporters were asked to rank the three
sources that generally provide the most significant infor-
mation based on the material actually received or obtained
from all sources
•
As indicated in Table XXXIV, four of the top five
sources named in response to this question are also among
the top five sources rated generally the most important to
Pentagon reporters* An exception is Informal sources in
other government agencies* which is considered equal to
-.. - , •
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news conferences in significance of information received
from each* However, informal sources in other government
agencies rankad low (J) on the listing of source importance.
Military jourial newsmen put releases third on
significant information ranking, while that source is one
of the lowest (11) for regulars sad irregulars (not even
named) • Irregulars said they get store significant informa-
tion from responses to inquiries than all other sources
except their informal Pentagon contacts, while regulars put
that source and releases toward the bottom of the list (11
out of IS).
Underwood found in I960 that reporters considered
the top three sources which produce the most "significant
information*1 to bet (1) informal sources! (2) Congress; and
(3) information organizations. Although Underwood did not
distinguish between OASD(FA) and military service informa-
tion organisations, it is still significant that the I960
press corps gave such a high rating to information
organimations
•
In 1970, based on total times named as one of the
top three, military service information offices were named
twice and ranked only twelfth out of the IS sources with
regard to providing significant information. OMD(H) was
not even cited and ranked with "other reporters** and "social
gossip** at the bottom of the list.
















UTtt.Of Source gy*1 tinting
Table X30CV shows a composite of how military
correspondents ranked the IS news sources based on the five
criteria of •general importanca , n "preference,* "actual
utilisation," "volume of information received, * and
•significance of information. • Table XXXVI provides similar
data for just the regulars at the Pentagon.
Discussion of individual ***** &*^vmB
Informal Pentagon Sources
Far and above any other source, newsmen considered
their own personal contacts in the Pentagon as being the
best and most reliable* The regulars said they would find
it almost impossible to adequately cover the military beat
without them.
Correspondents rank this source as number one in
importance, preference, utilization, and significance of
its information. It is third with respect to volume of
information. Regulars stated three ether sources are more
prolific. Irregulars said information received from three
other sources is more significant 9^ they "prefer* inter-
views to personal contacts in the Pentagon. Military
Journal reporters use congressional sources more often than
informal DOB contacts.
Two thoughts come through the discussions that are
direct reflections of EOD information policies during the















General Prefer actually of
«Dspor— To Use Vol- Infor-
lews Sources tanee V9* M0S31 ume mation
(n»40) <n«39) (n«39) <n«29) (a»2S)
Informal Pentagon




congressmen 2 5 3 1 2
Formal news
conferences 3 3 • 10 4
Formal interviews 3 2 3 7 3
OMD(PA) 3 9 7 9 mm
Backgrounders 6 » 13 mm *
Military service
information
organisations 1 12 10 4 12
Informal sources in
other government
agencies 9 • * 10 4
Responses to
inquiries 8 4 S 8 •
lit 00 a«m. news
briefing 10 7 2 6
Industry sources 11 13 12 5 9
Intentional *leaks * 12 11 11 •** 11
Mews releases 12 9 8 2 9
Other reporters 14 mm «MI m —
*
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General Prefer Actually of
Inpor- To Use Vol- Infor-
Haws Sources tanas Use Host ume mation
(n»28) <n*27) (n»27) Cn-18) (n*l$)
Informal Pentagon
source* 1 1 1 4 1
Formal rows





congressman 3 4 7 1 2
OASD(PA) 4 9 5 9 SSMMS
Formal intarviewe 5 3 3 6 2
Backgrounders 1 6 13 -*• 7
Military service
information




agencies • 8 a •**» S
Responses to
inquiries 9 5 4 3 11
Hi 00 a«m. news
briefing 10 7 2 3 7
Industry sources 11 •MM 11 5 7
Intentional
" leaks" 11 9 ia MM* i
Sews releases 13 12 10 2 n












sixties. Several of the more experienced correspondents
explained that informal contacts b@came progressively more
important as news sources during th» last decade because of
MeHaaara's attaints to keep the military voice out of the
public reruns, la that context, newsmen said they had to
rely wore and more on of£~the-reeord remarks by military
msn willing to risk being traced by investigators as the
originator of certain information Mcfgaatara wanted kept from
the public*
On the other hand, several regulars said even their
best informal contacts started to avoid newsmen toward the
end of the decade after seeing high ranking military
officers transferred or forced to retire because they were
suspected of coercing with the media on a story contradict-
ing official Defense policies or positions.
"Sven these ^informal Pentagon sources/ have dried
up. Good guts men are still around, but not taany, *
declared one of the regulars.8 this viewpoint is not
widely held among all the regulars—yet. However, the bulk
of criticism against Pentagon public affairs tactics during
the 1960s was founded on the premise that the tighter the
control of news, the greater the likelihood that a
reporters own contacts would dwindle into oblivion. Most
regulars new said their personal contacts have not h&Bti
greatly inhibited. But the fact that in 1970 even a few
veteran reporters expressed concern over getting less sm&
mdS tauiwM mwwin blov» •? frail*** «3* J«#d
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less from personal contacts is alarming. Reporters stated
this administration has made a conscious effort to open up
sore channels to newsc-en? hut faw said the trend developed
in the sixties to keep OBD between newsmen and the military
services has really btmn halted* swash less reversed*
An inherent difficulty is that cultivating and
maintaining informal sources in COB is a greater problem
for military correspondents than newsmen on other beats in
Washington because of tha continuous turnover of military
personnel. Often a military official attaints to put
newsmen in touch with his successor and encourage a similar
relationship. But this is not always easily accomplished
and the reporter must begin from scratch.
Several regulars admitted that their best contacts
are not in the public affairs field, but lie within the
middle to upper echelons of military officialdom.
Congressional Hearings, Documents, or
Individual Congressmen
Military correspondents said that on occasion the
only Washington sources who will talk about a particular
Defense issue are individual congressmen. Many regulars,
however, put congressmen in the same category as industry
sources, e.g., often trying to get in the limelight of the
media to advance their particular bias.
For whatever reason, congressional hearings, docu-
ments or individual congressmen on the Hill rank second in
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ranks fifth in preference, and share* the third spot with
formal interviews with regard to actual utilisation* On;
informal Pentagon sources are put ahead of congressional
services as far a& significance of information* Also, it
is the most prolific of the IS sources according to the
combined opinions of the tentagon press corps.
Regulars gave this source a mean of 3.6 (moderate
to great importance) and ranked it third, behind informal
Pentagon sources and news conferences* It was their fourth
preference, and seventh most utilised source* Regulars
said only their informal DOD sources give more significant
information, but considered congressional sources as the
most prolific*
Irregulars considered this source the most impor-
tant, but preferred to use five other sources before turning
to the Hill, and "utilised" it in about the same manner*
They, too, find it the most prolific, hut considered three
other sources more significant with regard to information
provided*
Military journal reporters ranked this source
between "great" and "very great" importance (4*2 mean), hut
would prefer to use five other sources before Hill contacts
or documents* However, they find themselves "most often
utilising" this source* Of the five sources named as being
prolific providers of information, congressional sources
ranked last, while journal newsmen considered the







information they receive from this source second only to
the significance of material from informal Sentagon
sources*
Several regulars ?ave high prsis© to the rosearc ii
facilities, files, and quick responsiveness of congress-
sian^s aide* and staff members*
ewamen acknowledged that hearings ors the Bill mafo®
hard am. but many also stated congressmen are of
"sederate importance" in covering DO© because they are
advocates and way not give a fuil story when hearings are
open to the public*
The majority of regulars do not deal directly with
congressmen* Instead, they work In conjunction with the
reporter who covers Congress for their news outlet.
It is more likely that solitary correspondents will
give their attention to hearings in the form of abridged
documents frees closed sessions that contain testimony
offered by military and civilian defense officials* These
transcriptions are released by congressional committees to
the press after being checked by security review personnel.
Importers said by the time they get sanitised versions of
hearings it is often weeks and even iftontha after the fact*
Then, according to newsmen, it may take several days o^
weeks before the flavor of their contents is fully digested*
* few regulars explained that to make matters worse.
•ore than once Sefense officials have, for some reason,
..^h'*-v " '
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chosen to hand out two oar roore such docuisents simultan-
eously. This, newsmen said, only perpetuates sloppy m&
superficial reporting for hard news media who strive to be
first with the story. ft few of the regulars noted the
following happenings with skepticisms (a) the simultaneous
release of unrelated bulky congressional hearings? (b) the
simultaneous release of transcriptions from military testi-
mony and unrelated &» study findings* or (c) the release
of key hearings on the day of a fast breaking story (or on
Friday). To these mmmsmn» such an approach, if intended
to bury the news, really works against the interests of
POD, since the likely result is a misguided, superficial,
news account that only confuses an issue rather than bury
it.
But some of these same reporters, and others, noted
instances when 000 released such documents with a "hold for
release*' qualifier which enabled newsmen to fully compre-
hend the meaning of the testimony and ask clarifying
questions before any stories were filed. «any correspond-
ents were irritated hy the lack of consistent policy with
regard to this source of news.
Other regulars suggested it would work to every-
one *s advantage if officials with a feel for news judgment
would index such documents tor ready reference. Two
regulars described how they submitted inquiries on sensitive
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as an answer; only to discover later* while going through
back testimony made by high ranking Stefense officials* that
tha information they had requested* and mors* had been
officially released weeks or months earliar by a committee
on tha Sill with EOi approval* Thus* thay suggested such
indexing by Defense public affairs officers or other
officials would keep them informed as wall as newsmen.
formal Sews Conferences
Mails sharing the third position of importance with
interviews and OASD(PA)* formal news conferences ranked
behind eight other sources with respect to utilisation.
Yet correspondents would like to he able to use this m a
source as an alternative only to informs! £©& contacts and
interviews. It shares a low position (10) with informal
sources in other government agencies as far *m "sheer
volume" of information derived* hut both sources provided
information* the significance of which is only outdone by
three other sources.
Regulars gave news conferences higher ratings in
all categories* but did not even rank that source among the
m«ven named with respect to quantity of information they
receive on a routine basis. Regulars ranked news confer
ences as followst overall importance* second* prefer to use*
second) actually utilise* ninth* and significance of
information* fourth.
Irregulars did not find news conferences *m
mm mdttamt ci®
, i, :-.'. M I I MIM • I * 1 1 "'
MMife -.- iM













t£j«a% Mill jaamBa t
Mi bib mtmlmmmr^l
232
appealing. Bata shear t (a) they considered sgvgn other
sources taore important? (b) they preferred to uss six other
sources* putting news confarenoes and leaks in the same
preference category t (c) they used seven other sources
before this one* <d) do not get a great quantity of &ater~
ial from news conferences; and (e) put this source last of
the seven they said provided the most significant informa-
tion.
Military journal correspondents took an equally &i&
view of news conferences as a source of defense news. Xt
was consistently ranked behind mvsvmn other sources in all
categories*
Hews Conferences Held Often Enough?
Military correspondents were asked if they agree or
disagree that news conferences are held frequently enough.
As Table XXXVIZ indicates* the press corps is about evenly
divided on the question. Those regulars* however* who
disagree have stronger feelings that there should be wore*
than those who said news conferences are held often enough.
Except for one reporter* irregulars did not exhibit
a preference either way and nore military journal corre-
spondents than not stated there are currently enough.
One of the veteran regulars front a daily newspaper
up the feelings of saost of the regulars*
Hews conferences could be of great importance if
conducted by cabinet officers such as Laird* Packard
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mm OOUffEKBMClS HSLD GITS* SSOUaif?
Q. Toll rae the extent to which you agree or disagree with
the following statements Formal DOP nows conferences are
held frecently enough. (n*36)
mm
Howe Conferences Held Often Enough?
—
>
* . m -- M , , >«.
Strongly agree- Bis- Strongly
Correspondents ftfHNi Agree disagree agree Disagree
Regulars
Daily Hews**
papers — 3 — 4.1
Wire Services — 1 12
Chains 11 1
Sewa Magazines 1 1 — — 1
Radio — 2 — 1
1 — — 2
Spec* Int.
Pubs. — 2
Sub-total 2 11 7 4
Irregulars — — 3 — 1
Military
Journals 3 111
M» i«<ww.ii i'ii i ' i mimiMnm+mmmmmmm:m*»<i**»""mi>wmmimm
aTotal* (n»36) 2 14 6 8 *
tftHMMMMNMNMNMMaNaMNHNMi
*Four responses not included* two "not applicable*
one "don't know." and one newsman did not answer.
VBxmz nsr* * mm***w*> mm
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Many other regalara axprea.ed the view that Laird
haa had MM naw, conference, than hi. twiertiata preda-
ceeeore. bat agreed that theae conferance. are uaaally
conducted for apecAfic raaaons, either Whan a "flap" 1*
taking place or whan the I>e£enae Secretary ha* lathing ha
wanta to ?«* acre*.. «The aiglet eo^laint w*. that 030
official. «** Military official, do not have open. "no-
topic • MH conference, daring which MM*** can ask
quaationa on any aubjact related to military affair.. *hay
•aid today thia juet ia not happening.
Savaral aaid while tha 11,00 «... aaily briefing ia
food eapoaure. it i. not tha .an* a. having a top (aon-Pao)
official who can raapond on tha apot before .,„,
A regular with a radio outlet .aids
yla^^^-TJ? efl8f,rweM *** ««^Y vary grea*{^^^J****??® th*y ****** »^Xi«g officials, o
^atlon'wnlcr^ -EK *¥*' S •SSTfi 3.«ao«rron wnich rauat atand as a barometer on clung*,
*hila tlM r«9al«r. r.cogni««s that a groat o«al of
pr.par.tion i. raquir.. on th. part of any official to roady
hi«»lf tarnw, sonfer.no*. they .till would lite to mm
M*u hold. on. of th. rogular.. however, offers thi.
oo—ot. "I e.ali«. ttey'r. Baeh . b^,, a^feEring to „*,,
eonf.r.ncW to th. official. If. unaer«tand*l. why th.ro
Baab
MfcAt ^^ «*A.
a iifciM^n ^%#ftri iM iMf •*if
vawJUUn &"*
*•* eft©—i^tir itoAn* i*
iiiibii^ to* mt 3*v£ •*** Y*wO# bl«m
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Several r«portfer* had the i»£»ression they are
merely used by officials who conduct news conferences
because the only time they are held i» When "they are
trying to sell something."
Sews magasine correspondents said they attend news
conferences to stay up on the key Cefense issues* Since
they do not compete with hard news media, they stated they
usually try to get to the principal official before or
after the conference to Obtain the human sice or a differ-
ent angle to what was emphasised during the conference*
One of the network television correspondents
explained how he views the normal COB news conferences
•It's great for getting on the air; 'moderately important'





The formal interview was among the top sources
overall* sharing the third position of importance with news
conferences and OASD(PA). The cea&lned opinions of mili-
tary correspondents showt (a) the interview is preferred
second only to informal »entagon contacts; (b) it is
utilised as often as congressional sources (ranked third)
j
and M i» third as far as significance of information, but
seventh with respect to sheer volume of material derive
Regulars put the interview after four other sources
«mb> #•*# v£«* «** —wpsrf
v^t*a- •* uMiairtWrtn erf*
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uwhen evaluating overall importance* yet preferred to use
only their personal Pentagon contacts and nuwa conferences
before the interview • In practice, they use informal
Defease sources* and the 11*00 a.ia* briefing
then the interview* Five other sources war* consi
more prolific to the regulars, while the significance of
information transmittec frorc the interview was rated second*
with congressional sourcee (behind informal Pentagon
contacts)
•
Irregulars *raost preferred 1* to use this source, but
actually turn to three other sources store frequently* They
considered information more significant fro® four other
sources « and get a greater quantity from two others—
Congress and informal Pentagon sources*
Military journal reporters gave the interview a
high rating for overall importance {third, behind informal
Pentagon sources and Congress) and would like to use it
second* but six other sources are more frequently utilised*
The interview was not even named by journal reporters in
discussions on the most "prolific" and most "significant*
information sources*
It has already been mentioned that newsmen recog-
nised that Defense Secretary Laird put the word out to
officials in COD to grant more interviews* Correspondents
stated this helped access slightly* but once they get to
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fortbccRlngu Xt was also established that one of the
biggest problems for the reporter m trying to «$*«»$*
interviews is th® Hm dalay *a gatting to tha official,
ttewstaan also su^estad interviews arranged through formal
public affair* chomsis usually are not as fruitful as
***>*• sat up fcatween the ^respondent and his own informal
contact. Much of this stems from what reporters considered
• holdover from the interview monitoring directive i*
existence officially from 1^2 through 1967, and which
unofficially—they hU-still agists.
KewsaaJ* are mm likely to request interview*
through information officers in *J*1><?A) 0r the service* if
thay ara not sura which official has tha information
dasired. Correspondents said quita oftan official*
approached directly by a reporter will sis^iy rafair thorn
back to "proper channels* and tha reporter soda up at
OAftlXSA) anyway.
•The military is mora apt to make newsmes fo through
information channels to sat up m interview /than civilians
in M&« said oaa of tha regulars. »I am vary seldom
turnad down. however.**13 Another ftm-u^ correspondent
said. "I've not had many formal interviews iataly. This
administration has made routine things so aasy to gat. tha
need for formal interviews is not as groat as it used to be.






















Many critics of DOD n^ws policies during the
sixties concentrated on the issue of monitored interviews*
stating that this was nothing xaora than & "big brother is
watching * sort of inhibition and therefore very detrimental
to newsman. Monitors usually are FAOs, although other
officials do b*tvg in this capacity at times.
Military correspondents were asked (a) if thay
considered the presence of a nonitor during mi interview as
being detrimental* an assistance, or (b) whether it made
any difference to them*
As indicated in Table XXXVIII, the majority view-
point among the Pentagon press corps was that monitors are
detrimental. Regulars do not feel as inhibited as irregu-
lars when a PAO sits in during an interview* But the
majority of regulars were divided between "detrimental* and
"doesn't matter. " A few suggested monitors can be both an
assistance and a detriment. Only one regular responded
"can assist," without qualification*
All irregulars, on the other hand, said the presence
of a monitor was detrimental and four of the military
journal correspondents stated it is both* while two
said detrimental.
Overall, the regulars suggested the disadvantages
outweigh the advantages. Generally, even those who said it
does not matter qualified their remarks with such things as
"if the monitor sits quietly*" and "if he doesn't interject
.-
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MOKITOB fcETRZHEWAL OR ASSISTANCE?
Q# In cjwnerai, do you believe the presence of a monitor
during an into* vie** is detrimental* can assist, or
doesn't matter to the correspondent? (n«39)






























On the detrimental aids, one of the regulars
expressed the feeling of many regulars*
It'* not so much detrimental. It's demeaning for
three different people* the monitor, who knows he's not
wanted f the official, who knows lie's feeing told &$"*
siot a sufficiently grown man to handle iti sad the
reporter , who just plain resents it because h«a resents
everything. 15
Another regular—a radio corres£x>ndent~~agre«d# but
added a different twisti
Outside of being downright insulting, the presence
of a monitor will often mefee a pliable source clam up.
The monitor ia often a direct subordinate, who—the
source may feel—is after his job. 1 seldom will agree
to interview a source under such a structure. i*
Many newsmen do not mind a aonitor when interview-
ing a high level official. But for lower officials, they
said it ia silly and only leaves *s had taste im everyone *&
mouth." Several regulars suggested the official t» scared
sore of the monitor than of the reporter* Some stated it
causes a lack of trust and giv*m officials new to DOD the
impression that reporters are unreliable; thus they tend to
clan up even before being estposed to good reporting by good
correspondents
.
Those who said a aonitor *s presence is detrimental
stated the official feela constrained, inhibited, and
reluctant to talk. Reporters suggested the official finds
it demeaning and immediately doubts the credibility of the
correspondent
•
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•ingrained cautiousness* was the primary reason officials
do not great interviews*
According to newsman* the monitor himself is d^tri-
mental When (a) he tries to answer questions, (b) he busily
takes notes on everything said daring the interview* and
(o) he continuously interrupts to interject his own
comments* "One monitor tried to answer my questions him-
self*" one newsman said* "If Z wanted to interview him*
I'd have gone across the hail and done it** According to
reporters* the monitor also has tried to tell the official
and the newsman what rules they should follow without first
consulting the official
t
Many XOs before an interview say "let's make it not
for attribution** It shouldn't be that way* Zt should
be up to the official* Some IDs tell you to run quotes
back through them* One time the official told the
monitor* "Why? I've always been able to stand on my
word*" It only degrades the official. 1®
Most frequently mentioned by those newsmen who said
it can be helpful is that a monitor—a "good" ane~-~gives
the official confidence when the interview is on a sensitive
or classified subject* Corns reporters suggested an
official may talk more freely if a monitor advises him on
what has been released* A few correspondents said the
monitor may act as a reinforcements *Xt doesn't bother tarn
one bit* gives me back up notes* fit^ I don't mind the
monitor getting informed also*" Hot many agreed with this
viewpoint* however*
Several regulars said that many times they get the
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ia&x&9*ion the monitor is just as uncomfortable being there
mi the official an© newsman are having hiss present. A
network TV correspondent who stated monitors do not help*
bat only make officials nervous* added s
But it's no real problem for ma. Monitors I've had
have tried to be as unobtrusive as possible* Soma even
apologised to ms before and after the interview for
having to be there. 1*
A veteran regular with a daily newspaper offered a
good side of the monitoring system* but added a disclaimer*
The monitor learns something that will be useful if
another reporter asks in the future. But X toldua
monitor not long ago that he shouldn't be here /during
an interview/ and he said he needed the education for
later. X said* "Yes* you'll be getting information
that X dug up. * He said* That's selfish. • tend X said
it certainly is. Of course a lot does d^tprnt^ on the
reporter and his outlet. Also the official being
interviewed may be the wild type and need monitoring* 20
In summary* one of the regulars expressed the view
of most reporters
t
It's detrimental most of the time. Some monitors
are Just a nuisance to newsmen and screw things apt
take notes* etc. Officials are conscious of that. *e*
in some cases it helps. Like if the official feels the
10 will catch classified information. But the dis-
advantages outweigh the advantages. 2*
Percentage of Interviews With Monitors
Reporters also were asked of the interviews they
had conducted at the Pentagon—those set up through
channels—about what percentage were held with a monitor
present?
Table XXXIX indicates 54 per cent of all correspond"
ents (20) said they had monitors at more than 75 per cent
Bftivi
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0« Of the interviews yoa have conducted at the Pentagon
(those set up through information channels) • about what
percentage were he la" with a monitor present? (n*37)
Percentage of Interviews Monitored
Correspondents 25%
25%~ About




























of their interviews, while nirva reporters (24 per cent)
stated l*ss than 25 per cent of their interviews w«re
monitored.
Three-quarters of the regulars (13) wars in the
"about half* and mora category. £bout half of all regulars
(13) had monitors at more than 7 5 per cent of their inter**
views, Less than one-quarter (6) of the regulars hav« not
had monitors present less than 25 per cent of the time.
Irregulars are store than likely to find a monitor
present during one of their interviews* while military
journal correspondents have no consistent pattern. Overall*
store than half (23) of all military correspondents have had
a monitor at aost of the interviews conducted.
Unclassified Information withheld?
It has been established that most reporters said
DO© does not give the whole truth all the time, •pacifi-
cally, regulars were asked if they feel that officials
intentionally withhold unclassified information from thaw
during interviews. Twenty said ym; three answered *some-
times,* and only one said no.
As with inquiries submitted in writing, newsmen
said they tend to get what they •** for during interviews.
However, several suggested this is natural since defense
officials are "just human beings who try to protect them**
selves, DOD, or the administration.
*
One of the regulars with a daily newspaper said;
lit
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"*«.. /official, withhold **lmmLttmd infcrsatloa7 wlwn
politically „».itiv. or^^^ to th-^^^
or ..rvic.. ^it hlvpan,^ Qften^ u 8tooM ^ ^ ^
bother**.. -« A Mw.pap.g eJwa„^^ ^^ .^
•h.«.v.r th.y ar. not r.ady to t.lk afcout thing„ ^^^^
until a final ..ci.^ j. .^ Qaite eftea congreM^
bo tow fir.t. If, a political factor.'23
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cant information.
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hy each group of correspondents—regulars, irregulars, «nd
military journal reporters.
Regular* have preference for eight other sources
over QAS0<PA). but ranked it fifth in "utilisation."
Irregulars did not list it as a preferred source, but it
was seventh out of eight sources named as asost often "used*
in covering the Pentagon. Irregulars said four sources m:m
more prolific and four others on a par with OASi>(PA)
regarding the greatest "volawe" of information provided.
But it was not named as one of the amvmn sources that
usually give the most significant information to irregulars.
Military journal reporters said there as® only
three sources they would rather use, yet OAfiD(PA) w*m not
listed araong those asost often utilised. Also, journal cor-
respondents did not view this source ataong the MM prolific
or one of the top three providers of significant informa-
tion.
One of the television correspondents saidt
The hulk of material cones from OASD(pa). h* Xmlyon their for so much, hut it*s not a source of hard
news. As a news source, x«d give it very little
usportance. **
A nagasine writer and a regular Pentagon newsaan
pointed outi W I use GAaD(PA) on very routine setters and to
get guidance where not to go.**27 Many correspondents
agroad they are MM apt to utilise 0A8DCPA) when the ostsr-
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h detailed analysis of the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Public *£*«!*• Coass/fcA) I* found
in Chapter IV.
Backgrounders
In 1968* Bill Meyers, former White House press
•ecretary, said the indiscriminate use of backgrounders as
* source of hard news is a dangerous practice in Washington,
one that constantly afflicts the credibility of the press
*nd the government. Be suggested that reporters want as
complete a story as possible and backgrounders give them
full opportunity^ to cross-examine, to check evidence
received through this channel with other sources later, to
choose information they regard as reliable and accurate,
*nd throw out self-serving propaganda.
Meyers added that
-formal group briefings- often
tend to degenerate into a relationship between the official
and reporters not unlike that of master and slave, lie said
oompetitive pressure permits little time for cross checking
*** contributes to uniformity. Meyers stated that Sylvester
admitted to him quite bluntly that for six years, while he
was in the Pentagon, he watched cover-up stories go down
•smooth as cream," when he thought they would cause a
"frightful gurgle.- However, Movers added it is naive to
believe the practice will be abandoned altogether, or even
should be. 28
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The backgrounder currently i. considered to be of
tb.
.». overall Iw^ „ .m^ information ^^
Nation, (sixth P^tta,. Corespondent, preferred to ^
*iv« other
.ouroe. before the backgrounder, but actually
utilised 12 other, ahead of thi. aourca. xt wa. not nas«d
«-o»9 the 12 .ource. con.idered th8 .,., p^^ awJ
reporter, evaluate the miv>iti„mam o£ lnforj9ation froa
backgrounds. on . par with ro8pon.e6 they ^ ^
inquiries {sixth position).
Regular. vi«,.d this source with respect to the
tiv. criteri. deling with „„ ,oujree. a- ^j^ ^^
iasortance. sixth, preference, sixth, utilisation, thir-






.ource. are mm i,^-
taat than backgrounder, and give thi.
.ource a mm of only
2.2 Uittle to moderate), y.t they prefer to u.e only fiv.
oth«
.ource. before backgrounder.. » practice, they .aid
thi. i. the caw. Thi. source wa. not ranked aaong thOM
con.idered by irregular. „ *„, mm „.Uf4o , but cmaat&
•ixth
-hen gaugi*,
.ignixie.no. of information received
from all aourcas.
Backgrounder, were .aid to be of little importance
to military journal reporter., who MM this source had
the MM importance a.
-other reporter..- They preferred
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not even list this source among those Zte:®<~ most utilised*
or is this source cited among the sav^n named with regard
to significance and volume of information.
Role of the Backgrounder?
A backgrounder may be in the form of a prearranged
personal interview, or it may involve a deep background
session with a group of reporters.
The term "backgrounder is most often both abused
and confused. According to Douglass Cater, the background
briefing was originated during World War II hy General
George o. Marshall and Admiral Ernest J. King to fill
reporters in on secret military plans ao that they would
not disclose vital military secrets by guessing. 29
In 1967, M«*t«ftMife editorialised that the backgrounder
became an institution during World War II, adding that it
allowed the late President Roosevelt and other leaders to
let bureau chiefs and columnists know exactly what they
were thinking.
As previously mentioned* McKamara met with military
correspondents at 3*00 p.m. on Thursdays, tor the purpose
of offering background information on Defense issues.
Until 1967, attribution to information disseminated during
these sessions was limited to "U. ft. officials.* After
much pressure from newsmen this was changed. One of the
regulars told the authors "It was done, but the decision of
Mcltamara and Vance to attribute backgrounders from U. S.
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officials to 'Defense officials' too*s a week for th&m to
decide thie."31
The regulars were asked What part they think back-
grounding should play in ths newagathering process at the
Pentagon. Most correspondents saxd backgrounding should be
used to Axpiain. clarify* or put things in perspective on a
eontinuiiig basis* or simply give information on a running
story that is not available elsewhere. & smaller group—
Xass than one-fifth of the regulars—stacad backgrounding
should be employed to prevent distortion or to keep
reporters on ^ractc when a hot issue deals with policy or
sensitive and classified areas.
The majority viewpoint was that large group back-
grounders—such as McNaaara instituted—lose their
effectiveness and generally degenerate into nothing store
than a news conference under different around rules. 8ews-
nen stated that in large group sessions* they are hesitant
to ask "good" questions since they do not want to tip their
hand. Small backgrounders with only a few reporters* or
even better* individual backgrounding* ar^ considered best*
One of the regulars from a daily newspaper saidt
They are extremely useful for individuals or small
groups of reporters where really backgrounding is done
to give the thinking behind policy. They •re dangerous
if they get too big or produce hard news—McHa»ara*s
got too big. Laird haa gotten around backgrounding by
dropping in on the Pentagon press corps. Also Laird
on-record is better than tecHamara was ©ff-the-record.
But it's frustrating if a reporter is not in the









Laird has a thing about backgrounders. I don't
agree with him* Ha wont to extremes because of
McSanara's experiences. X feel something embarrassing
to the 0. s. should not be on-the-record * yet should
not be withheld £ro» the pt*m»*$$
several suggested the only way military officials
will agree to meet with a group of re|?or tsars is on a back-
ground basis. If this is the best alternative to getting
nothing from the military* reporters said it should be done
this way. But many correspondents stated even this once
useful channel between the military mind and the newsman is
no longer available*
of the veteran military reporters said*
Individual backgrounders are better than group ones
and extremely useful in DOS). The military is very gun-
shy and scared they* 11 say the wrong thing if on-the-
record. It should play a role of great importance but
doesn't.*4
A wire service correspondent agreed
i
DOD and the services are sadly deficient in this
area. The store you need background guidance* the store
things are tightening up. He need more taking reporters
into confidence. This is virtually non-existent. The
services have fallen way down in backgrounding. 1 don't
think it's bad to have backgrounders? assuming an
official trusts a reporter and regards him as reliable
and responsible* and if the official feels the fullest
and most balanced account must get out to the public*
Information chiefa, backed by service Aecreta£ies« ought
to volunteer military experts so we ^newsman/ know where
they stand. 35
Several newsmen made a specific point that they
disagreed with the **aird~Xenkin philosophy of less back-
grounding. As one of the regulars said* •! don't look £or
evil motives in backgrounders. Reporters can decide for
«•2 ». «»A©*
munmci s.rT s fc*a fan






themselves about information obtained. X don't feel
victimised by the trial balloon. »36 Another veteran new-
Man got more specifics
I totally disagree with Mr. Laird and Mr. Bsnkin
who aort of act as if a backgrounder is a sinister
activity and that the unattrlbutable quote is somehowdirty pool, t Just don't accent that. The unattribut-
able quote by a reporter Who knows who he's quoting—
and if he's a reputable reporter and that means most
reporters— I feel it's legitimate. I feel the public
realises when a guy ia not quoted there is a good
reason why and it merits attention. Son* feel there's
a dancer that newsmen will sake up quotes themselves.
There probably is some of that, but not much. 3?
Host regulars suggested the benefits of honest
backgrounding tm described earlier far outweigh the draw-
backs. Many newsmen said ttdiamara practiced dishonest
backgrounding since he was usually trying to sell something.
The information, while useful, was provided to help 1X3©,
not the correspondents, according to many of those who
attended theme briefings.
"Laird is not pushing things on background like
McKamara did," one of the regulars said. *He took advantage
of backgrounding. Sis approach was self-seeking.*38
Several suggested the McMamara approach was not truly back-
grounding since everyone in Washington knew of the Thursday
afternoon sessions and, when they saw or heard news reports
on Friday, there was little doubt as to their origin.
Another difficulty that developed with iicHamara'e
sessions was that they became a form of hard news, according
to newsmen. Instead of reporters using the information
obtained through this channel for later reference, their
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superiors cane to expect a news story out of it. Thus* the
newsman almost vw obliged to fil« a story Whether he
wanted to or not. In retrospect * if this feeling was wide-
spread* it could be suggested that Pentagon reporters were
partially transformed into lap-dogs by their own news
outlets.
While regulars were quick to criticise the circum-
stances that developed because of MdUsaara's backgrounders*
many said l*aird has gone too far in the opposite direction
by all but eliminating any form of backgrounding in hl»
attempts to kill the Defense credibility gap. The question
of Laird* s view on backgrounders and how this affects news-
sen is addressed later in this chapter.
Several reporters indicated they would prefer to
have backgrounders conducted by officials other than just a
Secretary of Defenses *G*&D(PA) misses a bet by not exposing
SB
knowledgeble men to the press on key issues. ** Another
said DOD ought to hold what the State Department holds for
out-of-town editors—educational backgroundings
Informed people ought to tell about the issues.
They shouldn't use a Madison Avenue advertising
approach, for instance* the Havy has blown the carrier
issue so badly. They should tell the press all about
carriers; what they cost—total cost with everything on
them—to run* why we rm^ them* etc. Instead* we get
nothing. The naval Institute rcosefldingft and naval
Review give better information on the subject than any
brief we had on navy.40
Others agreed that 0Sl> and the services have missed











that could be used by reporters to better interpret th*
news. Correspondents said they Know that even in th* most
"open* atmosphere, not all pertinent information can, or
should, be on-the-record. Because they miss out on much of
the material that would be beneficial both to newsmen and
DQD in many instances, correspondents stated reporting
suffers and therefore the public suffers for not getting
the complete picture* One of the television correspondents
•aidt
/Backgrounders should/ put things la perspective.
Reporters who have been there /Pentagon/ for years know
what's going on but don't have time to keep up. That's
why weekly backgrounders on the key story of the week
would be good. You'd get better reporting. It's
logical. The more knowledgable the reporter, the better
reporting he'll do. 4*
A news magaxine reporter suggested t They're good
/backgrounders/. We need many to keep layering on useful
42information for use when nothing else is available."
Another electronic media representative added to
this viewpoints
newsmen have to get »m fully informed as possible*
Zf they have to be fully informed through backgrounding,
it should be. They can be useful; Z think they are.
But I'd prefer open news conferences.43
Whether or not they agreed on how backgrounders
should be employed, the regulars agreed that backgrounders,
like off~the-record interviews, tend to remove inhibitions
and sometimes are much more valuable than open news confer-
ences because restrictions forced upon the official
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There is a value to certain information being put
on-the-record. However* backgrounding- provide*
explanation and detail that can't always be put on-the-
record. Sometimes reporters get an honest view of what
happens—an inside look at what happens—that they
won't get in taped open interviews**4
The news magazine writer who made the above remark also
said the electronic news correspondents dislike back-
grounders, while wire service reporters prefer to quote
with attribution; yet he prefers backgrounders because he
is not competing with the others for hard news.
As mentioned earlier* a small group of reporters
suggested the background technique should only be used when
dealing with classified or very sensitive stories. * few
others said it is only warranted for special stories or
under special circumstances.
A newspaper chain reporter saidi "Its place /back-
grounders/ is when a sensitive issue arises and DOB needs
the cooperation of the press. Officials should lay their
cards on the table and be frank with the press.
"
One of the television correspondents saids
It should be limited to extensive discussion on a
specific subject of a classified nature so media can
understand why it's classified and why they should or
should not use the information. Backgrounders should
not be used to tell why the Kavy thinks this or that.
Yet* it would be helpful if a Navy admiral answers all
questions in background. This happens too seldom. 4&
Another regular saidi backgrounders should not be
used on a routine basis* for routine information. But
rather for depth on related information* such as State
47Department related material. " Several other reporters
Oi
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described to the author that on® of the "saving graces" of
JfeNamara's backgrounders was that ii—hb were able to get
a feeling for State ©apartment positions, rationale, ana
thinking on areas that had a direct bearing on solitary
affairs. These same newsmen suggested that under this
administration, this type of backgrounding i8 nonexistent.
Reporters said that type of approach was above and beyond
SOS's purview, but they atill considered such material
invaluable to then when trying to put Defense activities
abroad in perspective.
Only two regulars flatly suggested backgrounders
generally are bad. One said, "On-the-record is better.
Backgrounding seen* to be a cop-out by officials.-48 One
si»ply said.
-There shouldn't be any backgrounding.-49 a
regular who stated individual backgrounders are beneficial
•ddedi
-The biggest danger is that newsmen may lose their
cause. It's an inhibiting factor on correspondents and
makes for a kept p^mm. n5°
In suaamary, one of the regulars described his
feelings in a manner that generally reflected what most of
the newsmen seemed to think t
i»#J^!£?Und*rs 1?°^^ *! ^^ to *£S»ly *>*»** honest
backgrounding, understanding and the chance to ask
"now." !^^A!Jft^ !!5°^ Backgrounding also© to get^fympathy and understanding for a
specific story, it's like ice cream. Backgrounding isthe cherry at thm top of on-the-record information.*!
-«» 6*^
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Bescriptioa of Previous Backgrounder.
******* regulars ware asked to describe back-
grounders previously conducted at the Pentagon. Several
reporters gave mora than one general description. 8a.*d on
their own experience., the moat frequently cited descrip-
tion (nine time.) was the reporter
-obtained valuable
information not available anywhere else.* Five correspond-
ents said
-only a tool for OSD officials to present their
•ide of an issue." three stated that Wc»emara«s back-
grounders were used mostly as trial balloons. Twice cited
was.
-information offered clarified an issue to prevent
reporters from inadvertently reporting on classified infor-
mation.- One of the regulars said, «l think most back-
grounders were used to drive or mold public opinion without
the risk of being tied to it."52
hmmm Backgrounding Batter or Worse?
Raving discussed the proper role of backgrounders
«t the Pentagon, correspondents were asked if they thought
the current policy of lass formal backgrounding with more
defense information kapt on-the-record is better or worse
for the military news reporter.
The regulars and irregulars were divided on the
question and military journal correspondenta answered it is
either better or about the same. As *abie XL indicates,
*ore than one-third of all the reporters <14) said it is
worse not to have formal background session.} about
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TABLE XL
LESS SACKGSOU&£XiiS B£TTUt OS IfORSE?
U. Would you say that the current policy of laas forual
backgrounding with raor« Defense information kept on-the*
record is better or worse for the military
correspondent? <n«37)
Correspondents
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one-fifth (7) suggested it makes no difference* and the
larger* reraai .. group (16) St the ©ur£«nt policy is
better for newsman.
Many of the regulars who answered "worse" said they
feel tho way they do because they are not getting as much
of the type of information they need to do their jobs.
Others suggested Laird has not had ^a much contact with the
press as he would if he conducted such backgrounders.
One of the regulars said* I liked ftcliamaxa's way
better. Thsy were all snow jobs, but I knew it was a
regular thing, tie could hear his comments and just the
fact that SECBSJf was available on a regular basis was
900d.*53
"X felt i*c8amara's backgrounders were helpful.
especially on Viatnaa, • one of the magazine writers said.
"This is historically how government has dealt with wars.
It also reflects the difference between newspapermen and
id
magazine writers.*
One of the veteran regulars gave a description of
how backgrounders used to be*
Under Wilson /SECECF from 1953 to 1952/ back-
grounders used to explain things that weren't fully
understood. Most cases were used to i1lustr ate , empha-
sise, and put out information that couldn't be discussed
in the open. Xt was like footnotes to history—what it
meant? not intended in the past for propaganda* Today,
as in the past, newsmen recognise propaganda. 55
One of the television correspondents saidt "He
don't have as much contact with Laird—background or
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otherwise. Also, Packard is somebody we're getting to know
lass and less. We hardly ever see him now." 3"
A radio correspondent who said less backgrounding
is worse added
t
Ideally* everything would be o«-t'h£-r«ecra. But
this is not realistic. By cutting down backgrounders
in favor of on-the-record news conferences* Laird 1\&b
his cake and eats it too. He controls the news confer*
ease largely} the man is a brilliant professional. At
the same tine* there is a broad category of information*
because of sensitivity* which cannot be issued in a
public statement by the Secretary of Defense. At the
sane time* it way be information he %iould like to leak
in any case. By refusing to background* Laird locks
himself in. An example would be a story involving any
major foreign power* The administration may wish
information to leak* but can't offend the other nation
with an on-the-record consent. This backgreund-om-the
record dilemma is largely limited to X*aird. Below that
level most cultivated sources will freely -talk on
background* and deep background in the case of a really
tight story. 57
Another regular with a dally newspaper saldi "It's
worse for me simply because TV often hm more of an oppor-
tunity to monopolise coverage. Otherwise* the trend is a
One regular qualified his smsatxHrni "Generally worse*
but only if they eliminated individual backgrounding would
it really affect my ability to report.**
One of the irregulars viewed backgrounding as the
best and worst of two worlds?
It's worse: Worse for the correspondent if he is
astute* but perhaps better in terms of public interest.
Backgrounders clearly &se subject to great abuse, ffesf
allow tentagon officials to mislead or disseminate
without taking full responsibility for their statements.
On the other hand* if a correspondent is astute and
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officials* the better Me chance of getting at the
truth end the real solvations and purposes of the
adainistration. &®
On the positive side* many o£ those who said the
policy of on-the-record with little formal backgrounding is
better said so because they preferred attribution. But
many of these correspondents also suggested that this does
not aean they get all the information they would likely get
if there were backgrounders
t
It's 'better. SECBSF on-record is preferred to one
off-record. The public knows exactly who says it. But
Mciiasiara got a lot of information off his chest he
wasn't willing to put on-the-record. 61
Another added to this view by saying i "I prefer on-
record information, though we can't get SECDSF thinking as
Kuch mm before.*62 One of the irregulars saidi "It's about
the same. There's less information, but store usable.*
Another regular agreedt "Sane. But I have the feeling
I
i
they're not giving us so much on-the-record."
Two of the irregulars stated it is better because
of the impact it has on officials*
It's better: Makes officials responsible for the
information they are putting out. Background at the
Pentagon is often a shield for sloppiness; the sources
know they won't be tagged if information proves less
than accurate. 65
The other said it is better because "backgrounding
encourages the promotion of assumptions that officials know
Sjf
are not the whole truth. M
One of the regulars suggested it is better "because
when we do have backgrounding now. they really are
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backgrounder*. " yet another added s "From the and o£




As noted earlier* Secretary Laird and A8B(»A) Henkin
feel that by putting snore X>e£ena« information on-the-record
and cutting down on the use of backgrounding. D0»'s credi-
bility will increase*
In this context correspondents were asked if they
thought credibility increased when more official information
was put on-the-record* As Table XLX indicates, only
slightly more than half (20) said this is the case, about
one-third (12) stated it does not increase* tai4 five
reporters said it makes no difference*
•cms reporters did not see a direct correlation*
As ens of the regulars saids M I don't see it in that simple
a term** Another added* "I'm not sure that's necessarily
so* but at least you know who said it*"
A regular with a daily newspaper qualified his
remarks* "In some cases only. Reporters may not fully
understand because a situation is not put into perspec-
as
tive." Others agreed.
Depends on the information* But it's not just more
words* news conferences* etc.. that improve credibility.
I'd rather have someone level with me and I've found
people more honest in backgrounders. 70
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w^ilS reporters looking for it or lack ofknowledge on the reporter's part. 7! * OC
A network television correspondent suggested less
backgrounding leads to more credibility problems,
m+*rS*Zt^iUty iB a *«****©» of having media under-ll^T *J°U ^aft - Can «*v«* »** ^rySiL wu need
this, the d«« wfiiL fil ^i!1*?"? b«<*»«oandiiig like
On the positive side, several specified it is
better because it is easier to write a story when attributed
to someone, h few singly agreed that as a result of less
backgrounding there now ere *ore public disclosures and
that helps credibility.
But one of the regulars who agreed added another
effect of less backgrounding, »amart move Laird has made.
But it's not good for everybody. The military is scared to




As a source, military service information organisa-
tions were considered as important as
-backgrounders—both
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rank sixth (3.0). Correspondents "preferrm&» to use 11 of
the 15 sources before this one. and in practice moat often
utilise nine others first. With respect to sheer volume of
information, service public affairs offices ranked fourth,
while OASB(PA) was ninth. But military information organ-
isations vara last of tha 12 sources named in discussions
on information significance (OAS©/pa was positioned behind
that, grouped with "other reporters" and "social gossip-).
Regulars gave both service information offices and
•backgrounders- a mean of 3.2 (slightly above moderate
importance). Only three reporters named this source among
the three most •preferred"—it was never cited first. Six
©f the regulars said these information organisations were
•wong the three they most "often utilised.* This source
was cited behind mix others (named only three times) as one
of the three most prolific sources and toward the bottom of
the list (named by only one reporter), with
-releases* and
•responses to inquiries.- with regard to significance of
information it provided newsmen.
Irregulars gave more importance to four other
sources, but did not list service public affairs offices
among the nine cited as -preferred- sources. In practice.
Irregulars did not list this source among those most often
utilised, nor do they state it was one of the three top
sources with respect to significance of information.
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•one important to thesa as leak* (eleventh position) and
•preferred" eight othar source.* It was not even aBiong the
tan sources nased as isost often utilised, but journal
raportars said it was the MMfl moat prolific source. It
was grouped with three othar sources (behind infOmal BOD
contacts, congress, and releases) as far as information
significance.
Military service information organisations are
discussed at length in Chapter IV.
Informal Sources in Othar
Government agencies
Informal sources in othar government agencies or
departments received a mm of 2.9 (Uttle to moderate) and
ranked eighth, with "responses to inquiries, • with regard
to overall Importance whan covering the Pentagon on a
routine basis*
Military correspondents preferred to use seven
other sources before this one, but said they "utilised
only five sources before it. This source ranked rather
high (fourth position with news conferences) a* far as
significance of information, but newsmen stated nine othar
sources were aore prolific.
Regulars gave this source a mean of 3.1, but still
ranked it behind seven other sources in both "importance*
and "preference," while using only five other sources
before it. Regulars did not consider it one of the top
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three prolific sources* but cited only four sources that
provided more "significant information.
•
Irregulars gave as much importance to this source
as to "military information organizations" and "responses
to inquiries* (ranked fifth) * but preferred and used only
"formal interviews** and "informal Pentagon sources'* before
this source. While irregulars did not consider this source
as being very prolific, they dia view these informal sources
as being one of the two most significant with respect to
information obtained.
Military journal reporters viewed this source as
least important to these (2.2 mean and ranked last). It was
not among those sources preferred, and ranked toward the
bottom of the list of those actually used. This source was
not named in discussions on the three most prolific sources,
nor was it listed among those three considered to provide
the most significant information.
Many regulars said they rely on their counterparts
in various agencies or departments to furnish information
from informal contacts in his beat.
Others, however, stated they cultivate and maintain
direct lines to personal off-the-reeord sources In key
departments, such as State. Kewsmen suggested that many
times State Department or staff people on the Hill can be
more helpful than DOB officials. They attributed this to
attempts by Defense to keep the rhetoric down on specific
subjects.
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A veteran regular said of these sources* *They are
important to use ^ecauae so many sources in SOD ar« out off
to m*."'*
Responses to Inquiries
In April 1970, Jerry Friedhaim, Deputy ASD(PA).
estimated that OASD(JPA) officials are askad an av^sraga of
700 specific questions by n«WKaan each week (36,400 a year)
»
Of these inquiries* 500 are submitted to X>DI and 200
questions are asked at the 11*00 a.m. nous briefing during
75
a normal week.
Seven other sources were considered more important
than "responses to inquiries, m but correspondents "prefer-
red** this source above 11 others (ranked fourth, while
informal Pentagon sources, interviews, and news conferences
were "preferred** before this source). In practice reporters
said they used four other sources first and considered
information from five other sources as being more signif-
icant. Seven others were named snore frequently with respect
to volume of information disseminated.
Regulars gave this source a mean of 2.8 (little to
moderate) and ranked it ninth in overall importance. They
preferred to use four sources first and actually utilised
only three others before turning to the formal inquiry.
Regulars did not consider the information derived from this
source as being equal in significance to the top three














sources vera more prolific.
Irregulars gave more isnportenee to responses to
inquiries* naming only four sources that vera considered
more important on a routine basis* They gave high prefer-
once to this source (ranked third behind interviews and
informal DOB sources)* and rated it with informal Pentagon
contacts as the most often utilized. Irregulars said
Congress and sources in other agencies were the only ones
more prolific. They looked upon "responses to inquiries"
as the Pentagon source that produced the most signifies
information? ranked only behind Congress and sources in
other agenx:ies •
Military journal reporters stated this source was
more important than ten of the other 14 available sources.
They rated it fifth in "preference* and sixth in "utilisa-
tion.* But responses to inquiries were not cited among
those that journal correspondents considered the three moat
prolific or which produced the most significant information.
Most regulars said if they are not in a rush to get
an answer they will submit a query (either written or
verbal) to DDL The biggest complaint about this source
was it takes too long just to get a response. Yet. in many
cases* reporters said they are given no alternative because
many officials will answer correspondents* questions only
if they are submitted in writings
Officials just don't want to get involved. . . I
think they feel they can only lose if they get involved
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unnecessarily with the pr*ss, mating, with them or
anT/£«??%w^th*?* J*1*1* man* *°*id **» happiernd feel/ they'd gat a lot more work dona by handlino
xt strictly through the information offices rather than
face-to-face discussion with a reporter. 7€
During the time interviews were conducted, several
regulars explained they had standing inquiries that were
submitted week* earlier* "It takes too long. I've had one
in for a month. If l don't get a rempotw® to a query by
4«00 p.m. that same day, it's usually not worth much.*77
Another said* *X»d like to feel if I put a q^x&ry in at
lliOO e.m. I'd get the answer back that day. But usually
that doesn't happen." 78
*ven when reporters get answers to their inquiries*
they are rarely pleased with the response. One of the
regulars summed up the opinion of laost correspondent••
"They seldom give erroneous information* just not all of it.
rou have to ask everything because they will only answer
those specific questions submitted.*79 &®d others said
that even if a reporter ia not familiar with the subject
and cannot ask more
-in-depth" questions, nothing will be
offered unless it is mmkma for. Most regulars said they
realised this is how the game is played and are accustomed
to phrasing their inquiries so they encompass all possible
alternatives—although they said even this does not always
work.
Many newsmen stated they submit inquiries through
»DX sad then try to get an answer from their own sources t
tad * m vn-
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<*• of the wire service reporters echoed the view
of many 1
answe? hiTeHJ^f!?1*1 ' * r<*wt(K *»•«* W»D reaction to
iZorten^ ^ ~ fff*??'* ***? co*ld ** »* great
exeei^SS *>**!>***« to mil the reporter en stie&y
The majority viewpoint wee eaqareesea by one of the
veteran regulars.
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As noted earlier* the XltOO **au daily briefing for
military correspondents began after Hen*in became &£B{#?.) .
This was not a new technique* although it has not been
conducted on a routine basis since Sylvester discontinued
the practice of routine briefings in 1965. Some newsmen
suggested that Sylvester found it impractical to continue
the briefings because there was not a continuing daily
story to brief on at the Pentagon. Others said he did away
with this approach because the briefings turned into verbal
arguments between Sylvester and the press that made them
unproductive.
However* briefings called "nooners" were occasion-
ally conducted on particular subjects* These generally were
prepared and delivered by one of the military services in
conjunction with OA6£(*A). Also* special briefings were
held when a "hot" running story necessitated a verbal
exchange between newsmen and officials*
But between 1965 and 1969 little effort was made to
expose top level public affairs officials (Sylvester*
Ooulding or any of their immediate subordinates) to the
Pentagon press corps on-the-record on a routine basis.
As a service to the military correspondents* the
lit 00 a.m. daily news briefing was made part of the
regulars* routine under the Laird-Hanfcin team. Generally
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are held in the DOD audio-visual studio—a roots situated
just down the corridor from the correspondents* press room.
A few minutes before lit 00 a.m. the regulars* and at times
a few of the irregulars* take their positions in chairs
loosely placed in front of an elevated platform. Friedheim
enters and assumes a relaxed sitting position on a table
before newsman* the session is conducted in an informal
manner. He opens by making announcements* draws attention
to key releases or memoranda posted for the press since the
last brief* or perhaps gives responses to questions asked
by reporters the day before. The briefing is then thrown
open to questions on any Defense topic.
As previously mentioned* Friedheim said he tries to
anticipate questions likely to be asked so that appropriate
information is made available on the spot. In addition*
other public affairs officers in OASD(PA) always make an
effort to keep abreast of what has been reported and which
issues may be of interest to the media.
Thus* by lit 00 a.m. Friedheim has been briefed 1^
00D information officers and has received guidance from
Henkin on issues involving policy or secretary Laird
directly. If a topic warrants* Henkin likely would have
discussed the matter with Laird at their morning conference
and agreed upon a statement for the press that could be
attributed to the Defense Secretary.
Other times* Laird may drop in during the brief and
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respond to question* directly. In any event* he does have
facilities to monitor the briefing from his office*
Priedheiaa also pointed out that the briefing permits both
Laird and Henkin to stay abreast of what concerns reporters.
Senior military PAOs in CASE (PA) told the author
the briefing also is advantageous to irregulars because
they are able to get in capsule form all pertinent Defense
news of the day. Whereas before* irregulars came to the
Pentagon whenever they had a chance and tried to piece
together what was going on. Both regulars and irregulars
who miss the briefing can listen to a tape recording of the
session at their convenience.
Radio and television correspondents position camera
and sound crews only when they know in advance that a
special briefing will be conducted. On a day-to-day basis*
they participate in the briefing just like the print media.
Afterwards they may prepare material for possible broadcast.
Quite often television correspondents have a camera
crew meet them outside the Pentagon where their report is
filmed. Those who do radio spots return to the sound-proof
studio next to the press room and give news reports directly
by phone to their downtown bureaus.
Print media reporters may return to their desks in
the press room to prepare a story and* in many cases*
immediately telephone copy to their bureaus.
*1
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Mews Briefing as a Source
The 11 j 00 a.m. naws briefing received a mean of 2.4
(little to moderate) and ranked tenth in importance. Six
sources were preferred over the briefing, but it is iiiMifl
only to informal Pentagon sources as the most often
utilised source. Fiv& sources were thought more prolific
and the information disseminated at the brief was considered
more significant than seven of the 15 sources.
Regulars gave this source a slightly higher mean
(2.7) but still ranked it tenth in overall importance,
while actually "using'* only one source asore often. They
said congressional sources and releasee are the only two
that provided a greater quantity of information, while six
sources were thought to be better providers of significant
information.
Irregulars gave "very little* importance to the
briefing (1.2 mean and ranked with leaks in twelfth posi-
tion)
.
They did not list it &» a preferred source? and did
not cite it as one of the sources most often utilised.
Irregulars did not view it as one of the top thres sources
that either generated the greatest volume of information or
information that was most significant.
Military journal reporters put the briefing in the
fourteenth position of iis$>ortanee based on a mean of 2.3
(ranked Just before informal sources in other government
•fancies), while "preferring" eight other sources over
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the briefing* it is fourth in "utilisation * * &ut grouped
with three other sources in fourth position with respect to
information significance.
The regulars said the greatest advantage of the
briefing was the routine exposure to a high level Defense
official. One of the regulars with a daily newspaper saldt
•It's a useful routine that enables us to maintain contact
/with Defense officials/. It's insertant because of the
complete lack of coi^unication we had with Goulding.*
A news magazine writer's remark was typical of most
newsmen
t
I 90 to all of them* £t*s a good way to lismp
abreast. Unfortunately* the information put out is very
routine. Yet it does force BG© to make an accounting
each day and serves as »n open Ifrum. Also* officials
learn what's bothering newsmen. &$
A regular with one of the daily newspapers added
t
It's a useful device in times of crisis and even in
other times because you know what other people are
interested in—what other newspaper types are interested
in. You get a feel* if you've been away for a few days*
of what's going oa.8*
To most reporters* the lltOO a.m. briefing is a
"plus* and they would not like to see it abandoned. Bow-
aver* the majority suggested that as a source of hard news
it is generally of "moderate importance. * More frequently*
it generates leads to other things* rather than material
that stends alone as useful for a news story* they said.
Regulars considered the opportunity for daily
question-answer exchanges a benefit for newsmen. Yet many
jaattfl&nl
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suggested drawbacks to this procedure. A veteran regular
described two problems this ways
If they anticipate a question, they think up an
answer. This may be a quicker way to gat a response
but often reporters don't want to ask /their questions/
in front of other newsmen. Many days it's like
pulling teeth. Again it's the lack of completeness of
information. Often Friedheim goes back to old policy.




Many agreed the madia would be better served if
Friedheim was given more authority to respond on the spot.
Several said his most frequent comment is "I'll have to
check. " Reporters suggested Priedheim often has the facts
at hand, but has been given orders not to overstep his
boundary. Others stated he simply does not know about
everything that is going on.
As evidenced from the interviews with regulars* and
witnessing most of the briefings conducted during a two-week
period in June 1970* reporters openly display irritation
over having their questions evaded*
But, the vast majority of regulars joined in
praising rriedheim for the manner in which he handled him-
self during such open exchanges. Typical remarks included*
"Jerry does best as possible"; Jerry dees a good job*; and
"Friedheim is restricted in how much he can say. but he
does the best he can. " One of the regulars amplified these
remarks
t
Jerry does as good as he can. He does a good job
for the administration. Often he gives an answer that
can't be quoted; yet it works. I don't feel lied at.
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information officers said the number of news
inquiries submitted directly to Wt (Directorate for Defense
Information) have bean cut down as a result of the Hi 00 a.m.
brief. Also* soma newsmen said the chance to verbally
submit their questions to Ixiedhaim tender: to speed up
responses because pressure is applied from the top.
One of the dangers, however* in maintaining the
briefing was explained by one of the veteran regulars*
Sylvester tried this* but the Pentagon is so big and
it doesn^t hav© a continuing story. For instance* at
State Department the foreign policy story is one contin-
uous thing. Thus BOO ends up saving material for
11 1 00 aum. tomorrow. In that respect* the brief might
even be a delaying factor.®'
Overall* military correspondents felt the advantages
outweigh any disadvantages and said the daily briefings* as
an established institution* should remain*
Industry Sources
Industry sources associated with Defense contractors
were ranked low in each category except volume of informa-
tion. The mean for general iaaportance was 2.3 (little to
Moderate) and it ranked in eleventh position. As a
preferred source it ranked 13* ahead of "other reporters **
and "social gossip," while its position sieved up one notch
on the "utilisation" list* replaced by backgrounders.
There only were four sources thought more prolific* but
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Regulars classified industry sources as important
as intentional leaks, and gave both a mean of 2.3 (both
ranked in eleventh position) . This source was not even
named among preferred sources by regulars, while 10 others
were cited mm being most often utilised before industry
sources. It was considered the fifth most prolific source,
but was combined by the regulars with backgrounders and the
news briefing behind six other sources with respect to
significance of information provided.
Irregulars gave industry sources a low mean of 1.8
(very little to little) of importance and ranked it with
releases in the tenth position. The irregulars did not
name this source in any of tha remaining four questions on
sources.
Military journal reporters considered fiva sources
more important to them than industry sources, which ranked
sixth with releases and news conferences (a 2.8 mean).
Five sources were preferred more than this one and mnv&n
utilised more on a routine basis. Journal newsmen said
only three sources provided them with move significant
information, and three were considered more prolific.
Hfhila a number of regulars maintained their own
contacts within industry, many reporters stated they did
mot use industry sources as much as they probably should.
The reason most frequently stated for not utilising this
source was that industry has something to sell? they are
eager, but not always accurate. Some admitted there is a
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intentional leaks to the press, tn 1967, Sylvester said,
The Pentagon leaks like a sieve."92 often DOD was criti-
cised by the media, and some quarters of Congress, for
conducting investigations to ascertain the source of a leak
that resulted in stories unfavorable to the administration
or OSS officials. Critics felt the threat of lie detector
tests, or other harassing tactics against officials,
seriously endangered the flow of news.
However, military correspondents said there has not
been a flood of leaks during the last several years. Ster
did they give much value to the leak as a source of hard
news.
Most regulars viewed leaks with suspicion! "It
depends on who it is leaked to and what the motivation is
behind it. If ife a *olid »tory. I like it; if not. I
don»t waste the time*"*3
It is surprising that several of the experienced
regulars who would be considered prime candidates as recipi-
ents of such leaks said they had not been leaked to raueh at
all during recent years* One veteran newsman saidi
Leaks are pretty rare and few produce stories*
I?ff ! "? *uch *hiag *« the Pentagon "leaking like a
guard up. Usually I stay away frosa them.**
While some reporters found that leaks are usually
reliable, they stated they &re done for a purpose and thus,
they only regard leaks as pommiblm story leads.
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recently", *very small experience
. . . not many.* «i
reteewber one or two leaks to mi in /about 10 years/. X see
m evidence of leaking a lot", -th^ naw s>««n group
leakage*, but I've not had any personally «* and *I only got
ona leak /in over three year*/. Been waiting, but they
just don't show up# »
Several regulars aaid it ia difficult at time* to
distinguish "intentional** leak* frost "unintentional- leaks,
or even a leak mi off-the-cuff remarket "If a reporter
recognise* a leak as such, it helps. But it can be danger-
ous if he goes off the deep end. "^
The Leak as a Source
Intentional leaks were viewed as being of **little
isportance- and ranked with releases in the twelfth position
of overall importance. Correspondents store often preferred
and used 10 other sources ahead of leaks. This source was
in eleventh position with respect to information signifi-
cance, and not named at ail m one of the three most
prolific sources.
Regulars aai£ 10 sources wara more la^ortant, eight
had greater "preference, » &a& 11 were "utilised* more often
than the leak. But they stated only five sources provided
a»re significant information.
Irregulars gave leaks a mean of 1.2 and ranked them
with the news briefing (twelfth position). They "preferred"
sis other sources, but did not cite leaks as one of the
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sources raost often used in covering the Sentagon.
Military Journal reporters gw« the s»* i^ortance
to military service information organisations as thay d
to the leak—both received a m« of 2.2 (eleventh posi-
tion)
.
as did the irregulars, journal newsman did not name
the leak as one of the three moat prolific agrees nor did
thay cita it as on* of the three that provided the momt
significant information.
The news ralaass as a source was not considered
very important to military reporters in covering i*SD on a
daily baeie. It ranked with tha leak in twelfth position
of importance, sight sources Wars "preferred* «or« thm
the release and eeven mad mora frequently, sat it was
cited as the second most prolific source (second only to
congressional sources)
. sswsmsn said information from
sight sources was more significant than information con-
tained in releases.
Regulars ranked the release almost at the bottom of
the list with regard to overall importance and gave it
aejual weight with other reporters as a source (thirteenth
position)
.
Sloven sources were more preferred than this
one and nine most often "used- before they tuxm& to the
release. Also* regulara considered it as the second most
prolific source, but pet it with industry sources when dis-
cussing information significance (ninth position).
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Irregular* ?ave the release a lower mman (1.8). but
ranked it higher in iisportanca than aid regulars (tenth
•pot, shared with industry sources)* But they did not cite
it among the most preferred or used sources t nor did they
say information in releases is thought as significant in
the top three sources, Also, they said that four sources
were aore prolific.
More than the other reporters, military journal
correspondents said releases were iisportant. or "s^ora"
iaqportant than seven other sources. They ranked the
release in sixth position with industry and news conferences
(2*8 mean). It was the third most "preferred" and "used"
source for journal reporters, who also stated the release
is the aost prolific of all sources, while only information
froB infernal Pentagon and congressional sources was thought
wore significant to thesa.
Most correspondents said news releases had taken
the hack seat to the verbal aanounce»ent, with the excep-
tion of very routine information, Xn Chapter VI. it is
noted that the majority of military correspondents con-
sidered the timing of releases "for the good of BOB* as one
of the greatest irritants prompted by news manage*****.
Releases which contain major contract awards for
new Defense hardware have come to be recognised by reporters
as probably the aost important type of release they receive.
This, they said, is because frequently the release is the
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the only channel through Which they will get such
information.
The general viewpoint among Pentagon news corre-
spondents was that news releases—even the major contract
awards—&r* usually vague and lack any form of substance.
One of the veteran regulars summed it up this wayt
Timing is bad. The stock market is one factor, hut
also the lackedaisle aJL attitude to wipe the desk clean
at day's evn&. Most /release*/ are useless; not worth
the paper they're printed on. xxm seldom uses the
release to get information out today. During the
1950s, releases said something, bat not now,**
Other comments were generally the same* One saidt
"Releases mxm O.K. am far as they go, but they usually bury
the lead in the last paragraph.- Another stated* "They
often leave out basic factsi don't know why. **ost are a
waste of paper. Totally useless* vague and thin, * is
how another regular described releases.
With all their shortcomings, reporters said releases
are good for reference* *IOr files they're good. D00 keeps
op a good morgue, but releases are not used much."97 Others
said they are good as a record or sis$»ly "nice for files.*
One of the television correspondents added* *¥hey
are great for some, valueless for others. But surely they
/newsmen/ need them. at8
What Use are Releases?
Military news correspondents were asked whether they
feel releases originated by OASD(PA) are vital to the
.-
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*• Table Ki.lt indicate, even with the low regard
for releases a. a source ofM i*** mm ^^^ of
the regulars <11) responded negatively, a*^^^
•or* inclined to agree they are vital. While military
journal reporter. were divided on the iasu*. Overall, the
Mutagen press corpa was divided into distinct groups, an
a*ial number of newsmen agree <13) am* disagree U4) with
the small** remainder (9) not having opinions either way.
*on* of the wire service correspondents said
releases are vital to the newsgathering process.
*» I960. Underwood establiahed that 61 per eent of
the reporter, stated they could not satisfactorily cover
the Pentagon without official handouts. They were rated by
«o»t aa clear, timely, usually honest, but occasionally
deceptive in what they omit."
Other Reporters
A» a news source, "other reporters" were not
oonsidered very important. Military corespondents gave a
•*•* of 2.1 to thia eource and ranked it in fourteenth
position, it was not named in connection with any of the
other categories regarding source evaluation.
Regulars viewed this source on par with news
releasee (13 of IS) with a 2.2 mean. Irregular, gave it a
U4 mean <very little to little) and rated it juet ahead of
*oocial gossip" in fourteenth position. Military journal















ARE RELEASES VITJS, TO HEWSGATTHERIMG JPKOCBSS
smiwnnj procMi, T«n aw tha extant to which von















Hews Releases are vital
•trongly- Agree- .3- Stronglv-




































reporters gave it the highest mean (2.7) of the three
group* of correspondents and ranked it with backgrounders
in ninth position.
When discussing th« merits of the anonyisous "high
ranking official* in news stories generated from Washington*
D. c* frequently the charge is made that the newsman
himself may he the ghost "spokesman* " or a story is based
on an interview between two newsmen.
However* based on comments from regulars* such
possibilities are remote, Reporters said they do not con-
sider fellow newsmen as sources of hard news* but did not
discount the benefit roost derive from sharing personal
opinions on military matters* A typical remark iss
We in the press room do chat, but this has little
importance considering news value; more keeping
abreast. There»s no sharing or "blac&-sheating M /one
reporter does work of another newsman/. We discuss and
argue. But it's lively interest with different view-
points. iOO
Other regulars talked of "trade gossip 1* and "bull
sessions. * But none said they formulated stories based
solely on another *s knowledge.
If they have b&^n out of town* newsmen rely on
certain reporters they conui^r reliable to get caught up
on What has transpired during their absence. Reporters
relatively new to the Pentagon beat stated the pr^ss corps
is very helpful in giving guidance. By contrast* one of
the more experienced regulars said* "This is not a coopera-
tive press corps. **10i
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Another said it is vary important to hint to read
what other military correspondents writs. 8a stated this
enables him to keep on track. 102 One of the television
correspondents smsed up the feelings of most reporters
t
Xt's a strange interplay. If played right* other
reporters help because they all have different view-points—keeps reporters honest. This generally works.
Many of us try to have lunch with different reporters,if we don # t have appointments with officials, to
discuss Defense matters, 133
Social Gossip
The least important of all sources was social
gossip, which received a mean of 1,8 (vary little to little)
and rankad last by the regulars and irregular*. However,
military journal reporters gave this source a 2.5 mean and
named the HiOO a.m. news briefing (14) and informal sources
in other government agencies (15) below social gossip in
overall importance.
While a few of the regulars suggested that on
occasion they have picked up tips during social engagements,
the majority of newsmen said social gossip is rarely useful
as a hard news source. Hany suggested that attempts some-
times are made to slip reporters hot leads when on the
social beat, but generally such information is very
inaccurate.
Several correspondents said they simply do not mate*
it a practice to cover the cocktail circuit in Washington.
The view of reporters who have been exposed to tips
.•„- s -....; ... ...- H* *f»;»'w




Stained through social exchanges was summed up by a radio
correspondent t
Social gossip is generally wrong , but often thereis an element of txuth w&ich may tip off an ias>ortant
story. This one /source/. . • requires much lagwork
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**rson*i interview, Washington,©• C. , June
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Correspondent "E.
M—Hi^*.^ Co^*«i*M**an* "O." personal interview.Washington, ©. c, June 1970.
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Correspondent •?, * personal interview,Washington, 0. c, 1970.
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correspondent "K, - personal interview,
Washington, D. C, June 1970.
51Correspondent "S," personal int«rvi«w,
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BARRIERS IK THE SEW5GATHBKI23G
PROCESS AT TH2 PESITAGGB
ware aak«c to rank tlta three greatest
barriers confronting the military correspondent in covering
the Pantagon,
Tabla XLIII indicates that Pentagon reporters
considered the greatest obstacles to ba "secrecy or over-
classification" and "eoa$>Xaxity and enormity of DOD, "
followed by "news management • " The first two barriers were
named 29 and 27 times* respectively, while the third
obstacle was cited 20 times.
When reporters* responses were broken down by
regulars, irregulars, and military journal correspondents,
ranking of barriers varied by group*
In 1960, Underwood found the four most frequently
mentioned "difficulties" as cited by 30 news correspondents
werei *un£reedom of information,* "lack of time* * "enormity
and complexity of military affairs." and "diahonesty-
i
dsesption-distrust by officials,** in that order.
Table XLIV contrasts the barriers perceived by the
296
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1960 and 1970 press corps, The major barrier in 1960
("unfrsedor of information"4 ) was cited by 60 per cent of
the newsmen and chare vara about 14 percentage points
between the first and second greatest obstacles* and a 10
per cant separation between the second and third barriers*
In 1970, however, store newsmen agreed on the top three
aajor barriers, the first two were considered almost
equally troublesome to the press. The major obstacle was
cited by 73 per cent* the second greatest barrier by 70
pta: cent; and then 20 percentage points separate barriers
two and three.
Unlike ten years ago, the correspondents in 1970
appear to have sufficient tirae to "delve deeply into
Defense Matters" as a barrier* ranked fifth eor3par«*d to
second in I960.
Regulars ranked "difficulty in cultivating aad
maintaining sources* in the fourth position, while none of
the other reporters included this as an obstacle.
Irregulars viewed "complexity &a& enormity of 1X3©
"
as their greatest barrier and ranXeo "secrecy" fourth,
behind "news management* and "reluctant attitude.**
Military journal reporters perceived their greatest
barrier to be "reluctant attitude, followed by "secrecy,
"
"deadlines," and "news jaanageraent, " in that order.
Also, the three groups of correspondents did not
on the rank order of the barriers.
-ox * fem
,^ ewe »*©*••»©* «I
•
;q»*b •vlfrfr" CJ M
ftft* owi
.-T
tan pi*****!** 4 gjf—>*%tfcr»»*»i mint**
-OOa iMM *** ••«•!* rxaitfft
tatas? fan* *&i-twJ *•#••*» *^ •*
moot x J*
• b' i »^2 «t»« ** ©*
to I » •** •••J
Jl
BarfUr
' m Vtimmf hy g-vu l arm
Table KM f§v*| further insight into how regulare
Vi6Wd <****<*** ^Hey *ust cop* with when sporting military
affairs. IHfiy* ana "convexity* were both named 21
times aa one of the three greatest obstacles. But
"secrecy" was named firat U times (less than half), whils
seven regulars (one-quarter) said
-«M«».i«xity» la tha
greatest barrier. Fourth* regulars included "news manage-
ment- among tha throe greatest barriers, while only about
one-ninth (3) said management of tha news was tha icajor
obstacle.
Data alao show that a third of the regulars (9)
ware concerned acre with ttta continuous ft** of cultivating
and maintaining productive news sources than (a) getting
officials to open up, (b) inadequate briefings, or (c) time
pressures
•
The ranking of barriers based on combined opinions
of all regulars is significant since the two greatest
barriers were considered far more serious than the third
naaed obstacle. However, the following breakdown by media
types gives a more accurate picture of the problans











BARRX3R6 KJUCOUHTEWBC IH RESORTXWG PEFEMBB AFFAIRS t
REGULARS 0»ht
These are general areas that may constitute obstacles.
Of these—or any others you may think of—whet are the
three greatest barriers confronting the military corre-







Complexity and enormity of DOS
Hews Management (attempt to
influence presentation of nasws
by suppression, distortion, ox
timing)
difficulty in cultivating and
maintaining productive n*s*ws
sources
Reluctant attitude of DOD
officials to cooperate, mast*
or talk with newsmen
Lack of adequate background
briefings on sensitive or
complicated areas
Deadlines or lack of time to
delve deeply into ISefens© issues
Communications revolution during
last decade (e.g., today, an

























Zf two or .more barriers were n«
of times, rank order was based on number
first, second, third.
ued the same number
of times named
One regular said both "secrecy " and "difficulty in
cultivating and maintaining sources'* are egual aa the
greatest barrier (#1) • Therefore his other choice was
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Wire service correspondents vrero the only group of
regulars that considered "news management * the greatest
obstacle. News magaaine reporters were the only ones who
cited "secrecy" as the major barrier. Hews magasines and
radio~TV newsieen were the only groups that included
"reluctant attitude of officials" in the top three. 8ews~
nen in tha special interest publications category were the
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JCdwerd ShiIs, author of £Jaa *^g»*»» of gacr^y
wrote in 195 6 that Hm is en irrational adhesion of three
elements* fear of secrets* dependence on secrets* sad
2dependence on publicity.
In February 1970* Jerry friedheim* Principal deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs* wrotet
Complete secrecy, even in the interests of national
security* is not possible nor desirable in a free
society. Although our first concern must be the
security of the united States and the safety of our
Armed Forces* certain factors which impact upon the
Defense Department's security~of-information program
must be recognis**c.
Occasionally* national security itself will dictate
the release of information which has been classified—
in fact* sometimes highly classified. For instance*
there might be a requirement to make our deterrent more
credible. Another consideration is the annual require-
ment to justify the budget • • • • A third factor which
must concern us in our endeavor to deny information of
value to any enemy is our lack of ability to protect
of this information. 3
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs) has two responsibilities. The first is to
make the maximum amount of information available to the
American people consistent with security. The other is to
centralise that security information which cannot be
released. As previously mentioned* the Directorate for
Defense Information (DDI) is the office within OASD(PA)
through which military information flows.
Friedhelm also said* "Reporters quite often ask us
questions that they know we can't answer. ... Those that
Ml
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cover the building /Pentagon/ regularly understand that we
cannot answer some things b**eaus* of national security.*4
"Secrecy or overclassification" was given the
following ranks by n**wsi?*m with regard to barrierst
Overall
—
greatest barriers j regulars--first j irregulars
—
fourth; and military journal reporters—second.
.Abuses o£ Classification
"Selective Declassification"
This conflict between the Defense Department's need
for military security versus the public's right to know and
the media *s duty to fully report the news has always been a
problem.
In this context* 20 regulars were asked, "In general,
do you fael abuses of classification by DOD are increasing*
decreasing, or staying about the same?**
The majority of regulars (16) asked said the misuse
of the classification stamp is staying about the same under
this administration, while only three reporters said it is
decreasing r one responded "don't know."
Generally, regulars said DOD officials have always
overclassified information and in 1970 did not see any
significant improvement in this area*
it*a hard to tell what's hidden cway, bat I think
things are about the same* Yet this administration
claims more openness concerning information given out
about Russia's defensive capabilities. It would be
better to lay it all out and say what we think they
have, instead, officials tend to let such information
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Another reporter elaborated, »I>aird seesas to be
•ayina « lot more about Soviet capabilities. Of course a
lot of this may be political. In lower levels Zo£ tX®/
they still cover up by saying 'classified.^ 6
One of the wire service correspondents said that on
important issues things are about the sasie. Although ha
added,
-It's really ridiculous, but soaswhat better no*
.... Classification is used to keep things frois the
public until the top jsan wants it known.** 7
Several reporters agreed that classification claims
frequently ara made so that DOB officials can withhold
certain material until it best suits their purpose, a
veteran correspondent who said things have proved stated,
"Abuses occurred store during the JteHsraara era because it




Reporters agreed that som things should be classi-
fied, but during the interviews newsmen gave several
examples to illustrate how ridiculous the misuse of
security can be.
A few brought up a situation that occurred in 1970
whan President Uixon went to DGfc to be briefed on Cambodia.
Hewsaen were then briefed on the brief, during which time
one correspondent asked what the classification was of the
President's briefing. Reporters were told the classifica-
tion of the brief was classified.
One of the regulars described how sose officials














overreact when dealing with classifications
Ironically, the news office will often wish to give
the news media information on the crisis of the day and
be asked not to by any number of Military men. The
services are generally super-cautious and suspicious.
Telling the newsmen how many washrooms are on the
second floor of the Pentagon might help the Russians.
Once* when doing a feature story on the Army Map
Service, 2 was given a thorough background briefing by
a colonel who ended the interview by asking me to
submit my copy for his approval. X suggested what he
might do with him i&**, since no such ground rule had
been arranged in advance. He stared intently at me and
said. "Be careful what you write. Those boys on the
other side of the ocean would love to get their hands
on what I've just told you*" If this paranoia hadn't
been so frightening* it would hmm been funny.*
said often officials just do not know what
is classified and what is reieasable information, so they
classify to be M saf»... "People generally don't know what's
classified—either IADs or officials— and those who have
access to classified information don't keep up with it."
A veteran regular described a situation that
serves as a prime example of how this affects newsmen. The
correspondent was doing some stories with the U. 8. Navy's
Sixth Fleet in the Mediterraneans
X had to run the stories through security review.
When X got them back they were both censored. But one
particularly was scissored up quite a bit. Checking it
against the carbon, X found what they had scissored out
was two paragraphs in which 2 quoted directly or
indirectly Secretary Clifford and his posture state-
.
ment, which is of course, unclassified. The second time
I wrote "this came from Clifford's posture statement"
in the margin and they cut it out the second time. So
there's a great deal of work to be done in this area.
There's still some silly things going on.**
A few newsmen suggested if officials would simply
tell reporters why something is classified, many of the
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errors in reporting, and complaint* about abuses would be
eliminated. A daily nawspapar correspondent summed up tha
majority* a feelings*
It** always abused baoauaa it's part of the bureau-
cratic caution. And I 'a not surprised at it but the
protole* ia there's no penalties for overciassifieation.
xnere s no offsetting force except our complaints.
They overclassify everything. In Vietnam you can look
at lots of stuff you can't look at here simply because
they're all cautious and scared and they don't know
enough to know what to classify and what not to classify,
so they classify everything.
Often reporters have to rely on partisan interpre-tation or second hand accounts of whatever *s going on.What happens eventually is it leads to inaccurate
reporting. Xf material were declassified in thebeginning, there wouldn't be that problem. . . . They/officials/ create headaches for themselves. 12
Thus, newsmen believed that officials arbitrarily
classify information whom (a) it mmxv^a their purpose, (b)
if they are unsure what is not classified, or (c) just
because it is easier to say "sorry, that's classified* than
it is to check on it. They said the tendency is to use
secrecy to hide errors of judgment or information unfavor-
able to officials or the administration.
Does Security Deprive the Public?
Much has been written about "the public's right to
know." There is a fine line drawn between information
legitimately classified for national security reasons and
unclassified information withheld from the public to safe-
guard the lives of American fighting men. A cross-section
of the regulars (10) was askedt "To what extent does the
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withholding of information by DCS) for valid military
security reasons deprive the public of data it needs to
adequately understand Defense matters?" Four said it had
no affect; three replied it had some effect; and three said
it was hard to know or they could not tell.
They stated it would probably clarify many issues
that now confuse the public because* to safeguard national
security* they are not told the whole story. But »ost said
the citisenry need not have access if such information
would jeopardise American lives or the country's security.
One veteran newsman aaid
a
I've often wondered about that* especially concern*
lag the classification of new hardware. !» sure
attempts are made to withhold information* but history
will have to decide whether it was right or wrong* such
as the Cuban invasion /Bay of Pigs~196l/» 13
This same reporter suggested the public *s attitude
in 1970 toward anything military bears on this discussions
"I don't think the public cares much today. Yet in the
1960s* there were a lot of yells about why classified
,£>efen8&7 information was being printed. This is not true
today.
Zt has often been suggested that had the media
exposed plans for the Bay of Pigs invasion* negative public
reaction would have forced President Kennedy to halt the
assault* and thus save the United States great embarrass-
ment. Addressing this point* one reporter* who stated that
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But perhaps it distorts and confuses a situation.
People make political judgments every two and four
years. The information surroun&ing_the intrusion of
American troops into Cambodia /1S7Q/ is a good example.
If the public know the plans before* it*s possible they
would have tried to stop it. 14
cited instances through hindsight they said
were distorted or not fully explained. They declared a lot
of material was classified unnecessarily which only confused
the public.
Another reporter suggested this can be judged only
on a case by case basis i "It's most disturbing in the field
when ... SECDfiF declassifies information on the spot to
take the heat off or ease a situation on the Bill concern-*
log the administration. " 8s mentioned the time McSfamara
*inadvertently** slipped and said for the first time-~during
a briefing for newsmen—that Poseidon was a multiple war-
head missile. Another time, the reporter said, Clifford
came out with statistics that were previously classified to
knock down arguments against GOD policy. This type of
15
thing we should get on a regular basis."
Underwood discovered in 1960 that only 23 per cent
of the correspondents felt overelassification of informa-
tion "seriously" interfered with the public *s right to
know. 16
Secrecy a Problem to Reporting?
Twenty-five regulars were asked. "Is the use of
secrecy by DOD a very great problem to you in reporting
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Dafanw «-•?• filev«n raportar. .aid it i.. .ix othar.
•tateo it i.
-only
.o^ti-... » and «ignt o£ th. corrMpona.
•»t. rwpondad nagativly. rtm ra.dar i. ramlndad that 11MM MM aacsacy or ovarcla.aitte.tion a. tha gr.ata.t
barrier.
**t regulars said it is mora of * nuisance than it
is a major obstacle in reporting. o«a of tha regulars
summed up tha majority viewpoint:
eo»«! f# y^*** ?f thx*S» y®» don't know. Of
JSTtair'S STfaitt.^ ' *-**•*** 3 Sat* if
Rsportera indicated sometimes it is mora difficult
to comprehend a Defense issue based solely on "releaeable
information-, bacausa oftan so many other pertinent details
*ra classified. Thia compounds tha problem, avan for tha
spacialist oorraspondant who must interpret and explain to
tha public a no* weapon system or a Defense position as
related, for instance, to State Departments
isniui, ^f f!!! Xt ' * pm*mon aia08t Has to be a
nZZiZlr JZH iT!tanC# ' t0 Wrlt* ab°ut * reduction of
"rill5ly^.a5 # * ******* mmt **» ««» «l»t if
Bast Defense Against Gv«re 1assi fieation
Most newsmen acknowledged that overelassificatioa
ha. become a fact of life at DOB. Regulars were ashed what
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corresponds* suggested ther<* is no afc^u***
defense. However, methods employed to overcome excessive
•acrecy may ^ brokan oown into ^ ge|MMral 3^^^
Kleven
-in
._ said a reporter's best alternative is first
to complain or point out to officials how stupid it is to
classify information which does not meet legitimate
retirements of classified information, if this approach
fail, and tha reporter still believes ha is on firm ground.
Ha should, according to newsmen, expose it through tha
madia.
Another group (s reporters) said tha bast thing a
correspondent can do is remain aggressive, keep dicing,
•tay up on things, or constantly pursue all possible
•oerces. Bight othar newsmen simply stated thara is no
dafansa against overclessification.
A wire service corraspondant said*
thina l! ?S L>Jii ! °° pliSC* to *P£*al to, The hast
A talaviaion reporter suggested* »Xmp probing,
dividual effort, initiative, and enterprise. The FOX act is
flat the way.*20
The Freedom of Information (FOI) law was enacted to
kalp tha media and the public gain access to government
information which is not classified and which does not fall
into one of the nine categories listed as exceptions. 21
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Only two reporters said At helps tha* at the Pentagon.
They suggested tha ****** of the law has worked to their
advantage The majority of newsman, howavar. indicate
thay do not find any useful application of the law whan
raporting military news. More oftan tha view waa it haa
H*d little or no raal affect at X>OD. One of tha regulars
with a newspaper chain said*
atap^nd9t^!.
f,?LIS J* ?2ia* to Qm** *• • drastic
cou?t^ i2SitC^iiJS: ***<****• Wa0 m *«tari*adiaL
it \£uld S^w^ ?Ut h?Vlag to *m ttt* government.il«^w ^ ©attar, fceportere could take ariavaitt**.
•tf nava than evaluated oajactivaly. 22 «****«***»
Host othara agreed. One added that perhaps an
•oafcudaaian *t thm ^p|Jty a^^,^ ^^j ^^ ^^ ^
tha best alternative for all.
•Mora Than Two Hundred Spies*
Although tha Safensa &ep**tffiast is considered by
-•ay Washington correspondents to fe* a
-classification
haven* and tha tightest baat in tha capital. cospared to
othar countries, tha u. s. governisent (specifically DC©)
ralaasaa a great deal of information that would be classi-
fied eleewhare.
Ona of the Pentagon regulars said tha y. «. govern-
ment la -a lot looser than any othar government."23
A corraapondant with wall over a decade of
Washington raporting experience, and who haa observed
raporting in othar nations, was asked for his ©piniont
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» « 7 * , **id tlMlt *»• material found h«r* /TZ
hours a cay, 24 **
tW> auildr** «**•• working twenty
The pra»« corps stated that "news management" was
the third greatest barrier. &egul*rs judged it the third
«*jor cbrtiBU, irregulars said it was the second greatest
barrier, and military journal reporters ranked it fourth.
The phrase "news management" has been a topic for
press critics since James MM <**» *** ttooa) coined
the term in 1955. 25 However, the issue itself can be
traced back to the first government or first newspaper.
*et, it was not until 1962. when Arthur Sylvester openly
•emitted that the government "did it," was the criticism
loudest. Some journalists suggested that everybody in the
««*»«aications process "manages- the news. But BOD was
•ingled out l^ the general media as the prime offender in
Washington.
Critics of Defense information policies during the
1960's, accused Pentagon officials of misconduct for
practicing new* management as if it were a phenomenon
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*"»• Management Safined by Reporters
fentagon regular. wereM to define the term
"new. management." Although no two definitions were the
seme, one viewpoint was repeatedly stressed. More than any
other .ingle factor,
-timing of a release" to help DOS was
*sntioned wt frequently. One regular cited an e***ple of
this procedure*
cmrta^%a^^fT~ !f presenting something on a
S!!, ; , •a**®"*10^ at 6i30 p.m. on a Friday.
A similar incident was described by a news magazine
correspondent t
r«lalme4*e? *£?£ ^
S. Air Force bombed contract wase eas d at 5*3u p.m. on a Friday. Earlier in the davindustry sources suited the contract ^l^othaf'
tZV * JZ! "2 *° hint /f*°* *** official/ that it would90. This happens too often to think it?s accidental 27
An experienced newspaperman saldt
«*^J£l!«.^T* mana?*««ai7 the releasing of news and
*£tTE^J* •**•*»«« on a mlmstiv* basis to putsfiainistration. department &*m/. or service in theMt PO»«ible light, or to push or foster a project. 28
Another regular simply suggested news management is
-deliberate control of information; a holding back and
gxving out.
* Others said the term indicates distortion
through omissiont "Omission of information that may be
••barreasing to DOD. If. the selling of a program, the
technique is softer now. but selling is still there."30
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??? * fsntagon program is put together, so a falsa
•i££2 £^L tf*9<",?r , aR «W5©uno«»ant speeded up or
If they hold a story for days that's news mSiia^ment.n
Another newsman cttad another example of news
management!
a~*4 *? * f
•
cent si*«*t*©»* the administration made the
Sfia IS^i?1 **?*d<K3 ota* td talk about ona typa of
f^L' ?* ROt 5****®*- ***** is the way it is. The
T^l? ^J*- ' thu* oaly th* *«***«»» public is denied
infoSati^'
SometW Defense spokesmen latvaotf
i£Sf SL-f?ii f* \bad *°licy- * reportex's
nms^sS^^ fe 0ray *** t0 COE*bat ^a€SWS
Managing vs. Gathering the Haws
Regulars war© than asked. To what degree—if any—
doss news management actually interfere with your job of
gathering and reporting military news?"
Responses fro® 26 newsmen are grouped in tare®
•reas. About one-third of the regulars (10) said it has n©
affect, does not matter or is simply a way of life at the
Pentagon. A slightly smaller number <7) suggested it only
interferes on specific sfcoriss—uwslly concerning more
significant issues. The remainder <9) viewed the managing
of news as a constant interferes*.
The reader is reminded that three regulars named
news management as the grestest barrier and 11 others
considered it one of the three major obstacles.
One correspondent disagreed that news management
sven exists,
-There's no such thing. £OD doesn't have the















•Sparatu. to .«anag* news--the press ***. It ., ^ ^
issue." 33
™o«e in the fir»t category recognised that the
l~ue can nevar be avoided, but do not feel hindered by it,
-Xf« a normal function of any government. We accept it;
we'd be foolish if ^ dian .t . It^^ really^
/report1,^7. » 34
This approach was echoed by aevaral others. A
vtaran correspondent qualified the
-fact of life" feeling.
-If around long enough, a reports can overcome i&aws
••aagemen*/, if Ha knows tha pit-falls- But it takes
longer to gat information*
*
35
fiven though newsmen can overcome news management
with time, reporters on daily news deadlines find it diffi-
cult at times, as previously noted, several correspondents
•uggeetsd the releasing of major announcements or contracts
late Friday afternoons happens too often to be a coincidence,
t£L ^L??~ £ J*01*8 •** t>IQ *fcocH iaarket is closed.T^a policy has bean consistent since I've been here
fEEL**?** yeara/* Generally, if, mora oTanindividual news Management than a giant conspiracy. 36
M stated earlier, "mussling" the military's voice
was the topic of numerous heated debates in Congress and in
the media during the last decade.
Kilitary correspondents were asked how they feel







who maintained that tussling the military <either military
officers or information organisations) has resulted in a
ayatom which leavas little Loom for healthy debate on key
issues.
As Table XLVI indicates, one-third of the regulars
(S) said this is not the case in 1970* another third (3)
stated the assartion is valid, and the rafNtinttar (9)
indicated muzzling has "to some extent* eliminated active
debate on major military issues.
Only one of the irregularis said tha statement is
true* whiles only one of the military journal correspondents
suggested muzzling has not had this affect.
Overall, two-thirds of all the newsmen (24) stated
muscling has to son* extent left a climate that is not
conduslva for active debate on all sides of a Defense
issue.
Most regulars who said the assertion is false indi-
cated that muzzling is not a problem because military
officials do have avenues through which their side of an
issue may be aired. The channel most often named was
testimony before congressional committees. One simply sug-
gested that muscling has never been successful* and said it
is not a major problem. A newspaper reporter said there
was a problem before the new administration came in* *Laird
has changad all that. He brought the JCS i&oint Chiefs of
Staff/ into the decision-maxing process on policy
matters.* 37
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critics of SOD a«w« policies during the sixties
stated that mussling the military—either military
officer* or information organizations- -has resulted in *
systsn which leaves little roost for healthy debate on
key Be fease issues* Bow do you feel about this
assertion? (n»37)
Correspondents
Little Roots for Debate on Key Issues
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Eegulars who said maRling has Kept the iwsdia from
getting the military's aid© of an issue did not agree that
testifying before congressional committees is an affective
means to combat tha problem* h veteran regular agreed that
much comes out of these hearings*
But who reads 500 pages /of testimony/ for six
linas of print . six months aftar tha event? This is
not tha bast public participation in policy
formulation. *»
Many held tha same viewpoint*
Congress draws out views. Vat soma /military
officarji/ ara still constrained by his superior's
policy and won't axpr«ss honest opinions on tha Hill.
Tha days ara 90ns whan a top military officer goes out
and attacks a decision. 39
One of tha television correspondents added*
We don't gat tha flavor of all sides of mi issue*
DOB tries to ha a monolithic organization. On the
Hill, the military just doesn't want to fight with
officials. They are very circumspect at times? too
auch at times.4**
The majority of regulars said (a) there should be
active debate hefore a major decision is made* (b) the
public should know how the military feels. 9ad (c) once a
decision is made* generally the military should abi£a by it.
Hewsmen also stated the military usually tries to gat their
views out* but their success is only marginal. Host regu-
lars did not see the value in such debate—even if possible
—on aifioc. issues.
•II the Zs*rvic*7 chiefs differ with BWtmw* this
is something they should aay* tell the media why they
disagree. Mow this comes out through civilians in a
cii mtbmm md* iqo •»«< aeiliaiMi bl*« otfv ««ai»fM
ft<fj *»Xi* jac Mb ftoftci as lo #61• **y^
3e*ts »• «i ft*ft*}l«o»o» Xftaolftfte-zfaoft **oi.*a palt%<i -*«#:*
;fc&AC:CVSq ftftty 3ft<te©D «M* Mm
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backhanded way that's not satis factory, » a correspondent
for a daily newspaper said.4*
Another suggested musaling is still a problem and
always will be because of the promotion systems *The mili~
tary tries to stay out of hot water. They try to get their
views out clandestinely. Since Mcsiamara left, military
officers speak sore on the Hill, but we can't get sll sides
of a story in DOD."** A network TV correspondent agreedt
"Feople see a guy ^litary office*/ retiring early if he's
been burned, *
One regular stated* "Zfs not really mussling; but
not really debating. • And another •
-There are avenues, but
a newsman has to work and scheme. N
A newspaperman summed up the viewpoint of most*
There's quite a bit of constraint on all the
services not to get involved in public debate. I tnink
there should be debate. Yet after a decision is made.
there should be a closing of ranks. I'd like to see thepublic get some feeling for what the military thinks.
Vow, the military has overreacted—whan in doubt, don't
talk!**
A news magasine writer agreed but also looked to
the futures
The statement is valid today. It's a pity because
the country is suffering for it. The y&mzm under
McKawara were a winnowing out process—if military mendid not agree with McHamara. they were fired. It
should be better now with two Navy men in JC* and I
expect more debate in the future.*^
A veteran regular was not as optimistic
s
There is a tendency to run DQV like a corporation;
to run it from the top. There's no discussion before
a decision is made because top officials haven't
*ee * • tmdt w ta txifr;. M
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decided yet, nor is there discussion jtf£&£ because the
decision is already made—thus, no discussion: *$
One of the irregulars saidt
This is a red herring /referring to the muzzling
assertion/. The Pentagon is, and has been, probably
the raost "open" defense department in the world. Even
so. Defense officials will try to hide news that
reflects poorly on their causes or performance. And
it will always be that way.47
to Kill thft Stray
Critics during the sixties who accused military
news correspondents of being spoon-fed by defense officials
also suggested in order for &0£ to km&p the regulars under-
foot they simply had to **\t newsman not to report certain
information ox to Kill a story coraplately if it was unfavor-
able. Judged solely on the basis of what has been written
about this give-and-take, it appears officials ask, for
whatever reason, and reporters unquestionably cosily on a
routine basis.
About two-thirds of the regulars (1?) were asked
t
"Have you ever been requested to withhold publication of
Defense information in your possession?*
While most of the correspondents (14) said "yes," a
truer picture of such requests was possible after those
that responded affirmatively were asked s "About how many
times was such a request made?" Only one reporter said
"several times." Most often the responses weret once, not
often, a few times, not frequently, a couple of times, and
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•aids "Only one*** That was wb#n X went to S&QEMW and asked
it a story /the osvsMn prepares/ would be Harmful to
national security. Ha said it would and X killed the
story. mmo
Two newsmen considered by JX>fc officials to be quits
critical of the military establishment responded by saying,
"nobody ever asked me to kill a story. *** Another regular
said, "1961 was the last time a person /not in DOB? asked
M
as to kill a story and I quit."
Reporters were asked if they generally complied
with such requests. Almost all newsman said they did. A
few added s *X did when the request was valid or legitimate.*
They also were asked t "When was the most recent
request made?" Responses ranged from "recently* and "not
long ago* to *a few years ago."
Why Officials Hake Requests
Reporters were queried as to what reasons were
given for these requests. "Legitimate security" and
"national security" were most frequently cited. One said,
"The reasons were not always legitimate." Others suggested
"usually delicate matters." "touchy areas, * and "policy.
*
Although two suggested reasons were not always legitimate,
most are satisfied that requests were made without
ulterior motive.
When asked if they thought it is common practice
for officials to make such requests of newsmen, all regulars
jf X *»»* ££:JOV ii blM »* «\
o# %l
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asked responded negatively.
One reporter indicated requests to edit copy
prepared after an interview are more trouble than requests
from officials to kill or withhold a story. 51
QQ Critica] fitoriaa Draw Dlagging^ 1^11?
Critics of Defense information operations during
the sixties said that not only did officials muxsle voices
in the military but they also curbed Pentagon correspond-
ents from reporting stories unfavorable to DO© or the
administration by cutting off news sources or granting
special favors only to those newsmen who exhibited them-
selves as sympathetic to DOB.
In this context, experienced regulars from each
type of media (16 in all) were asked if they fialt dis-
criminated against by Defense officials if they report a
story critical of the military establishment. Less than
one-third (5) said yam, half (8) responded negatively, and
the others (3) said it depends on the story.
Most reporters, however, did not see the issue in
clear-cut form. Many said if a reporter is accurate and
honestly critical, chances are it will not affect hia
sourcest
-I've had people mad at me, but that doesn't last
long. If a story is accurate, doors won't really be
closed. "
newsmen suggested if a critical story proved to be
unfair, distorted, or false, the reporter's own credibility
-» i- «
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will b« tarnished and his contacts will fee acre cautious
toward his in future encounters. Generally, correspondents
recognised that officials are human beings who might give
them the cold shoulder, but it rarely lasts. As one of the
veteran regulars saldi
There's a certain amount of discrimination against
reporters who write unfavorably toward the military.
Officials favor those reporters who they know are
sympathetic. That's only human nature. An official
wants his story out. b3
Very few reporters were of the opinion their
sources are or could be entirely cut off. Even when
attempts meet with marginal success* it was not considered
a major handicap because DOD officials could never plug up
all a newsman's sources* according to the regulars.
Referring to those who said 35015 can tamper with the
flow of news through a newsman's sources* one of the
veteran regulars saidi
Uol Ho J That's totally impossible? completely
ridiculous and shows how ignorant people can be. It's
as simple and underhanded as thist you have the Mavy*
Army* and Mr force. If anyone thinks a reporter can
be cut off from all* he's nuts. If X can't get some-
thing from onm, I'll get it from others. Officials can
make it difficult and fail to educate you* but the
reporter wins. 54
Referring specifically to correspondents who do not
have a direct affiliation with the Defense beat* yet
suggest sources are cut off* the same correspondent saidt
"How can a reporter ... £fao doesn't cover the Pentagon
regularly/ say sources are cut off, when the regulars don't
feel it? They are flying by the seat of their pants. rt
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Newsmen stated it is more likely that en official
will take it upon himself to be discriminating toward a
reporter who ia
-hot. • Several regular, gave examples of
how non«*AQ official, are
-unavailable- to particular
reporter, they think did the* wrong. One l liini attrib-
uted thi. to the complexity of W® and saidi *Z did a .tory
on destroyers for
. . . & foreign country/ once and
haven't seen that man Official who gave him information?
since.*55
Another offered thi. views
** !5!!? ?
8tor? hM W«*rad from time to time that
latest^a^*^* «•**••»• with. «JH»^H»*mim^XS9^^?* *han w» have great difficultie. „
£!!^5 t a2HC<ST m X v* h4ia ©**i*ial» tell me Vfir.t
i^«. I-SK^Ss ••• you're too hot now. x jostcan't talk:- Thi. happen, more wh<m stories are sensi-
ttlt^i1011 ?han •^^ critical. Officiairaramore leary of sensitivity than juat criticism. 56
A few reporter, agreed official, do }udge corre-
spondent, by .torie. they originate t They tab you pro or
eon. The good guy. get fed a lot more .tuff. Yet I've
been rough at time, and it', not hurt me."57
Another regular viewed the problem from a .lightly
different parspectivet
..- 3!2 ^^°re L* <3i»criminatioa7. 1 think it' a good
2hL*?ZL *J!?*,* ** to * ****** '* advantage or dis-£ ££^!;* **? inatanc«* * military official may come$122i *t £ iagitimate complaint .o the reporter can
HKVSi-m &*&$?* ***' ^ *»* -* «***-
Another comment substantiated this point
t
«*%
**°3?l* 9at a little touchy. Sometimes it worfc. theother way—official, try to mellow you. But PA ifcublic
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a I u are honest, there *s not much
5 9
Adequately Brxefad on Defense last^a?
Military correspondents were asked if they feel
adequately briefed—either by news releases, briefings or
conferences, ur backgrounders—by OSD and the services to
stay abreast of major Defense activities.
As Table XLVII indicates, a great majority of regu-
lars (21) said they are not. Only two regulars responded
affirmatively; however, even their answers were combined
with "the reporter's own aggressiveness. 8 Also, this same
60
newspaperman said briefings are weak in all areas. The
other stated t "Yes, but some areas lack. Overall they are
doing a fair job. We could use more though. " '
Thus, for all practical purposes, none of the
regulars were completely satisfied with the amount or type
of information initiated by DOX3 to help keep Pentagon
reporters current on military affairs. A few suggested it
is a "little better" than under the last administration,
but still is not adequate.
Irregulars and military journal correspondents
similarly were not convinced officials make a good enough
effort to aid reporters in this area.
Overall, about three-quarters of the newsmen (27)
flatly stated Mno w to the question. Less than one-fifth of
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sometimes" sad just three of tha 3d correspondents wars
satisfied with briefings received*
A veteran regular describe how he views the situa-
tion and &QD's attitude toward keeping reporters informed
t
They don't anticipate problems and gat ready for
inevitable questions* Mso, reporters fioo that experts
have 90ns lata in tha day whan a story nits* 08P
doesn't begin to tap the sources in the services*
People just sit around saying* *££ nobody vote** don't
say anything.*^
Tha point mads about sources in tha military
services was raised several times throughout the interviews
with regulars* One veteran reporter expressed the view-
point held by most regulars.
DOD discouraged top military men from briefing on
major weapons and other issues* Military men mx& very
well-informed * . • and have been at it longer than
most civilian officials* and know their field better*
But our exposure to them has declined in recent years*
This im a hangover from the McHamara-Kennedy ara when
civilian control filtered down*
Under normal circumstances tea or twelve years ago*
if we had a B~l /Air Tore* bombe^jprogram* we*d have a
Brigadier General brieX /the press/ on bao?c$round*
Also the Havy Bi>~9#3 /new destroyer progreo/f w« were
not briefed on that* Thus newsmen don't know much
shout it* Before* an information officer would see to
it that military officials briefed the press* We could
discuss problems with three or four-star admirals or
generals* This has been discouraged in recent years* 63
Yet one of the radio correspondents viewed the
military as the prime offender t "The military often tries
to clamp the lid on subjects which may be embarrassing or
sensitive* The public affairs office /0?3i> <£-?&/. in s*3f
judgment* has dome much to fight this**
wm4fj MM «•
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Another regular put blame on the pzvam as w*ll a*
the military!
Xt'e lack of imagination on tha part of POD. Ha
need inforsaed background briefings. The only way tha
military will gat out of this bug-a-boo it's in now is
to explain its actions and kill tha credibility gap. Only
after that's dona, will people listen. But it will
take years to rebuild public confidence in the military
• . • • On the other hand, the military has given
briefings in the past which the pmw ignored. 65
A few correspondents suggested that many times tha
press corps is at fault for not requesting store briefings.
Areas Heeded to be Covered More
Newsmen who responded negatively to the question on
briefings were asked what areas they thought were weak and
why. About one-third of the reporters said there are weak-
nesses in all areas "across the board.*
The most often named weakest areas are "weapons
systems* (14) and "policy decisions'* (12) . Somewhat below
those* but next in order* is "strategic planning" (3)*
Major contracta (6) , the Middle last (2)« and the budget
(2) also were cited. One reporter offered another thought
t
"Briefings are weak for almost any story that's breaking.
Like the Cambodian action /he feels they were well briefed
on that/; they just have not been having many briefings
like this in DO©. "e6
Another regular agreed
i
One of the best and one of the few good Pentagon
military briefings we ever had, because they didn't








was in May whan JCS sent down . . . /som^ expert*/*
They got maps oat and want down the lin* on Cambodian
operations* Thay didn't claiss it would win the war?
their claims ware modest* And of course, nobody
listened to than*
On any other day, we would hava listened. But it
got buried quickly; it was a one day time and nobody
ever referred back to this briefing and it was a v^xy
good briefing. It gave the military rationale and aoma
of the problems thay would expect, to encounter, But
than wa got fascinated with words. .Laird said this
yastaarday and Rogers said that. Everybody was trying
to break up the thing. ... The big thing waa to pick
apart the political exposition of the military rationale
Which was quite different. &?
One of the regulars suggested two other areas
reporters feel should be given acre exposure
t
We don't have enough access to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff* Also, Systems Analysis wjns under fire the past
year and won*t talk to anyone ^any^correspondents made
this comment about Systems Analysis/. There's a
trestendous reluctance to talk about things in planning
stages* This i» bad because the public should know and
participate! express opinions. &&
A television correspondent described a situation
which illustrates how Defense officials hurt themselves
whan the press corps is not adequately briefed
t
The m& /Anti-ballistic missile controversy? i» a
good example. We couldn't get anybody /in DQQ/ to say
anything* we'd always get the same thing, even when
critics presented new arguments* DOE had a better case
than was presented* Yet they just di6 not get it
across. 69
Reporters said as the result of Inadequate briefings
the caliber and accuracy of reporting falters*
It's batter than before, but not adequate. They
ahould expose experts to the press, like about the
Middle East* Because this is not done, reporters
scratch around and don't always get full or complete
information* ' l
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And finally* a regular who aaid ha waa adequately
briefed only part of the time attributed soste of the diffi-
culty to a conflict of intereat between official* and
The official output ia directed toward showing what
ia iansdiats or what ia being done well* Reporters
muat look for problems and difficulties, aa well *m new
developments before DOC is ready to talk. Thus, there
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-Security vs. Freedom of Information, -
gArftftpifln Magasine (Navy Office of Information, Washington,
D. C), February 1970, 3.
I
r, ^
Cor5**£oad*,lt "°» " P«*««>*ai interview, Washington.D. C, June 1970.
e ~
Correspondent "C, • personal interview, Washington,
«• C. , June 1970.
7Correspondent "B, " personal interview, Washington,
0. C, Jums 1970.
Correspondent "H, • pereonal interview, Washington,
D. C, Juno 1970.
ICorrespondent mZ * free* ssail-questionnaire,
November 1970.
10Correspondent *<3, - personal interview,
Washington, D. C. , June 1970.
Correspondent mL, m personal interview,
Washington, £>. C, June 1970.
12Correspondent *». * personal interview,
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Correspondent *V. " personal interview,
Washington, B. C. . June 1970,
h- i*«. icS^#2 ^?-iPI V»*.te I*ngtHy and are listed 4nthe lawt 5U.S.C. 552(61 Stat. 54).
22Correspondent *C."
23Correspondent *».*
Correspondent not named? at his request.
In 1965 Keston said* ml happen to be rssponsibl^for the phrase, 'laanaging the news, • at a time when there
were many charges that government officials were censoringthe news or suppressing the news. X said before a
congressional committee 1 wasn't so worried about people
suppressing the news ft* X was about their managing the
££&*& J&ol Qgwegnwtf itt (Milwaukee. Wis. * Center for the Study
of the American Press. 1969). 93.
Also in 1965* Walter Uppmann said* *.
. . that is
a silly controversy. ^ad it alUstexted from a very foolish
remark made by
. . . /fcylv**t*x/. All news given out bygovernment is more or less managed. It always has been and
always will be, but what you n&v&z do admit to the publicis what Mr. Sylvester admitted* that he dL4 it. That is
the only mistake you're not allowed to make in this
business. ... It 1 s very naive* it's very innocent topretend that news isn't ssanaged. ... All the news gets
managed by the White Bouse, by the Defense Department, by
the managing editor, by the correspondent, by the columnist,




^Correspondent »X, • personal Interview.
Washington, ». C, June 1970.
2dCorrespondent *A„* personal interview,
Washington, fi. C, June 1970.
Correspondent *0, " personal interview.
Washington. ©. C. June 1970.
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30Correspondent "P, " personal interview,
Washington. D. C, Jane 1970.
3Correspondent *1C."
Correspondent "I, " personal interview,





37Correspondent *ff - personal interview,








43Correspondent "M, personal interview,




^Correspondent "II # * from mail-questionnaire,
September 1970.
Correspondent "E," personal interview,
Washington, B. C. June 1970.













Correspondent *B • "
Correspondent **K. M
Correspondent w&," personal interview,





















71Correspondent *X, " frosa mail-questionnaire,
December 1970.
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flbjtiCvAVflft and Bflw Thar Warn Mat
The primary objectives of the study werei (1) to
establish how Pentagon govrespondents evaluate their now*
sources* (2) to identify the barriers* as psresivsd by the
military news reporters, in the e*ws9athering process on
the defense MSfcl (3) to ascertain hew atestoers of the
Pentagon press corps assess (a) D^f4snse Department public
affairs organisations* (b) tXO> news policies ami procedures*
and (c) Pentagon officials* ano (4) determine {%) the back-*
grounds and journalise experience of military corespond-
ents* (b) how they evaluate the performance and caliber of
other Washington newsmen* and (c) how Pentagon reporters ao
about reporting the military beat*
Jfc secondary purpose was to determine what was
written by the general wm&i* during the sixties i£*
Defense information policies* operating techniques* and the
full -time regulars who cover the Pentagon.
How ctenerel Media Viewed Hewega* *gf
At the Pentagon during the Sixties
It was established that during the last decade*
general news taenia in Washington singled out the Pentagon
as an example of "how not to inform the public." Critics
33?
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declared that Defense officials did everything in their
power to keep the public and the proas in the dark concern-
ing major military issues.
The media thought DQD was one of the most important
sources of government news flowing from Washington, yet
felt the military beat was the tightest and toughest in the
capital, while repeated charges were made that the Pentagon
was the most Inadequately covered area of government
affairs*
Critics went beyond criticising Defense officials
or weaknesses in DOB public affairs ventures* and accused
full-tii**© regulars in the Pentagon press corps of collabor-
ating with military and civilian officials who tampered
with the free flow of Defense information. Regulars were
said to be puppets* publicists or lap-dogs of Pentagon
officials* Stemming from these accusations, the hard corps
of correspondents who regularly reported military affairs
were considered somewhat below the status that critics
normally associated with the White House, State Department*
or Capitol Hill newsmen*
However* many Washington-based correspondents
acknowledged the difficulty of newsy atHering under the most
adverse conditions at the Pentagon
—
primarily* inherent
secrecy and the "one-voice" philosophy of Defense Secretary
HcHamara*
Prom the time McRamara entered office in 1961
through the latter part of the decade* the media*
s
see
fc xiliviftvs bib i a *sa* :r,a 5&ai" btulMl
*M»»vog So o*t* 6»»»voo *oa» idi *a«
•
.»SS faOA , 5W *°
•qiOS M£ o* * **
-....:•.••






confidence in Defense public affair, and official, was
continuously shaken by events and practice. deemed, by
critics, certain to undermine the public-, right to know
«nd the media* a right and duty to report.
Baaic assumptions were made by the general media
that came to be accepted for want of further evidence.
Most frequently, DOD official, wera charged with telling
anything but the truth, even to the point of telling out-
right lie. and practicing deception at times. Bvents such
a. the Cuban miasile crisis in 1962, the TI3C aircraft
controveray in 1963, the Pierrelatte (France) affair in
1965, the Polomares (Spain) H-bomb incident in 1966, the
Soviet .hip accident and the attack on the jffif W*m& in
1967, the 1968 seizure of Ufife I^blfiu and the Vietnam
conflict which .tlrred critics' wrath during most of the
•ixtie., all were contributing factor, to the generally
accepted a..ertion that "official, don't tell the truth;
don't believe anything Defense officials say.
*
"Hew. management* wa. addressed by Pentagon critic,
as if it was a new phenomenon, unique only to the Department
of Defense. Charges ware aimed at KcHamara'. efforts to
mussle the military and seek revenge against those uniformed
officials who spoke out of turn. The general media felt the
tighter centralist control under Mcsramara ran counter to
the free and open exchange between government and public
that the American people are entitled to receive.
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Critics said the indiscriminate use of backgrounders
by MeMamara further abetted the stiffling of a legitimate
news flow. They declared Pentagon correspondents merely
were used by Defense officials to transmit sdlitary propa-
ganda. The media charged it was not until after ttcMamara
left office that such accusations were really substantiated*
However* criticism of Defense news policies did not stop*
but simply were tendered. Critics felt* by 2966, Pentagon
inhabitants—both uniformed and civilian—had be»n so
inundated with the MoMamara-SyIvestar tactics, it would take
years to undo the daaage done to effective military public
affairs.
Thus, the decade of the sixties was one of turbu-
lence between the general media in Washington and Pentagon
officials. It was also a period which ended in a basic
distrust between the public and the military. Criticism of
Pentagon news policies was further perpetuated by those Who
reacted to unfavorable public opinion toward military nmn
and actions.
While the volume of material authored by critics of
the Pentagon information apparatus during the sixties was
voluminous, it is suggested that basic qualifiers must be
added to what the public and the journalism community
outside Washington have read and *&*n concerning these
criticisms.
For the most part, critical material was authored
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by media representatives who had little or no direct
association with the newsgathering procass at the Pentagon.
Many critics had never actually covered DOS). Rather than
from regular contact or firsthand experience* their views
were likely based on hearsay, personal opinions* or—at
best—a fleeting encounter with Defense public affairs such
as covering a major news conference on a one-shot special
assignment.
Also, while numerous journalists were quick to jump
on the bandwagon of criticism during the sixties, appar-
ently little effort was made to establish how the regulars
at the Pentagon viewed the key topics of controversy*
The net result was that the public and the general
journalism community were raisinformed on some aspects of
ths newsgathering process at the Pentagon. While regulars
do endorse sone of the basic criticisms made during the
last decade* this study showed that other assertions were
not placed in the proper perspective or were proved in
error. These are addressed later in the chapter.
Evaluation of Sews Sources
There is little agreement between the regulars,
irregulars, and military journal correspondents when evalu-
ating the IS news sources available* Regulars considered
more sources as being between "moderate" and "very great"
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Regulars also utilize wore sources when gathering
material for a story. Thia gives them a greater flexibil-
ity to double-check and verify facta; playing one source
against another until satisfied they have the most compre-
hensive account.
Regulars consider their own informal contacts at
the Pentagon the most iinport ant « followed toy news confer-
ences and congressional sources. But irregulars found
sources on Capitol Hill the most important* followed by
informal Pentagon sources, and formal interviews. Military
journal reporters rated informal sources in VGD first and
congress second , followed by interviews.
The regulars do not feel the more official channels
of "responses to inquiries" and "news releases" are very
important* while irregulars rated them higher ("responses"
were fifth compared to ninth for regulars; releases were
tenth compared to thirteenth for regulars) . Also, while
regulars view the news conference as the second saost
important source* irregulars said seven other sources were
more important; journal newsmen rate conferences in sixth
position.
Thus, regulars are more apt to get a truer picture
of a given issue by going to their own contacts who are
closest to a topic. Since irregulars feel congressional
sources ere the most important* they are likely to get an
interpretation of information given congressmen through
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official DOS) channel*, rather than assessments from experts
in the Defense structure who confide in regulars off-the-
record.
Most correspondents pointed out they rarely rely
just on one source. More frequently they turn to several
to obtain the information needed. However* often they must
utilise certain sources not considered as important or
reliable because other channels are eat off or are singly
not available. Only eight of the 43 niiWimi participating
in this study said they generally use the same top three
sources they would prefer to use.
Source* Sr-afarre^
Regulars prefer informal Pentagon contacts far and
above their next choice "news conferences, * while irregulars
and military journal newsmen gave about equal preference to
formal interviews mn& informal Pentagon sources, but rated
the news conference seventh and sixth* respectively.
The regulars indicated they get nsore frank and
reliable information from their personally cultivated
information sources than from formal interviews with
officials who are naturally more cautious and reluctant to
open up with reporters. Thus, if regulars had their way,
they would be able to get a story peg from th« Defense
secretary at an on-the-record formal news conference , and
then follow up by requesting formal interviews with other
key officials to gain further insight (or add other
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•attributable source, to the story) to official Defense
rationale. *«t they would .it down with their own
contacta on an off-the-record. not for attribution basis
and fin i„ any nox^ ox discuss the real impact of a
certain decision; perhaps adding the additional perspective
of what alternatives were discarded and why. On the other
hand, regulars might profit mora by first checking out
eertain aspects with their informal sources, and than
requesting on-the-record formal interviews with knowledge-
able officials to substantiate or refute information
newsmen feel is significant to interpreting the story to
the public.
Without these informal contacts, reporters must
settle for carefully phrased comments given by officials
which m*y omit pertinent details. However, as valuable as
the informal Defense source is. a correspondent cannot
continuously raport military stories based solely on
anonymous officials? thus the need and importance of the
formal interview or news conference.
Most Often Utilized Sources
Such ideal conditions as described above do not
exist, however. While regulars do tsost oft^n use their
informal Pentagon sources, they oltad tho daily 11*00 a.m.
news briefing and formal interview as the second and third
»ost often utilised sources.
The news conference (held far less frequently than
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the briefing) drops to ninth with respect to actual usage.
Less than half the regulars said Defense new* conferences
war* held frequently enough. This would suggest even
though reporters observed that Laird has been exposed store
to the press than his predecessors* they feel simple
exposure is not enough.
Most regulars advanced the viewpoint that the major-
ity of news conferences are only conducted when officials
have something specific to bring before the media or are in
reaction to a flap. While the Defense Secretary has helped
by initiating news conferences to allow reporters to
question him on a current topic* correspondents suggest
there rarely are wide open "no topic** sessions during which
they can ask Laird questions on any Defense issue.
Irregulars did not even include the daily briefing
as one of the three a&ost often used sources* but said they
utilized responses to inquiries and informal Pentagon
sources most frequently. Military journal reporters cited
congressional sources* informal Pentagon contacts and
releases* followed by the news briefing.
Thus irregulars do not take advantage of the routine
exposure to on-the-record information disseminated during
the brief. This is not surprising since they generally
visit the Pentagon less frequently than once a week.
Yet even within the corps of regulars, newsmen
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three most often utilised sources; no two »<ats of sources
used by outlet types generally are the sane.
Most Prolific Sources
Regulars named congress and news releases as the
sources which provided the greatest volume of information,
followed by the daily briefing and informal Pentagon
sources*
Irregulars cited congress first, followed hy
responses to inquiries, interviews, and informal Pentagon
sources. Military journal reporters said releases were
first, then military service information organisations,
informal Pentagon contacts, and industry sources.
Significance of Source Information
Pour of the top five sources named by military
correspondents as the sources that generally provide the
most significant information were also among the top five
sources rated the most important. The exception is
"informal sources in other government agencies,'* which was
considered equal to news conferences in fourth position.
However, the former ranked low (8 out of 15) on the listing
of source importance.
Regulars said their informal Pentagon sources
produced the most significant information, followed by
congress, interviews, and news conferences. Irregulars
cited congress, informal agencies in other government
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agencies, responses to inquiries, informal Pentagon
sources, end interviews all about equal. Military journal
reporters feel informal Pentagon sources are first, than
congress and releases.
Thus, sources that produce the greatest quantity of
information are not necessarily the most important, nor do
they provide the most significant material. Also those
sources that are actually most often utilised are not
necessarily the ones newsmen prefer to use.
A few examples illustrate this point. Overall, the
news conference is the third most preferred source, yet
ranks only ninth with respect to utilisation, and tenth in
quantity of materiel received, but is fourth in significance
of information.
Regulars considered backgrounders as the sixth most
important source, sixth most preferred source, yet utilised
twelve other sources first, apparently because the formal
backgrounder has almost vanished at DOE. It was not named
as one of the three most prolific sources, but regulars
rated backgrounders seventh with respect to significance.
The lit DO news briefing was rated tenth in general
importance by regulars, seventh as far as preference, but
it is the second most often used source. While it is the
third most prolific source, it was ranked only seventh with
respect to significance of information.
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Barriers Perceived by Mewsmen
In I960 the three greatest barriers encountered by
military correspondents in reporting Defense affairs weret
"unfreedom of information*" "lack of time* • and "enormity
and complexity of military affairs.'*
The regulars in 1970 said their worse obstacles
were "secrecy or overclassification* " and "complexity and
enormity of DOX>, " followed by "news management • " the first
two were cited as one of the three greatest barriers 21
times , while news management was included only 14 times.
Irregulars named "complexity" and news management*
followed by "reluctant attitude of BOD officials to cooper-
ate, meet* or talk with newsmen" and "secrecy. * Military
journal reporters cited "reluctant attitude" and "secrecy* *
then "deadlines or lack of time to delve deeply into
Defense issues."
Officials are more reluctant to cooperate with
irregulars and military journal correspondents because (a)
they are not exposed to the irregulars as often as to
regulars who can gain their confidence* while officials
have little way of knowing whether irregulars are trust-
worthy, and (b) senior Defense officials are very busy and
if they Riust. would rather devote time with a general news
reporter than a military journal correspondent.
Thus* regulars have an advantage by building a
reputation with officials* which increases access to Defense
sources. Regulars* who consider informal Pentagon contacts
at
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as their best sources, ranked "difficulty in cultivating
and maintaining productive news sources " as the fourth of
eight obstacles considered. While neither of the other
groups of newsmen even cited this as a barrier* Especially
irregulars have little problem in this area because they
siaply co not have the time to maintain informal contacts;
a hasard of all generalist reporters.
Regulars have less trouble with deadlines or lack
of tiase than either irregulars or journal reporters, because
they are relatively free to select the stories they want to
report* Sines most work right at the Pentagon, they are
able to concentrate on severel stories at once.
In general, the barriers in 1970 were considered by
military newsman to be more severe than in 1960 and today
there is more agreement on the three greatest obstacles
than a decade ago.
However, am in the case of news sources, barriers
affect the six types of nm/m outlets differently. Only
daily newspapermen and newspaper chain reporters agreed on
the order of the three worse barriers.
While there is little a correspondent can do about
the problem of legitimate military secrecy at the Pentagon,
newsmen said overclassification also is difficult to cope
with. Reporters believe there is no adequate defense
againet abuses of classification. They feel newsmen can
complain or expose abuses of the classification system if
they are aware of such infractions, but many of the
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regular* be 1leva tha only defense is to stay aggressive and
parsua avary source of news available. Yet* most of ths
tia«» it is hard for than to know just what is held back*
The Freedom of Information law was said to be of
littis assistance to tha newsgathsring process at COD.
Only a faw regulars stated they effectively usee the
"threat" of the law to gat information. Thus* while the
court process may be effective in the long run* reporters
find little value when reporting hard news.
Besides being an inherent harrier* legitimate
classification is annoying to military correspondents who
are never sure if they have the entire story; pertinent
facts siay be withheld to protect military or national
security.
Pentagon reporters suggested officials arbitrarily
classify Defense information (a) when it serves their
purpose* (b) if they are not sure what has been made public*
or (c) sitaply because it is easier to tell reporters* "sorry,
that's classified. * While the situation is somewhat better
under this administration* newsmen feel the tendency still
is to misuse secrecy claims to hide errors of judgment or
information unfavorable to DOB. The result is that military
correspondents must dig harder when gathering material;
always staying on the alert for unclassified information
held from them* and never sure if they have the most accur-
ate picture.
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Regulars recognise the need for secrecy* but
suggested aany key defense issues ero clouded because of
it* yet they would not advocate jeopardising lives or the
country •» security by making classified information avail-
able to the public.
Thus* secrecy and overclassifioation tend to be a
nuisance and make the naws^ ethering process more difficult
to reporters trying to con^rehend a complicated Defense
issue based only on "r#leasable" information.
Although not considered a major barrier* almost
three-quarters of the correspondents said they were not
adequately briefed to stay abreast of major Defense issues.
Almost all the regulars feel the daily lis 00 a.m.
briefing is one of the best contributions the Laird-Henkin
team has ms^a to the Pentagon press corps* yet reporters
said DQD has not fully exploited this channel of news and
this handicaps newsmen.
Most regulars attend the news briefing and applaud
the opportunity to meet a responsible Defense official on-
the-record, face-to-face* on a routine basis. But now the
briefing is thought to be more or less a "verbal handout"
that may even slow down the nawegathering process. Many
newsmen suggested since there normally is not a continuing
Defense story* officials may save material for the next
day's session Instead of releasing it as soon as available.
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moat often utilised source for regulars. However, there
are several areas reporters feel are very inadequately
briefed. The two major topics thought weakest are "weapons"
and "policy decisions.
"
The lack of such briefings is likely to hurt Defense
officials as well as reporters* since newsmen are forced to
turn to sources in other agencies to obtain the barest
amount of information to satisfy story requirements. With-
out adequate briefings the caliber and accuracy of military
reporting falters and the public is exposed to superficial
or incomplete coverage.
Even answers given by Jerry Friedheim (Deputy
MMD/9&) in response to reporters* questions generally are
not considered satisfactory. Regulars have the impx^m^ion
that friedheim is told not to openly respond to certain
areas * but rather is instructed to put out pre-arranged
responses* Perhaps if he were given greater authority to
use his own discretion when confronted by provocative
questioning* everyone would be better served.
Correspondents could better portray major military
issues to the public if Defense officials ware to rely more
on the integrity of regulars to put things in proper
perspective. Sow reporters are not exposed to senior mili-
tary officials* either because they are reluctant to
confront newsmen or because Defense is fearful of being
criticised for advancing a particular service's propaganda.
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While certain obstacle* that existed during the
Metfamara «ra have been eased, avan tha ablest correspondent
finds it difficult to cope with tha inherent secrecy
problem and tha natural tendency to overclassify solitary
information, rthile anothar of tha greatest barriers haa
always been tha enormity and cosplsxity of Defease affairs,
this too has bean magnified during tha sixties.
Thus tha new ©amber of tha Pentagon press corps
needs longer to gat his feat wet than did a correspondent
who began covering tha Defense beat in I960. Although the
best source of news at the Pentagon is the reporter's own
p^rmon^l contacts within the department, the newcomer soon
finds that cultivating such sources is a frustrating and
tine-consuming venture* This is because the military side
of POD is "hyper-cautious, * reluctant, and skeptical of the
"messenger* who brings bad tidings.
Assessment of defense Officials, Information
Organizations, Policies Arm Procedures
Military correspondents agree that the Defense
Department is a tight beat; almost all said it is tighter
than the congressional beat. They sea little difference
between State Department and the White House, although the
Pentagon is thought to be a tougher beat to cover than ail
three. However, correspondents did not thin* the Pentagon
is as tight as critics suggested during the sixties. Only
about half considered DOD aa the tightest beat in Washington,
J**, ?*• ft»ec *v»n" **• «









The press corps credits Defense Secret «ry Laird
with helping in this area, but lass than half the regulars
feel 130$ is mors "open** under this administration;
irregulars said it is about the same. Yet* reporters
generally agreed there has been an improvement. Laird was
frequently singled out am having made a sincere effort to
open up the Pentagon* but newsmen said his efforts have
only met with marginal success because he is faced with
officials who have been entrenched with a reluctance to
cooperate with the media; a hangovar from the Mcliasaara days.
Also* Laird and his Assistant Secretary for Public
Affairs Daniel Henkin— along with his deputies—*are said to
be making a respectable effort to increase Defense eredi"
bility and enhance the flow of military information.
Laird '8 long experience as a congressman is considered by
newsmen to be one of his greatest assets; as is Benkin's
more than two 6&cad&m as a military news correspondent
considered to be one of his major attributes.
Regulars said the credibility of Defense officials
is generally fairly good. They do not feel victimised by
lies or deception* but said it is more a question of omis-
sion than intentional lying. More than half the correspond-
ents believe officials are usually reliable or have
excellent credibility. Other newsmen suggest that half the
time they 6o not get all the facts. In general* regulars
viewed the credibility problem with respect to reliability
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of officials to give out all the pertinent details.
This further substantiates the need for reporters
to maintain their informal Pentagon sources to enable them
to fill in the voids left by official pronouncements.
Most correspondents said their access to Defense
officials generally is adequate. A greater complaint is it
takes too long to see officials, sven though reporters
acknowledged that senior officials are busy* this delay
handicaps newsmen; especially if operating on tight dead-
lines. Reporters feel that responses to inquiries also are
delayed by too much coordination up the line of authority*
and most frequently* once responses mem received they mre
"watered down 1* or completely useless. They further suggest
that unless a reporter asks exactly the right questions*
the tendency is not to offer information beyond the
boundary of what was asked. Thus* correspondents feel they
are more likely to get the type of information needed in a
shorter period of time if they can arrange an interview;
enabling them to benefit from an instant "give-and-take* *
rather than having to resubmit formal inquiries in writing.
Laird was also credited with increasing accessibil-
ity by instructing defense officials to grant more
interviews* However* once access is gained* reporters feel
they do not get any more information than before* nor are
they usually satisfied with the material received during
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interview with the information they really tried to get.
ftegulars said officials are sometimes reluctant to
grant interviews because of "ingrained cautiousness" r they
also cited "misunderstanding of media role and/or require*
ments* and "distrust of correspondents* " in that order.
Irregulars feel the primary causes arei "ingrained
cautiousness. * "shielding by ovarlyprotective subordinates 1
and "fear of reprisal. * Military journal reporters also
cited "fear of reprisal" and "ingrained cautiousness.
"
Thus regulars appear to recognise that many
officials simply are not well educated on the relationship
of the media and government. This is coupled with distrust
and cautiousness to form another barrier which reporters
must try to overcome with patience* perseverance* and
reliable reporting.
Irregulars and journal newsmen viewed the causes
from a slightly different angle. They suggest that
officials are cautious* yes* but also fearful of reprisal
iron their superiors. These Brnom newsmen do not agree with
regulars on the "misunderstanding" cause.
Irregulars* and to some sxtent journal corre-
spondents* do not have the exposure to officials or they
may be turned down esore often than the regulars* who sug-
gested if Defense officials had a better understanding of
the role of the press* they would not be as cautious or
distrustful.
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This feeling In 1970 reflects what newsmen also
consider tolw a skepticism and distrust which wero
instil led duiriiKj the years under Mcilaraara. An outgrowth of
this viewpoint is that siost regulars said officials are* in
fact* afraid of repercussions if they frankly and candidly
express opinions that differ from official BOD policy.
Thus* reporters view officials as honorable men who
are also human beings. As such* they normally will try to
give factual information; but they also &ay tend to hold
back other details that may prove embarrassing. Corre-
spondents recognise this and generally have the sources to
ferret out the missing pieces to the puasla. At a lower
level of Defense officialdom* reporters feel officials are
more apt to be told what to answer or to respond only to
what is asked and nothing raor^.
Military officials are harder to get to* yet most
regulars suggested that military officers have more of the
kind of information they desire; but the military sen is
considered to be u«or© cautious and reluctant to talk on-
the-record than his civilian counterparts in OSb.
while Laird has made his people in USB more avail-
able* reporters said these officials tend to give more of
the political viewpoint. Correspondents should be exposed
to both the military mind as well as the political-military
mind when reporting ma^or defense issues. Instead they














military assessment off-the-record. usually fjrtxa their
informal sources.
However* it is not likely that this procedure will
change. The major ciowback. to this approach is that much
of the information needed to round out a story cannot be
attributed to the correspondents* source In the services.
Chances are that even if solitary men were given license to
speak mora to the pertinent issues* their responses would
not be as meaningful cn-the*~rccoro . Tha inherent reluctance
of the military and the legacy of JSCHamara's iron grip on
defense news is too deeply woven through the services.
Information s^sBlMii—i ffvelqatad
In I960* information organisations were rated by
Pentagon correspondents as one of the three top sources
with respect to significance of information. At that time
no distinction was made between OASD(Fft) and military
service information offices* In 1970, reporters did not
view Defense public affairs organisations with the sane
high regard.
OA6D(j?A) was ranked ninth as a "preferred** source*
seventh in actual "utilisation* * and ninth with regard to
"quantity" of information. It was not even named as one of
the top three with respect to significance of information.
Military information offices w©re rated the twelfth most
•preferred" source* tenth in "utilisation." and twelfth as
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This substantiates correspondents' opinions that
the services have been reduced in importance because of the
narrowing and nirt^ of the Defense information news
channel during the sixties.
ttawsmen further sugyest&C chat as the service public
affairs offices were weakened, their responsibility was
taken away and they degenerated into a rather insignificant
news source by 1970. Reporters again credited Mctfamara's
firm control with naarly stiffling the services* ability to
independently communicate with correspondents.
The result is that at the turn of the decade, the
combination of the military's natural conservative nature*
the unfavorable public reaction to the Vietnam conflict,
end the tendency on the part of 06P to keep the services in
the background, have all made gathering meaningful informa-
tion from military officials extremely difficult. This
especially is detrimental to many reporters who feel
military officers ar«s nore knowledgeable in their field
than civilian officials.
However, regui*ars continue to try an& get material
directly from the services. For instance, when a flap
occurs concerning one of the military services, about half
the regulars first 90 to the service concerned to get
initial information, while only one-quarter 90 to OMD(P*J.
This does not necessarily mean they get the information
desired. Often the services are told that GA8G(PA) will

















> ' .' J.I L
A SvrfW
nr.k-.' ion •••& •AnT
i>ac» iA-f^ ^loj mm M^i>¥T« «rtt mm&Q •&•«*•%
360
handle ail news matters relevant to a topic.
Kewsmea farther suggested that the military rarely
responds to formal inquiries directly to newsman unless it
ia very insignificant. Rather they will take a reporter',
question and coordinate with 0ASD<PA) in providing the
•nawer thrush the use office. Thia ia .a*n aa a further
delay.
Regulars think 0ASD(*J\) •» cjreateat aaaeta are*
being a <yiver of information* i„ response to correspond-
ents' requests, 'just oeing there." and acting as a
"liaison" between newsisen and the news. More than half
feel the centralized news flow hinders their ability to
report. whil« only one-fifth said it helps.
Yet. if the services were given back the authority
to release what they want, when they want and to whom they
want, regulars offered three viewpoints. The larger number
of responses were that it would work to the advantage of
newsmen. Another view is that it woul^ be bad and probably
turn into a public relations or propaganda war between the
services. A thira opinion was it would not work under any
circumstances because the military is too cautious and out
of practice in dealing directly with the media. Several
reporters suggested the services have become complacent by
having 0Mt>(m take over all responsibility for releasing














:, more than two-third* of the regular* are
not satisfied with Defense news policies and procedure*.
The print media representatives feel military information
and Defense officials are not forthcoming enough. Mso,
reporters said they are not exposed to military (uniformed)
experts? thus they can not benefit from years of experience
in special spheres of expertise. Instead they get on-the-
record comments by senior civilian official* who get a
great deal of their basic information fro© the services but
nodify it to suit the "official** position. Therefore,
depth military rationale is often substituted for words
tailored toward the benefit of congressional committees*
Radio and television correspondents said, in
general, OASD(PA) is print-oriented and procedures set up to
set their special needs are unsatisfactory* They suggest
there is a basic lack of understanding of electronic media
requirements* Apparently enough eisphasis has not been
placed on the impact and importance of both television and
radio. These reporters h&vm gotten the impression that
OAS£(F£) officials view them as second-class eitisens in
the Pentagon press corps* * specific complaint is that the
audio-visual division that functions as the 0^8D(i*A) liaison
with electronic media generally acts as another clog in the
bureaucratic structure or is a shield for X>efense rather
than working toward facilitating aewsgathering for electronic
media*
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Half the regulars take issue with the routine
perforaance of the directorate for defense Information
(Dfcl)
.
The chief concern i» that ODI slows down the news-
gathering process* Reporters cited the channeling of
responses to inquiries into oblivion as the prim* example.
The result is if they are not in a hurry and if the
information sought is strictly routine, regulars will
voluntarily utilise DDI. But there are times when newsmen
feel the only way to get an official position is the formal
written query, which invariably becomes the victim of the
"power of negative authority.** That is, a great many
Defense officials have the power to delete things from a
proposed response, but few have the authority to approve
the final version. As is the case with interview requests,
if a rather important question is asked through this
channel and it is delayed more than a day or two, the
information loses its value or becomes old news.
In general, public affairs officers in the Pentagon
are seen as not doing all they can to assist military
correspondents. The majority of the press corps suggested
that FAOs do not exert themselves; instead, most simply do
what satisfies minimum requirements, ftany officials will
not deal directly with newsmen* thus reporters believe that
PAOs should try to delve into a topic and provide corre-
spondents with rich meaningful information. This, they
said, is now not done.
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The more experienced military reporters suggest
that the emphasis during th* sixties has been for VfiO* not
to rock the boat, not to offer information unless mmkmd for
specifically, and not to use individual initiative.
Importers feel that during the last decade military service
information officers were discouraged from functioning as a
"substitute newsman" when gathering information. Rather
than critically questioning bland responses before giving
them to reporters. ?AOs in 1970 were more likely to "pass
along- whatever answer was suggested by the cognisant
military official. Thus, reporters said the majority of
responses were sterile, superficial, misleading, or simply
•whitewash. •
The legacy of McSamara-Sylvester Philosophy
The Mctfamara approach was to push the centralisa-
tion of defense news at the seat of government to the
furthest possible degree. This took hold early in the
1960s, gained momentum during the middle of the decade, and
finally snowballed over the last remnants of the "golden
era" of the late forties and 1950s.
It appears that even the noblest efforts by the
ablest officials cannot overcome the atmosphere of the
sixties which fostered constraint, reluctance, distrust,
and doubt through all the echelons of the Pentagon.
After fccsa&ora and Sylvester took their leave,
attests were made to erase many restrictions which were
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placed both on officials and the press corps. However.
apparently it was too late to rscoup the freer system
exhibited before McMamara entered tha nswsgathering scans.
While tight control existed by 1960. its full
impact waa not fully realised until after tha public affairs
apparatus was refined and tightened. As in any bureaucracy,
it is not a simple task to undo policies smi& procedures ones
they Ml woven into tha bureaucratic fiber.
Tha impact in 1970 is felt by reporters in many
areas of tha Pentagon* Sources are tighter. Barriers are
greater. As military officials became reluctant to riek
thair careers Just to get their views known, informal
contact between military officers and newsmen became more
frequent aad more important.
The interview monitoring system was instilled and
officially abolished, but it still exists unofficially.
Uniformed officials are still said to be hamstrung by
McNamara's "ona-voica" philosophy exhibited throughout the
last decade, His attempts to muzzle the military had their
affect, newsman must cope with still another predicament i
overreaction by military officers who muzzle themselves out
of the news channels or contacts with the media that they
are permitted under the present public affairs structure at
COD.
Paid military service information organisations have








although their potential is still appreciated by corre-
spondents. Veteran regulars feel they have seen the last
of the old stereotype Array general or fciavy admiral Who
would get up and say what he thinks* even if it differs
with the position publicly taken by the Defense Secretary.
The) HflffUtQsag J&juu&um
While the interview, as a source, rates highly with
all newsmen, it is also the subject of great irritation to
military correspondents. Although officially rescinded in
1967, the interview isonitoring directive has left its mark.
Correspondents still bear the brunt of its intent? the
monitor is still a part of the formal interview at the
Fentagon.
The majority of correspondents said store than three-
quarters of the interviews they conduct usually have
monitors present. The general opinion is that the monitor
is detrimental to the verbal exchange between official and
newsman, but one-quarter of the reporters suggested it
makes little difference if the monitor does not overstep
his boundary &n& interfere or cause distraction by making
notes*
Most often, newsmen feel the "third party* is
demeaning to the official and the reporter and immediately
puts the official on the defensive since the monitor's
presence gives the impression that the correspondent's own
credibility is in doubt. Reporters believe officials are
b*>*K LS* t
*i .*.*>-. iff.? &a *»{f« \*» *"*» V **&
•fit • «*3fc i^ifl#l| •AS t,
•-•
,u :. . - • -„,,.-. -.- •••;.
«y»« «2Jk Jif-.t e*ff j i/6 $*. son volvzetol erf* *fdtl
{lens) •*!$ 5o 3 s t- i 'sesJLjnH
•flOffl Ml**
twmtt ^utaco v**"*^ &*'£
uoiir.oc ti ;r>ii«£ aifT .Ja***!*? o*).
»*tta*f a£R*4»tt9> iicfuev a#1:; «9a*all?aJi el
rna •>'»»?$, tft^ioqa? e, -up"—o #94 »n*sia*#Du
••
« aq ftviifJ" ntii lm*& nauajwatfi %a*iio *ao»M.
vx-zliXbomnd ! ;<.3i».f; ad* inn tn *»JkMo *ril cj ,
ano a • inaftnogtaiia* art* fAS r»aiaaa-»«aai arf* ***ip *r/aea*iq
Mi
constrained, innibitad, and reluctant to talk when a
monitor is present.
It would seem if $e£«n»a officials feel the need to
continue the monitoring system, it would be advantageous to
all parties concerned if prospective monitors were given
clearer objectives.
Reporters consider the backgrounder to be extremely
valuable if legitimately used to explain, clarify, or
prevent distortion* Large group background sessions are
said to be inadequate, but individual backgrounders or
those held fOr only a few mmmmm are invaluable; again, if
used other than as a tool of OS*> officials.
Most military correspondents feel fcctfasiara abused
this channel of news dissemination. Be often drew heavy
criticism for the indiscriminate use of his Thursday after-
noon background sessions for Pentagon reporters. Both
Secretary Laird and ASD<p*) Henkin suggest that less back-
grounding with more Defense information kept on-the-record
will enhance Defense credibility.
tthils many regulars disliked the fecftamara approach
(large formal group sessions), they said it was better than
no backgrounding at all. These newsmen do not agree with
Laird's decision to eliminate Defense backgrounders.
Several reporters believe he has overreacted mx^L went to
extremes because of the bad experience McVamara had during
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the sixties.
Most experienced report,*-, do not feel victi«ised
by bacxgrounder.
.f ^ kind . ^^ thay can^ ^
•elf-waking Utaill and «m what information they went.
-hen they want. ««„„. torjnal Hrt„rWHi ^ confer.
ence, generally dictate what will bo reported and whan.
Sot all nam., agtw that Laird- a approach hinders
tha newsgatharing procesa. Specifically, tha praa. corp.
ia divided on thi. issue. About tha saae «*« of
reporter, aaid hi, ^u^ ot le„ fQrmal baekgroun<Jing ^
batter, aa thoaa who aaid it wa« worse. Law than one_
fifth stated it had no affect.
But tha general viewpoint is that even in the MM
open at-osphere. not aii pertinent infonaation can. or
should, be on-the-record. Thus they miss out on much of
the material they consider would be beneficial both to
MW-»en and official.. A.
. r„uit. reporting suffers, and
therefore the public suffers, for not getting ,u the
pertinent details.
With respect to the affect on DQD credibility, just
*ore than half the correspondents agree that credibility
increases with koxb information put on-the-record
. *bout
one-third
.aid this ia not the case, the others stated it
makes no difference.
Therefore, this suggests regulars generally welcome
the Laird approach to keep «»re information on-the-record.
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while they disagree with total abandonment of back-
grounders. Xn their efforts to Increase the credibility of
tOt> t Defense policymakers may have added a "plus" to news-
gathering, out in the process took away a valuable channel
icr legitimate briefings.
Regulars recognise and appreciate the intent of
Laird *s position* They acknowledge this has increased their
ability to report Defense news* but suggest the news-*
gathering process could be further enhanced if backgrounders
were used discriminatory under certain situations when
officials cannot or will not 90 on~record. If senior
officials were to relax their ban on this source, but
maintain the basic doctrine of putting and keeping most
information in the open, correspondents eould better inter*
pret military affairs.
Affect of MMggUag
Critics of Pentagon information procedures charged
that "muscling" the military voice during the sixties all
but eliminated debate on key issues before ma}or decisions
were made*
Two-thirds of the 1970 corps of regulars agree that
muscling has to some extent left a climate that is not
condusiv* for such debate. Regulars who do not feel
McHamara's attests to muscle th* military were effective
suggested senior military officials do express their views





before congressional committals on Capitol Kill. Others
said this channel is completely inadequate. Most regulars
agree military leadars began to speak out asors before
congress after McNamara * s departure, but added military
officers are still reluctant to disagree with the Defense
Secretary. Although reporters admit such information does
cone from such ttsstiraony, they maintain the ssost weaning ful
views do not reach the media until months after the closed
hearings* when sanitized transcripts are releasee, normally
after decisions were made and key issues ere buried.
The majority of regulars feel there should be
active debate before major decisions are made and say the
public is entitled to know how tl^e military views tcey
issues. But once a decision is made* reporters suggest
generally the military should abide by it. Now military
officials try to get their views across, but—to newsmen-
success is only marginal. However, correspondents do not
see the value of such debate on all minor Defense issues.
Overall, the press corps suggested there is
constant constraint on all military services not to get
involved in public debate. Regulars believe military mmn
have overreacted, for the most part, newsmen credit this
to OSD*s efforts during the sixties to intimidate military
officials who were willing to openly express their own
opinions.
Thus, muzzling has had its affect on the ability of
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correspondents to cover the *entagon, although the effect
was not as critical mm was suggested by the general media.
Whil« the greater number of regular* believe they do not
get the full flavor of all aide* of mm issue, they atill
overcome part of thia obstacle by turning toward their
informal contact* in POD. Even though the military wa.
victimised by mumUng which ***** them from on-the-record
exposure, many are willing to participate behind the
relative safety of non-attributable sessions with particular
regulars they consider trustworthy. But, as previously
noted, several experienced military correspondents indi-
cated the tendency in 1970 of some of their best informal
sources is to give less information, even though they
respect the integrity of the reporter involved.
Tkm Military Correspondents
During thus last 10 years, the Pentagon press corps
has increased in sise fro© 31 news outlets representing 10
types of media with 44 correspondents in 1960 to 51 outlets
and 57 newsmen in 1970.
In June 1970, the corps of military news reporters
included 29 regulars, 15 irregulars, nine military journal
correspondents, three foreign media representatives, and
one assigned to cover for a government outlet (USIA).
*he hard corps of specialist reporters (regulars)
at the Pentagon form an experienced group of well-educated
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professionals who devote their time to covering ths> raost
difficult best in Washington.
Regulars must be experts in many fields related to
Defense affairs. They must be familiar with complicated
weapons systems axt& associated hardware* from nuclear sub-
marine capabilities &ry6 the potential effectiveness of a
new Air Force bobber, to an Army tank design or the latest
Marine Corps concept in amphibious assault. Regulars must
have a working knowledge of intricate budgeting procedures
in order to report on a department which maintains assets
in excess of 200 billion dollars and operates a budget
exceeding 70 billion dollars.
In addition, they cannot do their job effectively
unless they become familiar with the military's legal
system, strategic planning, overseas commitments, the close
relationship between BOD w& State Department, and manpower
or hardware deficits. Thus, the regulars spend much of
their time keeping abreast of ail the associated subtleties
inherent to the beat. To become conversant with only a few
of these topics takes months of independent study and
questioning j to gain depth or become expert in specific
fields takes not only ninths, but years* of "layering on"
information from numerous sources for use when any occasion
arises.
With time and personal effort, regulars gain in
proficiency and talk the language of Defense officials, in
.•exile














cases they know more about total ramifications of
certain decision* on national security than many of thfe
officials in the middle and: upper echelons who, by nature
of their jobs, axe specialists in their own areas of
Defense* Regulars are, in effect* "generaliats within" the
specialised reporting field of milit ax? affairs.
This works to the advantage of the American public,
which is exposed to meaningful interpretation of complicated
Defense issues* It is also advantageous to IX&> officials
who are themselves specialists trying to get complex
information to the public, with their background knowledge,
regulars are able to grasp the intricacies of military
issues* hardware, and policies; then relate them in tersas
understandable to their news outlet's audiences*
When a story breaks, they are there to put it into
proper perspective* Oeneralists or nongranular* snay simply
be able to a&K broad basic questions and report super-
ficially instead of making the pieces of the Pentagon maze
come together* Sen-regulars *report on** the Pentagon,
usually when a news peg necessitates it*
Regulars continuously "cover" all aspects of
military affairs and weave stories into the basic pattern
of Defense and national security, non-regulars may go to
the Pentagon to gather material for one particular story
without fully comprehending its relation to the broader
picture*
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*lso, since non-ragulers g«n«rally do not rely on
personally cultivated informal defense sources, they may be
forced to aattla for official verbal handouts or news
releases* which ia bound to result in more superficial
reporting with lass understanding of long-range implica-
tions. This* however* is not necessarily a flaw in
individual correspondents t rather a consequence of spreading
generalist reporters too thin in Washington.
Regulars are better equipped to probe. For
instance* while they are probing into the many facets of a
multi-billion dollar contract award* non-regulars may be
asking what the new hardware system is all about or how it
is expected to perform. Something has to be sacrificed in
the translation from BCD to the public through the
generalist.
&&a\a«ss* aaciwraurela
The average age of regulars in June 1970 was 42.
They are better educated than the Pentagon correspondents
of a decade ago; 39.2 per cent are college graduates*
compared to 75 per cent in I960. Six hold master's degrees
and one had some postgraduate study. Of the 31 degrees
received by regulars* only 12 were in the field of journal-
ism; others ranged frorc history and political science to
international relations and economics.
Regulars have been in the field of journalism an
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an average of seven years. Eleven have been reporting in
Washington 10 or mora years (five for 20 or ssore years).
About one-third hmv* been covering the Pentagon alnee 1961.
And regal ars have been with their current news outlet on an
average of seven years* several have changed outlets but
continued to cover the military beat.
Thus the public is represented by seasoned
Washington journalists with diversified educational
expertise* Regulars have the tools of knowledge and report"
lag skills required to cope with the complexities and
barriers confronting tbeia while gathering Defense news.
Almost all regulars are at the Pentagon daily.
Twenty-two regulars report exclusively on military affairs*
eonpared to only 16 in i960. The other six correspondents
cover other beats* but little time is spent away from DG£>*
A sore accurate gauge of the degree of specialisation
centered around the Pentagon is that only two regulars
devote less than 75 per cent of their working tioa to
Defense reporting. Including military journal correspond-
ents* this means 32 newsmen generally specialise in military
affairs.
Regulars frequent other Washington beats in order
to gather material for & story. They consider Congress a
















On* of the advantage* of the regular i» that ha ia
wall equipped to handle depth interpretation. About half
•aid 50 per cant of their military atoriea generated during
the past year were the direct result of interpretative
reporting; five said atore than 75 per cent* and only eight
indicated leaa than 25 per cent.
Regulars appear to operate under few restriction*
fro» their superiors. Most agree that other correspondents
are given license to be objective in the selection of
stories and free to elect how a story will be played. Hone
said editorial policy of their news outlet actually
dictated how and what they report.
Thus the increase in ntaabars of outlets and corre-
spondents (specifically regulars) during the last decade
indicates that the Pentagon has not been cosr^lstely ignored
by the saedia &a some critics suggested.
Regulars have time to delve into Defense issues and
interpret confusing solitary matters without fear of getting
bogged down by petty assignments fros* their bureaus. Thus*
regulars can afford to exercise their expert judgment when
assessing items of major importance to be reported.
naattsiAns ffirejr ffrara
Regulars feel the specialist reporter is even «or»
essential at the Pentagon than other Washington beats.
They suggest generalists often sdss the meaning of key
issues and *x<% in over their heads on raost complicated
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decisions or setions.
Most regulars recognise a danger inherent to the
specialist is knowing too &uch and expecting the public to
coegprehend as wall* However* regulars consciously guard
against this kind of "over-kill* reporting.
More than two-thirds believe the caliber of other
regulars compares favorably or is about the same as the
rest of the Washington press corps. Hone of the irr^ulars
suggested the caliber is worse; one even said better.
Two-thirds of the regulars are generally satisfied
with the routine performance of other Pentagon newsmen.
Several of those dissatisfied feel too much pressure is
exerted on reporters to see what they can expose.
Sven though they are not always pleased with their
peers' performance, regulars are quick to take issue with
the charge of being a "kept press.** They suggest there is
no saore "lap-dogging" at DOD than on any other beat in
Washington. Although about half the regulars said other
reporters can and should be raore aggressive in their
reporting.
This study shows that regulars ar& far from being
"lap-dogs 1* or pawns of Defense officials. These newsiaen
are quick to criticise Pentagon information policies <m&
procedures or unjust practices relevant to the newsgathering
process, ret, they praise those who make sincere efforts
to increase the flow of news.
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The tern* "kept press* suggest* the corps of
regulars is a unified group which functions together* This
study indicates this is not true* They are individuals
representing diverse interests based on their news outlets*
audiences. Thus* their evaluation of sources and barriers
in the newsyethering process differ with their requirements.
Only shout one-third agree Pentagon correspondents should
organise formally to advance their interests. The majority
of regulars do not feel the diversified interests of
military correspondents are compatible enough to make an
organisation such as the State department Correspondents*
Association effective*
Regulars are also very coa$>etitive. But they do
agree that newsgathering at the Pentagon hes become
increasingly difficult during the last decade, & "kept
press" would not likely express the degree of dissatisfac-
tion illustrated throughout this study in so many areas
related to Defense news policies. With backgrounders cut
back and intentional leaks a rarity, there is little basis
for asserting regulars are puppets of the military
establishment, especially since they consider their best
sources as being their own informal contacts, vice the
senior Q&D officials who are in the best position to "keep"
the press.
061> officials admit that stories very critical of
Defense are generated by the regulars, not just by the
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general media in Washington, mile the relationship
between officials and regulars is cordial, they are far
froa bedfellow*.
Experienced regulars said it is not cowmen for
officials to ask correspondents to withhold or kill a story
in their possession. Many reporters admit such requests
have been made but laost added this happened onc«a or twice
and rarely more than a few times over a period of years.
When made, most requests were considered legitimate and
based on security or delicate matters involving national
security*
Hany regulars report stories which criticise
various Pentagon actions, yet they feel if the criticism is
accurate and honest, chances are it will not result in
discrimination against the newsman. Only if a story proves
distorted, unfair, or false, will the reporter's own
credibility be tarnished; making his sources reluctant to
confide in him in the future. Thus regulars* criticisms
are usually founded on truth*
Regulars also perform the function of a news
"conveyer" between defense and the public. Some critics
miss this significance when charging regulars with being
publicists for Pentagon officials. The Pentagon corre-
spondent reports on solitary affairs, just as the State
Department reporter reports on diplomatic affairs. Many


















characteristic of all Washington regulars— a major part of
their function and duty is to objectively present to the
public, positions taken by, and rational* of, officials on
their beat.
Jn all, regular* at the Pentagon work harder than
most any other group of Washington newsmen in order to
report military news* ymt they are criticised hy some
official* for reporting unfavorable news, by the general
media for being a "kept press* and by the anti-military
segment of the public for being associated with the Defense
Department*
Regulars Support soh» im^
^y'MritTfflti
In certain areas, criticisms made against Defense
information policies were substantiated by this study,
Reporters agree the Pentagon is probably the most difficult
beat to cover, rh&y feel McHamara did misuse the public
affairs apparatus and consider many of his efforts to
stifle the free flow of news still remain a part of the
newsgatheriifcj process in 1970, despite the efforts of
Defense Secretary Laird and ASD(*A) Henkin to open up the
Pentagon, Hews sources are tight, barriers are more severe
than 10 years ago, and the military officials have turned
within—permitting themselves little on-the-record exposure.
Regulars also agree that the tendency at BOB is to over-
classify information.
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However, several of the criticisms made during the
sixties ar* not endorsed by the regulars, As previously
noted* the raost outstanding discrepancy is that military
correspondents do not adhere to the myth that Defense
officials intentionally lie to the press or deceive the
public.
Data gathered from regulars suggest that critics
have over-emphasised the impact of news management at the
Pentagon. Although it ranks third as & barrier* only 5©
par cent of the regulars cit*?d it as one of th<* three major
obstacles, con^ared to 75 per cent who feel "secrecy** or
DOD*s HcoiEplexity* sare the greatest barriers. Most feel it
is more of a fact of life inherent to all government as
well as the media. Only one-third said managing the news
is a constant interference when gathering and reporting
military news. Thus nowa management is far from being the
controversial topic some critics suggest.
Another significant area is the a ffact of
Mcfetanara v s tussling of the isilitary. Critics advanced the
view that because of tauczlinc** Pentagon reporters are forced
to lean snore heavily on the official party lino* since they
can no longer get the views of military officials who
refuse to risk their careers by speaking out against posi-
tions taken by the Defense Secretary. While not the best
method of furthering public participation on key issues.
the regulars feel they still can rely on their own informal
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Pentagon contacts in the military servicea to keep 0S£
officials honest.
Regulars »ay consider their beat t ac c*f£icult
in Washington because of its vastn&sa, complexity, and
secrecy; but they are far fr©*» unanimous in suggesting it
is the "tightest* beat in town, as many critics advocated
throughout thv l:st decade*
Finally, as previously noted, this study shows that
there is little evidence to substantiate the charge that
the corps »1 x* at the Pentagon is a "kept press.*
JJaHMoathexiatpr at *H» g*n»^jan .
gflgna ftragfls.fila
It is evident that key QSO officials most directly
involves4 with setting Defense news policy and maintaining a
continuous flow of news have done much to ease the burden
on correspondents responsible for collecting and reporting
military news. Yet the newsgathering process can always be
refined and improved.
Based on data drawn from this study, the following
proposals would benefit both officials and newsmen—plus,
in the long run. the public—and assist in overcoming many
difficulties cited by correspondents.
OSD officials are encouraged to continue their
efforts toward reversing the trend of the sixties that made
military and civilian personnel reluctant and distrustful
in their dealings with the media, ft constructive step in
io
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this direction would be to increase the responsibilities of
service information organisations while maintaining overall
authority for news dissemination.
If services were given a freer hand in working
directly with Pentagon correspondents, much of the delay now
encountered in gaining access to officials and gettiny
responses to inquiries would be cut back. However, t-
such an arrangement can succeed, the military service
public affairs offices and information officers would have
to prove they are capable of aggressively pursuing the
function objectively* It would take the direct support of
service secretaries and military chiefs to overcome (a) the
tendency of military officials to conservatively hold back
information they feel reporters do not really need to know
(even if unclassified) and (to) the lack of faith in public
affairs* a basic distrust or misunderstanding of the media,
and the inherent cautiousness of military men to open up
with correspondents on-the-record.
Military service JPAOs would have to be encouraged
to consider themselves "newsmen in uniform* (asking provoca-
tive questions, digging into a subject Mt& doing their home-
work to stay up on current issues, not taking a negative
reply or sis^le *that»a classified 1* response when 3?aOs know
it is not true) in order to effectively provide correspond-
ents with meaningful information, without such an approach,
PAGs would probably become a party to "selective release
*
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or a -nora damaging news management than exists today,
OAftD(PA) would be justified in granting more
responsibility only if PAOs clearly saw their mission as
one of increasing the news flow instead of stemming it by
protecting their own service or military officials. *AOs
must indeed satisfy the requirements of two masters r the
newsmen and the legitimate need and duty of their superiors
to clarify and explain matters relating to their service.
Smphasis should be on the newsmen*
Another proposal involves the monitoring of inter*
views. Xt is appreciated that often Defense officials
specifically request that a ronitor be present, even though
it is no longer officially required. Since it is apparent
the monitor will remain part of the newsgsthering process*
it a.a suggested that guidelines be established for the
conduct »x*6 function of the monitor*
Based on reporters* experiences* this system would
not be nearly as objectionable if the monitor remained an
unobtrusive party to th<* interview. He should not Interject
unless absolutely necessary and only if He speaks frost
authority? nor should he attempt to answer questions for
the official unless asked for guidance* A monitor should
not distract from the interview by feverishly taking notes
on everything said* Xt should be the responsibility of the
monitor to discuss with the official the ground rules of
the interviaw and clarify same with the reporter before the
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interview b^ina. And finally, new officials should
i*»ediately be inforased that the presence of s taonitor does
not reflect the credibility of the interviewer.
Reporters feel they are inadequately briefed on
defense issues, thus hindering their ability to accurately
portray military actions. In this regard, the mechanic,
•re there and most regulars attend the daily 12*00 a.su
news briefing. Yet. this excellent channel is not exploited
to its fullest potential. More routine briefings by
experts (military or civilian) appear to be in order;
especially involving weapons systems and policy decisions.
While correspondents praise Jerry Friedhei^s
handling of the briefing, he is not given enough authority
to ineaediately respond on many issues. If newsmen do not
get answers from the briefer, officials hurt themselves
because reporters are forced to turn to other sources which
*ay not have as current or reliable information.
The result is that often Sefense rationale is
weakly presented, while critics feed newsmen information
aW< at knocking down the military's case. This result is
further evidenced by the lack of
-no-topic* new. conferences
conducted by the Defense Secretary or military service
chiefs. Such wide-open on-the-record sessions would better
equip regulars t© adequately report controversial issues
that tend to confuse the public.
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position on backgrounders* Certain facta can n«v#r bo
expressed on-the-record. While regular* feel Secretary
Laird's policy of only talking for attribution is a vast
improvement which increases their ability to cover the
Pentagon, they also suggest that often reporters lack a
perspective possible only from legitimate backgrounding.
It follows that officials should take reporters into their
confidence.
This study shows that regulars explore numerous
sources in and out of the Pentagon, on and off-the-record,
while attempting to report as complete a picture as pos-
sible. However, the greatest sin committed by Defense
officials, in the eyes of the press, is one of intentional
omission, followed hy overolsssifieation. Thus, unless
officials confide more in the regulars—perhaps explaining
planned omission if done for a legitimate purpose—there
will continue to be a credibility problem* not one involving
lies, but rather reliability in presenting all pertinent
facts*
Pertaining to another area, reporters suggest that
by releasing major announcements very late in the day or on
Friday afternoons after 4t00 o* clock, officials do not
necessarily come out ahead—if their intent is to bury a
story, More likely such timing only manifests sloppy or
superficial reporting, which puts even very unfavorable
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error and previous experiences as described above were
unintentional * COD should place greater importance on when
key releases will be made*
The military correspondents are not without fault.
The study indicates even reporters within the corps of
regulars do not feel their peers are as aggressive as they
can or should be. Perhaps problems such as the lack of
adequate briefings and wide-open a«m» conferences would be
eased if the correspondents themselves m&&& their feelings
known and pushed harder to get what they believe would
enhance the aewsgathering process*
Also* while reporters must continue to be skeptical
and critically examine all facets of Defense information
policies and procedures* they should not lose sight of the
fact that often even the most reliable officials responsible
for disseminating the news initially receive erroneous
information* especially when releasing material on a flap
that occurs halfway around the world* evidenced by inci-
dents during the sixties* when officials realise an error
in fact was made* it was quickly rectified. It is better
to get Information thought to be accurate out immediately
than create further havoc by withholding information for
hours or days until e^mx^ bit of material is verified and
double-checked
.
Finally* military correspondents are cautioned




•words* of key official*. There way fee pressure exerted to
play one personality against another in Washington* but
this would likely push the real Defense issue in the back-
ground. This is not as yet a major deficit to the Pentagon
reporter* but enough newsmen noted this as a tendency to
cause concern for the public's benefit. They are entitled
to know the facts ami implications of major issues* not
given lead stories pitting remarks made by the Secretary of
State against remarks made by the Defense Secretary.
°* ^ so y»^ $o
*•









(Q)—question,air* mailed and returned by correspondent
(S)
—
questionnaire sent* bat not returned
( *) ^-questionnaire mailed and latter received from
correspondent* but did not participate in study
Mkoan ^^£-W
Sews Media Outlets ana Correspondents
,i *m *»m ' ——
.









































(Q) Willlaa K. Wyant
(Q) Robert L. Keatley5 )
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Aaaociated Hm (*P) Cl> j^^ Soften
(I) Robert Bobkin*
United *resa International (UPI) (I) Steve aarwood
(X) Warren L. Ifelaon7
liggfrgml^tfe (I)
Reutera (S ) juiph Harris8
*8WS*»AI»£R CHAINS (5)
«•»«!£* (3)
Copley Neva Service (I) x,# nagar Frina
Fairchild Publication* (I) Heather David (Mra.JScrippa-Howard tfetfapaper Alliance (I) Michael V. Miller
Knight Wevspepera (q) ji^ i^eCartney
Texa* Papere (8) Sarah McClendon (Mre.)
FEATURE S»B>XCM:£ (1)
Bewapaper Snterpriae Aaaociation (Q) Ray Crowley10WMI (colunnist)
II^WWWWWiH ir'riiiiiliiMawiWilWWa^igWMWhM^ ii^Mi^.
8EK* K^GAaiKES (3)
BwtffiU La<CS \ 3#
(I) Lloyd Norman
** (I) John Mul liken
U.S. fiiewa and World Report (I) Bonner ©ay
nauWwm-mni m i im i llWBIWIlW
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American Broadcasting Cor^any (ABC) U>Colus^ia Broadcasting Syste* (CBS) <i>HStftCNHISOia tn\













Bureau of national Affairs
Publications (B£A)













(S) James IngramW Bill Hickman
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Sows Outlet Media Type Correspondents
fORElGK m&l*. (3)
Agence France Press* (Q) Louis de Roche
Deutsche Press Agentur (German) (Q) Hans Hoofer
Springer Foreign Mews Service
(«sm«tt) (*) Kurt Leiesler20
goverkheht outlets (2)
United States Information 5 .
Agency (USIA) John Uhler*1
Voice of America (VD&) Central Desk
eeMMMweeei
TOTALS 10 types of isedia? 51 separate news outlets? and 5?
correspondents*
THIS STUDY TOTAL FKKSS COIUNI
Correspondents (n»40) (JS*53)
<m w»ww «iiwh *>mm*mp« -m*mm<mm
(Both "n* and ***** exclude
foreign mv& government outlets)
Regulars 23 29
Irregulars 6 15
Military Journals 6 9
Total 40 S3
Total excluding
military journals . . • . 34 44
Total including general a
news laedia only » ... 31 35
k,Excludes t Business and Special Interest Publica-
tions, and Military Journals.
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FOOTNOTES TO APPENDIX A
Ashworth was out of town during the two-week
interview period tn June 1970, However, the night before
the author's departure fro© D. C, he was reached by phone*
and interviewed for a half hour. Areas not covered were
included in saail questionnaire returned in December 1970.
Sell no longer covers POD. Returned to L. A.
bureau. As of September 1970, Warren Rogers was represent-
ing the &• £•
3%a& only }»m^n assigned to the Pentagon beat a few
weeks when interviewed. Be was only asked to respond to
questions he felt knowledgeable on. However, with four
years as a Washington correspondent—having covered Labor
Department for £££ before Pentagon* lsrvine's responses were
very useful.
Ho longer covers DOD* but is still with Washington
bureau of the £pj& as of October 1970. OASD(PA) listed
(Sept. 1970) two correspondents from the newspapers Mike
Getler and George Wilson. Wilson* although not officially
listed on the DOD list of military news correspondents in
June* has reported on military affairs for several years.
He was also asked to participate* but h© wrote the author
he would rather not.
5
Keatley covered the Pentagon from October 1968
through May I97G as a regular. When Levine relieved him,
Xeatley began covering the State department for the Journal *
but continued to write an occasional story on Defense.
HDobkin began covering the Pentagon as a regular on
May 1, 1970. Prior to his present assignment, he had been
a Washington correspondent for AP for a year-end-a-half and
covered the Hill. He was not amk&d questions or requested
to answer any that he felt he could not has® on his own
experience at D0D.
7Has since been reassigned to UPI State Department
desk in Washington. Ed DeLong (as indicated on September
1970 POD list) replaced him at the Pentagon.
8Hugh Ducas* AfltftSPoCB Daily, also is a stringer
for Reuters.
m
In addition to servicing the print outlets of
Pairchild* Mrs. David also does one or two radio spots
(45-seconds) for her employer's seven owned stations, plus
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10Cromlay* a syndicated columnist for KSA which
services 600 newspapers* is unique among the press corps
members. In addition to Defense, he writes columns on the
Whits Bouse* State department* and Congress* but maintains
a desk in the Pentagon press room which serves as his base
of operations. Because he is one-of-a-kind and does cover
other agencies* his responses were included in the group of
irregulars* although he has been a military correspondent
since 1946. Before going with SEA 12 years ago* he was a
Pentagon reporter for the EaUL Str^t Journal - Me has 24
years experience as a Washington correspondent.
11Rowan is no longer with CBS. Bob Schieffer began
covering the Pentagon as a regular during the period the
author conducted interviews in June 1970. Rowan had
covered the military beat since &&rch 1966.
*Th© author and Gary fcxslson made several attempts
to get together for an interview in June* but unfortunately
were unable to do so. His opinions were therefore given
via a mail questionnaire and letter which amplified the
shorter questionnaire*
* Hugh Lucas elected not to participate in the
study.
14
*^Said he spends most of his time on Aminos* w&&&«
but McGraw Bill's B. €• bureau covers VQD for 40 of its
aagasines.
ISCarter covered the Pentagon regularly for the
Norfolk (Va.) VirgAftifln-fciOat. from 1961-1965* before
joining £&i&J$S&*
Has a desk in the Pentagon press room*
17
Also has a desk in press room and covers broad
Defense matters* whils other correspondents concentrate on
individual services for Arja^, &s&y. msk £i£ Eorc& tia&eju
Returned questionnaire with letter indicating he
did not think his remarks would contribute much to the
study since Bob Schweits covers IK3D and ho specifically
covers only the Mr Force.
^Covers everything of a military nature from Maine
to Hawaii. Also has a desk in Pentagon press room and* as
is the case with Vols and Schweitz. is usually at the
Pentagon daily.
«8XMpKtfMMl ' #•• 8£>D.tV3;+ft
ri&llffer —r* sftr- -• (Mi? J«& ft
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Ho longer covers DOD, His successor wrote the
author that "unfortunately aay knowledge and experience
regarding tn© working* of the Pentagon's information
service is extremely limited* Dietrich Schulz added that
he would not be able to answer most of the questions in my
questionnaire because of his lack of experience. J^eiasler
was reassigned to Rome, Italy.
21Ho longer covers the Pentagon for USX&. Thomas
sHi aton now represents USIA.
HOTEi Although carried" on the CASD(pa) listing of
ailitarv correspondents, Sanford Watsaan, Clsvftlaral Hialtt
uuAiUtt* wrote the author that he does not cover &0t>«
»l
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ARTHUR SYLVESTER *S REMARKS
Despite the effective use of the information
function by government officials during the Cuban missile
crisis in October 1962, Defenses news policies became the
subject of bitter controversy as the international incident
faded. This new criticism of BOD information procedures
was touched off by Arthur Sylvester *s remarks made on
several different occasions.
After the Soviets had agreed to withdraw their
missiles from Cuba, Sylvester granted an interview to
Richard rryklund (then of the ffjffihAfrfft*^ £tarl during which
he said*
X cannot think of a comparable situation, but in the
kind of world we live in the generation of news by the
government becomes one weapon in a strained situation*
The results* in my opinion, justify the means. *
On October 30, Sylvester broadened his thought
before a group of reporters
t
Mews generated by actions of the government as to
content and timing are part of the arsenal of weaponry
that a President has in the application of military
force and related forces to the solution of political
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&• &• UaStSL 42*1 SorJLd. stepey* editorialised that on
October 29, 1962, Sylvester publicly admitted the govern-
ment had been using "manageRtent" and "control" over news
reports as & "weapon" to help force removal of Soviet
missiles from oases in Cuba.
In March 1963, Arthur Kroek wrota in Fortune that
the news weaponry concept had two sides, lie said its
proper use in a democracy is limited to concealing from the
enetay, military plans and movements by means of which power
is created to force the enemy* a retreat, Iaiproper use is
as propaganda in behalf of the establishment, to inflate
success or 9 loss over error, he added.
Alan L. Oiten, WMXX Stoftfc &2tt£&sl» said in 1965*
"The right to lie in a national crisis is probably ordinary
government policy; it just shouldn't have been stated in
5
public.**
Also in 1965, Fry&lund (while still a newsman) said
Sylvester was right, but added he would certainly like to
see a "minimum M of lying. However, he continued, there are
times when a public official has to stand up and tell a lie
for the good of the country. At the same time, he suggested
that reporters have an obligation to ferret out the lie and
report it for what it is.
In addition to his "news weaponry* and "news manage-
ment " remarks, Sylvester fueled the fire of media criticism
on December 6, 1962, when he addressed the deadline Club
* rrffrrr* Aiaofli Xw*. Mma •«§ «fi
•«M *i-<vo "Io*iaot>" bo* nan" &ii*v R*md fc&if *naa
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(Sigma Delta Chi Chapter) in &?w York* °. . . a government
has a right ... if necessary, to lie to save itself when
it's going up in a nuclear war.*
The &&LL&& editorial iaad on December 22, 1962* by
stating no on« disputes Sylvester's assertion that
"information is power"—Francis Bacon said that three or
four centuries agoj
As a matter of cold fact* we havo dona a good d&al
of lying whan ws? were up against it. as in the U-2
incident and at the time of the Bay of Pigs invasion.
Only, until Sylvester came along, no one tried to
defend the practice.
If it is inherently right for the governta&nt to lie
and for news media to propagate government lies, then
it must be unpatriotic to challenge those lies, both at
the time of utterance and later* at the time of
utterance, obviously, for then wa are in danger? later*
because the next time the government lies, it will not
be believed. 8
When summoned to testify on March 12, 13u3, before
the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
Sylvester slightly *sodified his opinion on the "right to
li&* statements
The government ^o&» not have a right to lie to the
Pjaople, but-, it does have, a right in facing an enemy
4Jto disseminate information wBicby is not accurate and
is intended to mislead the anemyT*
On March 23, 1963, he testified before the Mom*
Committees
The government did not have the right to lie to the
American people, but it did have the right in time of
extreme crisis to attempt to mislead the enemy, which
might in turn mislead the American people.
• -•'- •••:» ••• ' ' ' '> | | : l^pl . •:; M pi IttMt
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On January 5, 1967. Sylvester's resignation was
announced. In hi* office with & group of reporters ha
dafended the right to li© statements
i don't believe the government as a political group
of wen has a right to lie. But when a nation* 3 life i»
at stake* that takes precedence over everything, li
burin? *« interview in £pril 1&S3. Sylvester dis-
cussed his "right to lie" and "news wm*$*mg* remarks. Be
was critical of the attack* and 3t y
taped the speech (right to lie)* but got it ya^bled during
the recording. Thus, it is not possible to know what his
words were in answer to, because the question to which he
addressed himself did not come across in the recording.
Concerning the "weaponry* statement that first
appearad in the Washington $&&£,, he said he was misquoted s
The feneration of news by the ^overreaent" phrase
should have been "news generated by the actions taken
uy the government" becomes a weapon . • .
Sylvester stated he would stand by the true state-
»ent, but not the way it was originally misquoted.
Writing in defense of his "right to lie** statement,
Sylvester authored an article in the Saturday Smaifla £flftfc.
(November 1967)*
For months the news industry and others destroyed
my remarks beyond recognition, howling that they ware
proof the government was not to be believed under any
circumstances. -1 **
lie added that the late General George C. Marshall,
who served am both Secretary of State and Defense Secretary,
once gave an enlightened dissertation to newsmen on the
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strategic advantage to the military of confusing the enamy
by deliberate iaakage of misleading information to the
prase.
Martin Gershen wrote in the CQlmsbia OLourja^liaa
Jbtxisw. (1966-67) that not all accounts were fair to
Sylvester; that souk? put his words in a way to snean the
government always has a ri^ht to lie* when really Sylvester
was talking just about in times of extreme crisis* eSarshen
added » in other cases the full quotation was accurately
presented but was stretched to cover cases unrelated to
nuclear crisis. He concluded that critics of government
credibility who have used Sylvester's statement would do
14
well to fiiza their shots mors carefully.
James Reston wrote in 1967 that premature publica-
tion of the movement of American ships and m^n to intercept
the Soviet ships bringing missiles to Havana in the 1962
Cuban crisis could easily have interfered with what proved
to be an essential &nd spectacularly successful exercise of
American power and diplomacy, lie continued that responsible
officials* news reporters and executives have not he&n able
to resolve this new intelligence problem* "There is no
guiding principle that will cover all cases* yet it is
clear in this time of half-war and half-peace that the old
principle of 'publishing and be 6m&n&^' . . • can often
15damage the national interest."
. 1
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P0OTNOTS6 tO APPENDIX C
Entered into the record during hearings before the
Bouse Subcommittee on Government Information Plans and
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SAMPLES OF L&TTZHS SESTT TO COR&KSPQ8I>&»rS
May 197 Q L«>tt«r Sant to Praafittgtiva Inturvff^i
May 18, 1970
Dear /Correspondent** Maine/,
/As you know.«y I am a graduate student currently
working on a master *s degree at the University of Wisconsin.
X have been granted approval by the School of Journalism to
fulfill the thesis requirement by doing a survey research
study based on data gathered from military correspondents
in Washington, D. C. You might recall 2 was back in April
doing some background work for this effort.
It was during the period 2 spent on the Sews Desk
in the Wavy Office of Information (two years prior to
beginning my advanced studies in September, 1969) that X
gained an appreciation for the problems encountered in
reporting Defense affairs to the public*
to develop further understanding of the news-
gathering process in the Pentagon, an extensive survey of
pertinent literature was conducted to establish what views
were expressed by the media relevant to DOB information
activities agyd military correspondents during the period
19€0 through 1969.
Xt is apparent that a vast amount of diversified
material was written Mabout" the Pentagon 9ts a beat or
source; "about" the obstacles in gathering information and
reporting Defense Department newer *n$ finally, "about**
military correspondents.
1'his background research revealed two key weaknesses
in what the public has been exposed to in this contexts (1)
the majority of related written material was authored by
media representatives who had no direct association with
the Pentagon (thus their views were likely based on hearsay
or personal opinions, rather than from first-hand experi-








*theyw (the military correspondents themselves) view the
•object of the free flow of information from DOB to the
public through the media.
The purpose of thia study is to identify the
BARRIERS, *ft &BJLti»A bit laUiJUtttf JQ8MA CQggffiSgOndSfttS, in
the newsgathering process and to establish how they
evaluate their SOUBCSS of Defense news.
While numerous surveys have been made of other
segments of the Washington press corps, there has been only
one in-depth study of military correspondents. In 1940,
George Underwood completed his analysis, X&& Maahiaotaii
XXlxtJUQ/. QagrespQiMfatnts, (unpublished master's thesis.
University of Wisconsin), which constituted an examination
of "who* the military reporters were and •"how* they
operated.
Since the number of military correspondents is
relatively small, 1 think you will agree that a compre-
hensive, academic analysis will only be realised if the
widest number of correspondents agree to participate.
Vox this reason, X am asking you to spare about 43
minutes for an interview. All data gathered will be
presented ANONYMOUSLY. Your name will not appear in
connection with responses in the final analysis.
I will be in Washington to conduct the survey from
June 8 through June 1$. Upon arrival 1 will personally
contact you to discuss arrangements for an interview at
your convenience during this period.
You will be making a valued contribution to what X
hope will be a significant study to the field of journalism,
conducted in a dispassionate manner.
Looking forward to seeing you again in June.
Sincerely,
£>oug Strole
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Havy
i A*aul*ft a*
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APPENDIX D (Continued)
,ia,7,a frafcfcfig Seat With Mail-Qu^tienmurafi
September 24. 1970
Dear ^Correspondent's Ham*/.
X am a graduate student currently working on a
master's degree at the University of Wisconsin. X have
been granted approval by the School of Journalism to
fulfill the thesis requirement by doing a survey research
study based on data gathered from military correspondents
in Washington, D. e.
Prior to beginning advanced studies in September.
1969* X spent two years in the Havy's Office of Information
as a news officer in the Madia Relations Division.
The purpose of this study is to identify the
BARRIERS, as defined hy military correspondents* in the
newsgathering process at the Pentagon and to establish how
they evaluate their S0URG3S of Defense news.
During a two-week period this summer I completed
29 interviews with newsmen who concentrate primarily on
Defense news. Since another trip to Washington is not
possible. X have prepared the enclosed questionnaire in an
effort to gather data from the remainder of newsmen who
cover the military beat.
Since the total number of correspondents who cover
the Pentagon is relatively small. X think you will agree
that a comprehensive, academic analysis will only be
realised if the widest number of newsmen agree to partici-
pate. For this reason. X am asking you to spare about IS
minutes to complete the questionnaire.
All data obtained will be presented ASOmftfiOUSO*.
Your name will only appear with the listing of those who
contributed to the project, h stamped, addressed return
envelope is also enclosed.
Vou will be making a valued contribution to what t
hope will be a significant study to the journalism
community * conducted in a dispassionate manner.
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(White House) (Congress) (State) (££&&) (mc)
(Others* Specify
,_.
lb. In a usual week* what percentage of your working
time is devoted to reporting Defense news?
(less than 235*) (25-50%) (50-?$%) (Over 75%)
2. Bow «any years hav& you been a Washington correspondent?
3. What position did you hold just before being assigned to
Washington?
4. When did you begin to cover the Pentagon? .
5« How frequently do you actually cosae to the Pentagon
during a norra&i week for the purpose of gathering news?
(daily) (2-3 times a week) (once a week) (less frequently)
6* During the past year* about what percentage of your
military stories would you consider ub the result of
X8TERPR2TIW. RBPORTISG?
(less than 25%) (25-50&) (50-75%) (over 75%) (all) (DK)
7. Do you believe that most military correspondents 1^9v&
license to be completely objective in the SEI£CTXGS and
REPORTING of military news or do the *qiftffirlei policies
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9. (HAtfD CARE II)--There may be certain aources that you
would PREIKR to use, but for some reason cannot. This
may force you to use other sources in gathering material
for a story. Fro® the categories listed on this card.
Select your THR£E «most *REfER*EJ3* sources, RANKING TBBM












10. Sow RASK the top TaREE sources that you ACTU^IXY MOST
OFTES IfTILXSSE.
11. with respect to aheer V©LU3&S of Information you receive,
which would be the THRSE SOURCES that are most prolific?
Again* rank in order , with #1 being the source that
produces the greatest volume of information.
12. And finally, of the material obtained from all sources*
RAHK the THRBF that generally provide the most
SZQHIFICAWr information.
jfflMB?, IL
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13. In general, bow would you describe the military corre-
spondents" access to Paatagaa Official today?
14. What do you think causes officials not to grant inter-
views or engage in conversations with n«swsmen?
(SHOW CAR© III—USE AS ftBF£R£0C£)
iiiniwy Hit
.a. Distrust of correspondents
Jj. Hisund&rstanding of media role and/or requirements
jc. Ingrained cautiousness
Pear of reprisal
j&. Shisloing by overly-prot&ctive subordinates
Information officers discourage cineting because of
sensitive nature of area to be covered
.$• Officials blame media for current unfavorable public
opinion toward military
Ju Other (SPECIF*)*.
is* for rarer, osmnim ^vshsqh iimm mm thjq mma*
Has the accessibility of military and civilian officials
increased* stayed about the same, or decreased under the
MXXQU administration?
(increased) (about the sane) (decreased) (X>K)
15a. Sfhat do you feel has caused this?
,
—
14. FQ* TaPfiP gftTOtfflfi PrHTAflQfl I£S£ THAN TH& YJURS*
Prow your own recent experience # would you say
ACC£SSIBIi,rr* is generally increasing* remaining about
the same, or decreasing?
(increasing) (about the same) (decreasing) (&K)




17. Another factor that obviously i -ncos your source
•election is CREDIBILITY. For our purposes* CREDIBILITY
Qfi* might be defined as ths "lack of confidence—in
varying degrees—that the reporter has in the ACCURACY
or TRttrarotMBBS of Refense information. * In that
context. I'll read some sourc au tall me if you
evaluate the information transmitted from each in tents
List* this c^. (saw* c^&p xv)




r.iost Usually Reliable Seldom Hover
Always Reii- Half tha Rail- Eeli~




ci« iafenafcry, aau .IfU






/not used aitcr first three days/
tf> ftthar Kaportasa,



























how WDttld **** r*** th® c^******** of DOC
lf
"
^J°L£?L?ffici!^ ™*^x>xaux withhold unciaasi-f&od information from nawsssen during interviews?
lf
** iss^^u^r thia* ****** tb#m * wtthhox*
evaluation of source credibility?
(ya») (no)
(so o.ai)
20a. Uhat fon&e do such modifications take?
•
'<»!— I I liH Kh II
?£Jf?L ^S*??** offici«*» «r« fs*kful of mamma* ath«y'r# CASDZ& in «ipr*Miny their views even if thdydiffer with official BOB policy?
21a, (XT rm$ What do you think has generated this fear?)
21b. (Pmmt *ny differences between services?)
22. Once ACCESS ia gained to an official, does ha normally
***** your as** for information* y
23. Xngeneral, do you believe tha piiMMi of a public
JffSf* °ffiS*5 f**i»gr an interview is tm*zmmf&. canA*SW, or IH&aWT aamat to tha correspondent?
23a. iWWBBt In What ways?)
24. Of tha interviews you have conducted at tha Pentagon,
aoout what percentage wars held with a vm present?
(lass than 25*) (25^50%) (about haif) (5G-7S*)
(asora than 75%) (all) Cms)
25. Ar« you generally smt&fXm with tha -routine" perfor*-
anca ©f tha naws division (SCI) of 0A3D(*A)?
25s. (9mm t ifhat are you t)immzSFXB& with?)






26. (PROB^t tinder what circumstances do you work through
xnforsaation org ©uxaations —either OAiD(PA) or military
service information of £icos~~in making contacts with
officials?)
27 • (PKOBBt Sttoat what percentage of your contacts with
officials are made through information organisations?)
(lass than 25%) (25~50%) (about half) (50-75%)
(more than 75%) (all) (DK)
29* (This question discarded after eight interviews.
Respons&s wars just alike and it was too time eonsuar*
ing.)
iHNm C&&D V)—Sow, looking at different source mmw
in "OSD H (only)* rank the levels listod on this card in
the order you MOST OfTKM "prefer" to usa them in
0A1MP0-DA* reporting:




) |„ | iTTfT -nPlf"Kr "" n i . ii . i . i I-" 'iin mm i l
(0.28) (8. &)
LEVEL Pi.Qfia „..- ffftffrgEftftffi l&MJL
it* NBSti%h\ or hi.a &eaut,ift»
c« ftthar ftwaft
, ,Sprateria«, of tteffmaa.
vi .laWriiih fi<Lfiy„ iflffiB QffjfcCJLfli^i , , ,..,n„.. ll,,
Hi iMl* In omiiiM , , ,.,., ,
29* stank these sane source LEVELS in tanas of how you saoet
often actually UTILIZE them. (Sitter above)
30. (BAW> CMOS VI) —On THIS card axe five source LEVELS in
the sdlitary services. Rank in the order you momt
often prefer to use them*
(Q.30) (Q.31)
I£Yl«Ii IH iftfiHtVIOKfi . i i I n , .. » . ..u . W^PjysJtSIL-..- . l i. , lUElTnaHm
* SJMmiMJmSMmJu6mS£JSiSJmUkMm . u .n» ..Mm,. . .. -m. » ' iiimi«i».i ' <
«• fW ift i 4li ^*y ABl iCy.iLfiiifitii n QiUmMXitku. „ , „ . ,... , ,.,~ ,..~»,.—
.
.,. -,.. .
c« In fia graat. ion , shiftfi Qf dftgut ias , - —~~
~
<3,„.ymtg tier military affiesta »,
^JJUUsMUBiJ^SiStAncmammm m m i 1
y*~>°it 1 1 ;."'{ii - ' \. . i
4X5
OT£W>ZX X (Continued)
r^*d?™ ttl 55* °ft€m *>***«-- to get information
(0A3&/PA) (Military service) (Both) (X>epende)
3la. What aa*ee you prefer one vice tha other?
31b. Depends on what?
32
#
i#^Sn#SST would you *v«i»*** tha overall orfldu^,f,
32a. MM, Any differences *******^ aac^es^
33#
whi^J^^11*3 !*»"»"**« tall ma tha extant tohich you agrae or diaagree with each—in terms of th*categories on thia caraT (saow CARD VII)
ffiilM TIT
strongly Agree- Dis- Strongly
a. Releases













d. In general, more
A0ORS»SIVS report-
ing is aaadad by
military news
corr^p^n^fflfj,,












34. What would you say is the SINGULARLY greatest contribu-tion OASD(PA) laakas to the adlitary corresponded
35# S YS^?£5ni? ,S' a**** ao M5 Policy-makers believe isthe PRIMARY mission ©f OASD(P£)?
36. Excluding the Pentagon* give two government agencies
*5£tyou *And useful when reporting military news.(PROBE i Which is most important?)
(White Souse) (State) (Congress) (NASA) (AEC)
(other—SPECIFY) *




37 a. (PaOBEi Would you consider the Pentagon the
tightest beat in town?)
38. Are you generally satisfied with the current defense
information policies and procedures?
(yea) (no)
(TO Q.39)
3de. What are you DISSATISFIED with?)
_
39. Do you consider the present administration as beingmm
39a. (PROBEt T© what extent do you think DO© news
policies have been affected by President SXXOSfs
desire to maintain an OFE« ADMINISTRATION?)
(Any changes in OASD/FA?)
40. Concerning the whole issue of BACKOROUSDINO—what part
do you think it should play in the newsgathering
process?
40a. Do you think CREDIBILITY increases when more
official information is put Otf-THE-RECORD?
40b. Proa your experience* which of the following
phrases BEST describes DO© backgrounders (either









a. Obtained valuable information not available anywhere
else.
b. Used mostly aa a trial balloon.
p. Only a tool for OSD to preaant THEIR aide of an
IMHi
. Information offarad clarified iaauaa to pravant




40c. If backgrounders were eliminated altogether, what
affect would it hava on your abilitv to report
military news?
40d. (PROBE t Would you aay the current policy of less
ftaraal backgrounding with more Defense information
kept OH-THE-RECQHB is hftfefc»g or wern^ for the
correspondent ?
)
(better) (about the same) (worse) (8.0.)





J2i5«2^ ****** °* 25?*1®1* i>HALS WITHEMCOUTTERED I» REPORTING DQD &KWB**
** S^fliS C^?}^ ******* ***** that *syconstitute Obstaclas. Of these--or any other you mavthink of--what are the three greatest BAsAIMS ^
confronting the military correspondent in covering thePentagon? AL*> RA&K THE* tH 08BSR, l-2~3.
fiflnl L
a. Ccsaplftxity and enormity of DO©.
!^f*w ^iitUfVf ** official* to cooperate.west, and talk with newsmen.
"Wews management" (FOR otm PURPOSE* attempt toinfluence presentation of news by suppression, dis-tortion, withholding, etc.)
M«w«m. «
Secrecy or overclassification.
Oeadlines, lack of tima to delve deeply into defense
difficulty in cultivating and maintaining productive
news sources.
Lack of adequate background briefings on sensitive or
complicated areas.
h. Communications revolution over last decade (e.g..
minet*





" " " ' ' " " ' J l 'I ' 1 ' " I H I! !
42m 2?^ f*1^*^ 0*« SOD HEWS POLICIES DlMim THE 1960sHAVB STATE© THAT "MBZXLlm* THE KH.ITARV SJ£KVlSs~
2J5^flfiH^ ©facers or information organisations—
SXJ^^ISLfV ****** IWICH LSAVES LITTLE K00R »*HHAL7HY DEBATE OH JOEY ISSUES •»
&* #ftii J&eX abaufc tfci* assartign?_
42a. (PROBE* EKJ you feal that the CENTRAL CQmmt* over
news dissemination as it exists today—having
military information funnel through OASD(FA)
—
hinders your ability to covar the Pentagon OR doesit help?)
42b. (PBOBSt What do you think would happen if the
military services were given the power to release
WHAT they want, WHBS they want, and to WHOM
they want?)
I67« (XI 0M9 VQV1) Her, -i« j nO ..-.*.
*m&rimq60&
;*:.;•: 7 ; E«f»f ,
I Civ^i | -IT | •*.. -•








* ""' " —————
,
43a. (Jj; xaii In what way*. ».«. .„„,,. , ,. „invito to backgro^r.;9;; 5^* ' "**
-J— - a conation 5 & SS^KTS.*
DO WO AGRFe OR DISAGREE THAT «tar> mmi*^.. ««
44a. (Question was discard**? i» ^w*-~ *~ . „
of interview.) ° eut do*n •*•
government official aslant b-» DrA fl«„^ 4«r~ !;».
^t«Satr 2 «•?*• *" ~^™" £oi* rt.^Lan international crisis. In *>*ia ™JT«L 5 ™M M-te certain eiwuit^SSi^JL^J^to lie or present die*«»*-J* 5I2r -. , rightmm COWmm** «*••**%•« facts to avoid using
(yea) (no) (depends) (X>k)
U4a#X
* cS^LHT 2? you ****** ror this dis~^ancy? llfc&c^^^^j^^
45
- S^L^mlwS^\^^m Pfi !* «*»«* SECRECY
«**wr TBS WS FOUaf HAS A£M*¥S BBSS A 9H&BIMH.
a^e
9!^^!^ ^J^L***^ °* «*«**i*ie*tion fey DC*r XHCtHAsiae, I»SC»EI«Iho # or staying ABOUT THE S%ttT
(increasing) (decreasing) (about the sane) (BK)
(TO 0,46)
45a. lihat do you think has caused this?
\ m « I
feu I ---i.







»JWBBHbWw»*WW i iiiiini i ii mihiiiiii»»«»iiw<miiiiu m+mf -+*mm0mmmmmmmmmm»*m*m—+**kw m*mit*uwmm
a. Only legitimate classified military information
vital to national security is classified*
• DOE officials use secrecy claims because it is
easier than answering reporters* questions*
• DQD uses secrecy claims to hide errors of judgment





47. TO what extent ooes the ]&ij&halgija& qJL iflfoxmatloa by
DOD for VALE XTMY SECURITY reasons deprive the
public o£ data it needs to adequately understand defense
Issues?
43* Is the use of SECR&CY by DOD a very great problem to
^au In reporting Defense news?
49, XT HAS D0QICAL1Y BEES SUGGESTED THA, UBCY IS
WfTIHfinT AM) QSaffMMA*B IM ORDER TO PROTECT MILITARY
AMD MA7Z0SAL SECURITY. IF POSSIBLE, HOWEVEE, I&^L
SITUATION WOULD RE THE SSTABLlSliHBIi? OF SOKE KZW> OF
•PROTECTIVE" a<a*ffM to assure hot OSLY the MEDIA, EOT
TICS PUBLIC THAT THE GOV'T WOULD APPLY THE CLOAK OF
SECRECY OMLY WHSH IT WAS ABSOLUT&LY MECESSARY (the FOI
Law was such an attest) . YET, IH PRACTICE* SOME FEEL
THE ABUSE OF CI^SSIFICATIOS PERSISTS A8D PROBABLE
ALWAYS WIU.S
In this context* what go you think is the BEST defense
for a reporter against excessive secrecy
50. nave you ever been requested to withhold publication of




50a. About how many times was such a request «ade?
50b* Did you comply (Did you generally comply?)?
50c. Whan was the most recent request made?
50d. What reason (s) were given for the request?
51* Do you think such requests to withhold information frcn









52. THE PHRASE "news aanageraent" HAS mmn THE TOPIC FOR
PRESS CRITICISM EVER SIBCE JAKES RESTOH COIWfcD THE TERM
IH 1955—ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE ITSELF CAM BE TRACED BACK
TO THE' FIRST GOVERNMENT OR FIRST KEWSPAPER. YET, IT
ffAS HOT USTIL 1362, WHBH ARTHUR SYLVESTER OPEMLY
ADMITTED THAT THE GOVgRHKEHr "DID XT'* WAS THE CKITICISW
LOUDEST.
Mem ksu1& xmi £a£±m, "assm. mxi&aammt"?
53. To what degrea-~if any—does "n«Mt managawant " actually
interfere with your job of gathering and reporting
military news?
54. Do you feel you are adequately briefad**either by news
releasee* news conferences, or backgrounder*—by OSD
and the Services to STAY ABREAST OF MAJOR DBFEWSE
ACTIVITIES?
(yes) (no) (somatiiass) (H.O.)
(TO Q.5S)
54a. What araaa do you feel are weak and why?
55. Unauthorized L?;AXS havs always plagued DOD officials.
To what extent do you feel your ability to report would
be hindarad if there were HEVER any "leaks"?
(vary smch) (considerable) (some) (little)
(very little) (none) (DK)
56. The "specialist" reporter in Washington has been criti-
cised as being handicapped because ha knows HORE and
MORE about lass and lass. HOW WOULD YOU COMPARE THE
^^p jw^^ e»e"*«Hp*afle* a> w SHNCTew a<pp^ a> ewse ^jpws^^wW'^^aT^ieSWpaw^ y^$^0*w«mwe> ^e*ewewwweies, •w
WASHINGTON TODAY?
57. In general, how would you rate the caliber of military
correspondents (regulars) compared to the rest of the
Washington Press Corps?
58. Ara you generally satis fied with the routine PERFORMANCE
of other military correspondents?
59. finally**! have some hUffHaroanrt quasiIons to help
interpret the data.
FUST, what is your present age—closest birthday?










60. In what state were you born?.
61. How long have you been in th** field of JOURNALISM?
62. How long have you been with your present ©CTLET?„
63. What was the highest grade of schooling you completed?
12345678 High School9 10 11 12 e.Qiifttfu.13 14 15 16
17 IS 19 20
63a. What was your MAJOR field in college?,.
63b. IF GRADUATES, what degree (u) do you hold?_









'.:•.' - :,: i<gm WHttm Man H •*•
MAXL-Qt^TJQWBAXftEI SE**T m S&PT&MKSa 1970
1. What agencies do you cover in addition to the DefenseSepartstent?
White House Coagress„_ Others* {SPECIFY
etatis &ept.„
, Bona
2. In a usual week, what percentage of your working tin*® isdevoted to reporting Befenae news?
I*M than 25% 25~$Q&_ 50-75*
, Hore than 7Stt
3. How many years have you been a Washington correspondent?
4. What position did you hold just before being assigned to
Washington? ' '
5. Whan did you begin to cover the Pentagon?..
«—tuawtc ' l^-WI Hj>
6* How frequently do you actually exftae to the Pentagonduring a normal weak for tha purpose of gathering news?
Daily 2-3 times a week Ones a week m
bass frequently
7. Indicate in terms listed below oe««p«iyy how important
each of the SOURCES is to you in covering the Pentagon
on a routine basist
4.23
.UUP












* I?™ftl nj>M" ™w#*>T*>nirm*
Very nod- j- »
-
firaat ffitRMr a™^ rm^
r ,.^^














g. Hews briefing* (••$•«
-T—









au. Intent innal "i<e^ft*»
o. Informal aourcea in
SlOttES sources that you actually i«06T
8#
S£r\£?yw 2f!4li,s ^^^^ ***** 3f®« would mm to
u^'otn^r^Lr^ **^*°*™at- ^i« may force you toae ther «ou*c*# in gathering arterial for a etory.
^fi^?*LTS*L£^&rr^ •QWNMMi—all thing* being
•*ual~-i*AHiUEHa TH&** in ORB35R ot XWm*m& {1.2.3).
9. Mow rank the top
©WE* UTH.I3K;.
i0# SKSh'SJWV ?**** WWm of Antorwftioo you receive.
^i??*? ?1**^*11* ^^^ *>«*«*« that ar« the moit
aourca that prooueea the greatest VOttms of information.
11#







CQ.#9) (Q.#9) (Q.#10) (U.#ll)
rami VOLUHS SlOJtir-
to acTUAn,* or ikfor- icascs
JSfitS .uyiiiXssKt? EwYtHQH qjf./imfq*
a. Responses to
i-^^^.bw.wiw. »** 'am






3 * JUmtm I, irCftiiiftajKsa
k, intentional, *3ftflKa'
l» Jeaclal, ffawte iiw i'- nwiM iinwin^ ' i
at* Informal sources
in othor government
n. Formal nmim confer-
JwBBwJl i I «ii . i.i... ..!«. I... « . «ii.. l i.in.i. n
o. Military service
information organ'
12. In general, how would you describe the military
correspondents* ACCESS to Fontagon officials todays
Poor.. Fair wmmm «4Sequata__ Good Sxcellen.
13. (for those oovERiiic ra* mrnmom wm&m turn TWO XBJ&M)
mam the ACCESSIBILITY of military and civilian officials
increased, stayed about the same* or decreased under the
NIXON administration?
Stayed about the same*. POSTfS




14. What do you think cau^i officiaie not to grant inter-
vitaws or engage in conversations with newsmen? (If
more than on* list in order.)
distrust of correspondents
l*isunderstaadi»<£ of isedia role and/or requirements
_c. Ingrained cautiousness
—d. Fear of reprisal
• Shielding by overly-protective subordinates
.
Information officers and/or officials discourage
amstiao. becaaae of sensitive nature of area to be
covered
_^f. Officials blase media for current unfavorable
public opinion toward military
Other (SPECIFY/) 3
IS. Another factor that obviously influences your source
•election is CBmmt^JTi* Credibility Oap* might bedefined as the *lacfc of confidence*--in varying decrees
—that the reporter has in the ACCURACY or YaUTHFULii8*S
of information. *
In that context* evaluate the information transmitted
from each of the folloving sources In the terms listedbelow
t





Always Usually Ueliabi© Seldom Never


















—, iisfriflBi ttffifiiajji , .
n* wthftc Bmm . J3tfj>ibflASlSn
«< M i|>. nu iin .miii n imllMWW »T)i Umi wiPl il. »W l> .w»>M I in !! I Ml M IMlMBllW
i. Other military
16. In general* once ACCESS is gained to an official*
describe how he normally meets your nm»d for information*
Completely.. Aaply.,^- Adequately Marginally
Inadequately
17. Do you feel the presence of a monitor during an inter-
view is DwmxmsKfih. can assist* or MK9«f mrxm to
the military correspondent?
Detrimental Can assist 3D©esn*t matter_
IS. Of the interviews you have conducted at the Pentagon—
those set up through formal channels—about what
percentage were held with a monitor present?
Less than 25% 25-50% About half 50-75*
than 75*
19* Of the following statements, describe the extent to










Strongly agree- 0is- Strongly
oSlTllfi . i JtfflSi
a. Releases originated






b. Formal DOD news
con foronces ara held
fraquantly anaugh* , ,
c. Pentagon oorre-
spondenta should organ-*
ise FORMALLY to advance
timic intaxflm.tB,.
w««i^l<«f—IB,
d. In general, more
A0SRE8SIVB reporting
is needed toy military
iwmn rrinr^,*pQndfmt-.«»
e. Public affairs




Qetl I U lllll I II .1 M l—n l .1





g* "{tussling* of the
military services hy
DGD during the 1960s
has resulted in a
Ssteal which leavesttle room for
healthy debate on key
JmMKmmmi •> i ».»i.i i» »n« i . , , ,— n- -... ...^jh ^.., ». m i
h. "Ho Comment 1*
generally has the sens
meaning to newsmen as
a confirmation of the
information being
mmmmmmmmmmtmammmm
20. What would you say is the SXSK3ULARLY greatest contribu-





*• * source of information, would you consider m«#*at«gon a T10TOSK
-beat" (raore difficult L^information) thant «*rr*cuit to get
*. White House yaS KOb. State t*pt. Hyea Z^oc congress IZJes ZZ£
21*#
f^S? £?!K<^rl®mt®' woaid you consider it thea«»t difficult neat in Washington to cover?
: I
"' Men?**1 tH@ ** * ***** W°^* an««* «*• •***••
*•* no_
— about the sJWiu*..
22a. What do you think caused this?
23
" g^ndi™ with^/^^ ^H* °f J*" ***** *****S*?* £*? ^r* »•*•«•• information kept GtMras-WSOORE is better or worse for the military
correspondent? •
Better About the sent* Worse
23a. Why do you feel this way?
" i > i «' » . » .
SSSiS1^ 22 r****1 ***** ***** *** constituteS^iT-S SS'iS**- °* th^*~°* «V you may think
SLlslUt»^tJ"Vr*aJ#*t ******** confronting
r^mZtr^JE^T*^** iR «»«*»* the Pentagon?*lease rank thes in order, l-2~3.
a. Coaplexity and enormity of the COO.
fc. Reluctant attitude of DOD officials to cooperate,
•est, and talk with newsmen.
u ^era
_*. »ews nanagetKent" (FGft Quit *URJK>6E, attest to influ-
^UnhSlK^cT) " *""* by *********- ^-tortion,
d. Secrecy or overclaesification.
*"
issHes"?**'





lty iR ouXtAv«ting and maintaining productivemm** sources*










today, an incident is before world-wide public in
minutes)
.
.. Other (SPECIFY) s
25. Do you feel that the cantxal control over neve dis~
semination as it exists today—having militaryinformation funnel through 0£3D(P&)
—hinders your
ability to cover ths Pentagon or does it help?
HindorsL™ Makes no difference.^. Helps
26. Do you feel you are adequately briefed—either by news
releases, briefings, or backgrounders—
-by DOS officials
and the military services to stay abreast of major
defense activities?
Yes so only at times_
26a. What areas do you feel are weak and whv?
27. In general, how would you rate the caliber of military
correspondents ("regulars") compared to the rest of the
Washington press corps?
23. Most of the tist© would you say you are generally satis-
fied with the routine FEfcfOR&AUCE of other military
correspondents (both the regulars and those covering
other agencies in addition to DQD) ?
Yes no
28a. How do you feel they are not performing satisfac-
torily and why?
-B&cmm\n8> questions-
29. What is your present age—to closest birthday?
30. In what state were you born?
31. Bow long Ixbvq you been in the field of JOmH&LWH?










*** high€lSt gradl* of **•****§ you
Qrftdft gfihftffil High S^ffiffl] coll^^1234567B 910 UU 13 14 STu
^^^gritfwatrr ffftr.fr
17 ia i* 20
33a. What was your H&J0& field?
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